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1.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
Everyone who travels by train in the Netherlands knows that they have to take potential 
delays into account. For example, there might be problems with the barrier arms at a level 
crossing, forcing trains to approach it slowly. Such disturbances are annoying as they may 
mean missed connections or increased waiting times. Major disruptions, however, such as 
broken overhead wires, cause such substantial deviations from planned operations that 
these plans have to be significantly revised (Nielsen, 2011). This rescheduling is done by 
controllers working in control centres. Controllers are confronted with all sorts of unique 
and challenging disruptions on a daily basis as their job is to ensure that operations are 
adapted to contain and minimize the impact of disruptions (Golightly & Dadashi, 2017).
While in most cases operators are able to adequately manage disruptions, the past few 
years have seen a number of instances in which the system span out of control. This oc-
curred during the snowstorms of 2010, 2011 and 2012, but also more recently with power 
supply and ICT failures in 2015 and 2017. On all of these occasions, there was relatively little 
or no rail traffic in large parts of the country. Images of crowded train stations, passengers 
staring at blank departure boards, and crammed trains dominated the media. In response, 
politicians have repeatedly expressed their concerns about the poor performance of the 
Dutch railway system. In 2011 the minister even judged the system to be too complex to 
adequately anticipate and recover from large-scale disruptions (Ministerie van Infrastruc-
tuur en Milieu, 2011). These major disruptions have been extremely detrimental to the 
Dutch rail system’s image, even though overall performance in terms of punctuality has 
been good over the years. Many politicians have called for radical changes, such as placing 
ProRail under direct state control. Improving disruption management is thus a very impor-
tant challenge, one that is vital to restoring the trust of both passengers and politicians.
While these large-scale disruptions form a serious problem to the economy and society1, 
we must not forget that managing the Dutch railway system reliably poses significant 
challenges. First of all, the Dutch railway network is one of the busiest of Europe in terms of 
passenger kilometres per kilometre of railway track (Ramaekers, de Wit, & Pouwels, 2009). 
Accommodating all the different train services on this relatively small rail network makes 
it difficult to run according to schedule. Moreover, with such a tight schedule, delays will 
have knock-on-effects causing problems to spread to other parts of the network. Secondly, 
the railway system has been developed over decades and therefore its components are 
of varying ages, designs and performance characteristics (Schulman & Roe, 2007b). For 
example, the Dutch railway system has more than 7,500 switches and 10,000 signals of 
various types and ages. Over the years the system has also become more complex as new 
1 KiM (2017) calculated that the social costs caused by rail delays and disruptions ranged between 
400 and 500 million euros in 2016.
Chapter 1
12
communication, control and information technologies have been introduced to automate 
and centralize rail traffic control. For instance, signalling control has shifted from lever 
frames and control panels to computer-based control. Research by Perrow (1999) has 
shown that these systems with their complex collections of interacting components are 
prone to multiple and unexpected failures that can easily cascade. In the last couple of 
years ProRail has experienced several traffic management system failures which made it 
impossible to operate signals and switches so that rail traffic had to be stopped. Finally, the 
rail network is a large open system more than 3,000 kilometres in length that is exposed 
to all sorts of risks, such as extreme weather, suicide attempts and animals on the tracks.
De Bruijne and Van Eeten (2007) point to another important challenge for the reli-
able management of infrastructure systems like the Dutch railway system, which is 
the fragmentation of organizations that operate, manage and oversee these systems. 
Restructuring policies, including privatization, liberalization and deregulation, have 
changed infrastructure systems from large-scale integrated monopolies into networked 
systems consisting of multiple private and public organizations with competing goals and 
interests. Of course, the split-up of Netherlands Railways (NS) in the mid-nineties into the 
train operating company NS and the infrastructure manager ProRail is a prime example of 
this development. Another example is the outsourcing of the maintenance of the railway 
infrastructure to private contractors. Hence, the provision of reliable services has changed 
from being a primarily intra-organizational task to being an inter-organizational challenge 
(ibid.). While much has been written in the academic literature on railway unbundling and 
privatization (cf. Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard, & Kronborg, 2009; Finger, 2014; Gómez-Ibáñez 
& de Rus, 2006), most of these studies look at the reform policies, their implementation or 
the outcome in terms of performance. Far less attention has been paid to the effects that 
these policies have on the daily operations of controllers tasked with managing rail traffic 
and disruptions (see Steenhuisen & De Bruijne, 2009 for an exception to the rule).
With the unbundling of the rail system, rail traffic operators who used to work in one 
control centre were forced to work in separate control centres. Currently the rail traffic of all 
train operating companies (around 40 cargo and passenger service operators) is monitored 
and controlled by ProRail’s controllers working in 13 control centres spread throughout the 
country. NS has five control centres to monitor its own operations, a significant share of 
which involves managing train crew and rolling stock. Although both processes have been 
separated, there is still a massive interdependence, especially when dealing with disrup-
tions. This means that operators working in the different control centres of both companies 
have to work together closely and share a great deal of information by phone or via infor-
mation systems. In practice, however, situations during a disruption often changed faster 
than the parties could communicate and the decentralized control made it difficult to 
manage disruptions with a national impact. This is why ProRail and NS decided to develop 
a joint control centre, called the Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR).
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In the OCCR many of the parties involved in the management of the railway system 
are co-located. These parties not only include ProRail’s traffic control and NS’ operations 
control, but also the teams responsible for Incident Management, Asset Management and 
contractors. The co-location of all these parties is intended to lead to improved information 
sharing, a better understanding of each other’s roles, procedures and processes, and as a 
result, better decision making during disruptions (Goodwin, Essens, & Smith, 2012). Inside 
the OCCR, ProRail and NS monitor railway traffic at a national level and can intervene in re-
gional operations when necessary. Despite the establishment of the OCCR, however, there 
have been several large-scale disruptions in the last couple of years where the situation 
span ‘out-of-control’. One prime example of such an out-of-control situation was during a 
snowstorm on the third of February in 2012. Snowfall caused multiple malfunctions to the 
rail infrastructure and rolling stock. As a result, there were little or no train services in large 
parts of the country. An evaluation of this day by ProRail and NS revealed that the out-of-
control situation had not been caused by the snow, but by the way in which the disruptions 
had been managed (Nederlandse Spoorwegen, ProRail, & Ministerie van Infrastructuur 
en Milieu, 2012). Poor communication and slow, ill-informed decision making meant that 
people were unaware of what was really going on and what should be done. Due to the lack 
of efficient coordination2, control centres were working at cross-purposes and local deci-
sion making was encouraged. This had a negative impact on the train service as a whole 
and the management of disruptions in neighbouring control areas.
1.2  ReSeaRCh aIM aND ReSeaRCh queStIoN
As the previous section has made clear, the introduction of the OCCR as a boundary-spanning 
platform for the rail sector did not solve all the coordination issues in the Dutch rail system. 
In fact, one could say that it might have even made things more complicated by introducing 
another layer on top of the already complex network of control centres. The introduction of 
the OCCR created a multi-level networked system consisting of multiple semi-autonomous 
control centres, who pursue their own sub-goals within their own scope of action. At the 
same time they need to work together towards one overarching goal: restoring normal 
operations as soon as possible after a disruption. Achieving this overarching goal requires 
the coordinated efforts of all the control centres. As the previous section made clear, this 
is no easy task when working in a dynamic and time-pressured operational environment. 
The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of the coordination and com-
munication challenges between the different control centres during the management of 
2 Following Faraj & Xiao (2006), we define coordination as the integration of organizational work 
under conditions of task interdependence and uncertainty.
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large-scale, complex disruptions. This means that the disruption management process 
must be studied at the level of the system as a whole. We will analyze the management of 
several large-scale disruptions in the Dutch railway system and compare Dutch structures 
and practices for dealing with disruption management with those found in other European 
railway systems. The main research question is as follows:
“What explains the coordination breakdowns between the control centres in the 
Dutch railway system during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions?”
In this study we specifically look at how the control centres jointly cope with the disrup-
tions that do occur, although we acknowledge that it is also important to try to prevent 
disruptions from happening in the first place. For example, over the years ProRail has 
greatly reduced the number of switches in order to reduce the risk of malfunctions. It 
has even started to place sensors on switches to measure temperature, power usage and 
vibrations in order to predict faults. Despite these great efforts, it remains impossible to 
anticipate all events (Golightly & Dadashi, 2017). Hence, it is still very important to improve 
disruption management practices. The results of this thesis should therefore contribute 
to the improvement of the disruption management process in the Dutch rail system. Also 
provide valuable insights other rail systems and large critical infrastructure systems in 
general. Strangely enough, research on how public networks organize for a reliable service 
delivery is almost absent from the literature (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, Müller-Seitz, Raab, 
& Sydow, 2017). Academic research on railway disruption management, particularly on the 
coordination of these rescheduling activities, is still very limited (also see section 1.3). With 
this thesis we want to contribute to the literature on railway disruption management by 
addressing these coordination challenges.
This thesis also aims to contribute to the Whole System Performance of the Dutch railway 
system. ProRail and the Dutch Research Council (NWO) initiated the Whole System Perfor-
mance research programme3 (2012-2018) to improve cooperation between the many dif-
ferent stakeholders in the rail system and to advance its asset and disruption management. 
A total of four research projects contributed to this research programme. I was part of the 
research project called Managing Complex System Disruptions (MaCSyD). In this project 
researchers from VU University Amsterdam, Delft University of Technology, and Erasmus 
University Rotterdam jointly studied communication and coordination practices during the 
management of rail disruptions. This has, for example, resulted in a joint article on collective 
3 See http://explorail.verdus.nl/1334 for an English summary.
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sensemaking among operators in the OCCR during an autumn storm4, which is not part of 
this dissertation. This dissertation is one of the project’s end products and offers a systems 
perspective on disruption management by looking at the joint efforts made by the control 
centres to manage disruptions. Another end product is the dissertation of a PhD candidate 
from VU University Amsterdam (Willems, 2018). As an organizational ethnographer this 
candidate observed the daily practices of the different parties involved in the management 
of disruptions to gain a deeper understanding of these practices. The micro-perspective of 
the ethnographic study and the systems perspective of this study aimed to complement 
each other in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of rail disruption management.
In the next section we will take a closer look at the management of complex socio-tech-
nical systems in general and the literature on railway disruption management in particular. 
In section 1.4 Dynamic Network Analysis is introduced as a method to analyze coordination 
between actors in a complex system. Section 1.5 addresses the methodological challenges 
of studying disruption management and the outline of the dissertation is presented in 
section 1.6.
1.3  SCIeNtIfIC PoSItIoNING aND ReLevaNCe to the LIteRatuRe
1.3.1  Disruption management in railway systems
Operations Researchers dealing with disruption management focus on how to assist 
operators with rescheduling activities by developing algorithms and recovery models and 
implementing them in decision support systems. Disruption management deals with 
topics such as coping with disruptions, minimizing negative effects and how to minimize 
deviation costs while solving disruptions (Yu & Qi, 2004). There is extensive literature on 
disruption management and its techniques have been applied in several areas, including 
project management (Howick & Eden, 2001; Williams, Ackermann, & Eden, 2003), supply 
chain coordination (Huang, Yu, Wang, & Wang, 2006; Qi, Bard, & Yu, 2004), and airline op-
erations (Clausen, Larsen, Larsen, & Rezanova, 2010; Kohl, Larsen, Larsen, Ross, & Tiourine, 
2007; Rosenberger, Johnson, & Nemhauser, 2003). Disruption management for railway 
systems is, however, still relatively unexplored in comparison to, for example, the airline 
industry. Moreover, most of the models and algorithms developed for railway disruption 
management only cover a small part of the disruption management process, as they tend 
to focus on a specific type of disruption, a phase in the disruption management process, or 
the rescheduling of a specific resource (rolling stock, timetable, train crew) (see Cacchiani 
4 Merkus, S, Willems, TAH, Schipper, D, van Marrewijk, AH, Koppenjan, JFM, Veenswijk, M, & Bakker, 
HLM (2017). A storm is coming? Collective sensemaking and ambiguity in an inter-organizational 
team managing railway system disruptions. Journal of Change Management, 17(3), 228-248.
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et al., 2014 for an overview). However, the interdependence between tasks and resources 
is a key challenge during the management of a disruption. So far, these systems have not 
been implemented much in practice due to the lack of integrated and dynamic models and 
tools (Quaglietta, Corman, & Goverde, 2013).
While Operations Research has paid a great deal of attention to the support given to 
rescheduling activities, less attention has been paid to the coordination of these closely-
linked activities. One of the exceptions is the work of Corman and colleagues (2012; 2014), 
who assessed the performance of centralized and decentralized rescheduling approaches 
and developed algorithms to support coordination. Models are, however, simplified forms 
of reality or may even be normative, and therefore they cannot always deal with the un-
certainty and dynamics of the disruption management process (Golightly et al., 2013). In 
addition, although there has been a lot of development in terms of supporting tools, most 
of the rescheduling is still done by the different dispatchers on the basis of predefined 
rules and experience. Decisions made by individual operators or control centres are not 
necessarily optimal and might even lead to new conflicts (Kecman, Corman, D’ariano, Rob, 
& Goverde, 2013).
It is therefore important to take into account the uncertainty associated with human 
behaviour. In order to understand disruption management in the Dutch railway system it 
is vital to look at real-world cases of how the different control centres jointly respond to 
a disruption and the unexpected consequences of this adaptation process. Communica-
tion and coordination play a crucial role in this process, which is facilitated by technology. 
Hence, the Dutch railway system can be seen as a complex socio-technical system that 
is characterized by the interdependence between social and technical elements and the 
resultant behaviour that emerges from their interactions (Walker, Stanton, Salmon, & 
Jenkins, 2008).
1.3.2  the reliable management of complex socio-technical systems
In recent decades there has been a growing interest among organizational scholars in the 
conditions that influence organizations’ ability to reliably manage large-scale, complex 
socio-technical systems under a variety of dynamic conditions, i.e. an organization’s ability 
to both plan for incidents and to absorb and rebound from them in order to provide safe 
and continuous service delivery (cf. Hollnagel, Paries, David, & Wreathall, 2011; La Porte, 
1996; Perrow, 1984; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The best known examples are the studies 
on High Reliability Organizations (HRO) (La Porte, 1994; Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987; 
Rochlin, 1999). Studies on nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers have shown how these 
organizations were able to operate relatively closed complex systems safely and reliably 
over long periods of time and under trying conditions by creating appropriate structures, 
attitudes and behaviours. On the other side of the spectrum is Perrow’s (1984; 1999) Nor-
mal Accident Theory (NAT).
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As stated by Perrow, large-scale complex systems are actually prone to failure. In his stud-
ies he showed how one failure can trigger other failures and how these failures can spread 
and cascade in a way not anticipated by either the system’s designers or those operating it. 
This may cause small-scale disturbances to develop into large-scale problems that are dif-
ficult to stop and may even lead to system failure. Despite their differences, both NAT and 
HRO point to the importance of the social and organizational underpinnings of a system’s 
reliability (Sutcliffe, 2011). Many studies address the limitations of traditional hierarchical 
systems in effectively coping within complex, ambiguous and unstable task environments 
(Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Woods & Branlat, 2011a). The core assets of these systems stan-
dardization, formalization and hierarchy severely limit the flexibility needed to operate in 
these environments. Within the organizational literature two important trade-offs can be 
identified in the reliable management of these systems: a) decentralized versus centralized 
structures and b) anticipation versus resilience.
According to Perrow (1984; 1999), complex and tightly-coupled systems must simultane-
ously be centralized and decentralized, which he deemed an unsolvable problem. Highly-
centralized authority structures are needed to facilitate rapid and decisive coordinated 
action, given the tight coupling of systems and the risk of cascading failures. Decentralized 
systems are too slow to handle cascading failures. The latter is also a problem in the Dutch 
railway system. For example, evaluations of two large-scale disruptions during the winter 
of 2012 showed that situations would often change faster than operators could coordinate 
and deal with (Nederlandse Spoorwegen et al., 2012). Moreover, the system’s decentralized 
nature led to local optimization, as local problems were unintentionally spread to other 
control areas. Nevertheless, decentralized decision-making remains necessary in order to 
deal with the interactive complexity of systems and the unpredictable problems resulting 
from this complexity. Decentralized units are better able to manage these non-routine 
situations given their local expertise and more direct control over resources (Perrow, 1999). 
For example, train dispatchers’ detailed knowledge of the rail network helps them to find 
improvised solutions in order to reroute trains.
Other researchers provide an alternative view on the tension between centralization and 
decentralization (cf. Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Branlat & Woods, 2010; Gauthereau & Hollna-
gel, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). For instance, Gauthereau & Hollnagel (2005) state that 
centralized structures do not always need to limit organizational flexibility and that both 
decentralized and centralized forms of governance must be present at the same time. They 
showed how central planning offered a framework that supported the coordination of local 
adaptation. This kind of control is also known as polycentric control (Branlat & Woods, 2010; 
Woods & Branlat, 2010). Polycentric control seeks to sustain a dynamic balance between 
the two layers of control, i.e. those closer to the basic processes and with a narrower field 
of view and scope (e.g. regional control centres) and those farther removed, which have a 
wider field of view and scope (e.g. the OCCR), as situations evolve and priorities change. So 
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instead of being centralized or decentralized, autonomy and authority should be adapted 
to the pace of operation. Nevertheless, much remains unclear about polycentric systems 
and the coordination challenges that follow from this dynamic form of governance.
Another important tension is that between anticipation and resilience (Roe & Schulman, 
2008; Wildavsky, 1988). According to the anticipation approach a system’s reliability stems 
from constant and predictable performance. The anticipation approach involves predict-
ing potential failures or disruptions in order to plan ahead (Stephenson, 2010). Designed 
coordination mechanisms, such as protocols, rules and contingency plans, prescribe what 
operators should do in the event of a disruption and how they should work together. This is 
intended to increase the system’s responsiveness as it reduces coordination issues between 
actors. However, it has been shown that it is extremely difficult to anticipate every contin-
gency, as the type, timing and location of an incident make disruption management very 
unpredictable (Golightly & Dadashi, 2017). An over-reliance on anticipation can thus cause 
a loss of capacity to adapt to unanticipated situations. Hence, Woods & Wreathall (2008) 
distinguish two types of adaptive capacity: first order and second order. First order adap-
tive capacity involves responding to anticipated events according to predefined procedures, 
plans and roles, while second order adaptive capacity emerges when operators dynami-
cally respond to non-anticipated situations by means of, for example, mutual adjustment, 
informal communication, and improvisation.
The second order adaptive capacity or resilience approach to reliability substitutes fore-
sight for the reactive capacity of systems to recognize and adapt to changing conditions 
in order to maintain control (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). In other words, there needs to be 
discretionary room for operators to respond to the specific situation through mutual ad-
justment and improvisation (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). However, this does not mean that formal 
modes of coordination can just be abandoned. As Kendra & Wachtendorf (2003) observe, 
anticipation is an integral dimension of resilience, as planning and formalizing response 
arrangements help actors to make sense of a particular situation and facilitate a rapid and 
flexible response. This means that anticipation and resilience are not mutually exclusive 
and that both approaches need to coexist.
Organizations operating in a dynamic and complex environment thus paradoxically em-
phasize both formal and improvised forms of coordination (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). Operators 
working in control centres are confronted by these trade-offs on a daily basis. They have 
to decide between following design principles and relying on improvisation and between 
hierarchical and on-the-spot decision making (Schulman & Roe, 2011). Operators not only 
have to deal with often unique disruptions, but these disruptions also tend to be very 
dynamic as conditions often change fast. This makes it difficult to create a good under-
standing of the situation, since information is often ambiguous, quickly outdated, and only 
becomes available gradually (Nielsen, 2011). For example, in the case of a broken catenary a 
repair crew has to go on site to make an accurate estimation of the damage and the repair 
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time. An effective and timely response to a disruption depends on the operators’ ability to 
quickly create an understanding of the evolving situation (Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2008). 
This process is called sensemaking and involves the creation of a plausible understanding 
of a situation and the continuous updating and revising of this understanding to deal with 
uncertainty and the dynamics of the environment (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).
Operators thus not only need to coordinate their activities, but must also do this in an 
adaptive fashion (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006). Most research has focused on 
these coordination and adaptation challenges in complex, dynamic and time-pressured en-
vironments from the point of view of co-located teams (Ren, Kiesler, & Fussell, 2008). In this 
thesis, however, the focus is on the network of control centres, separated by geographical 
and organizational boundaries. There is limited knowledge on the challenges of coordinat-
ing activities between distributed teams, despite the fact that these teams have to deal 
with unique communication and coordination challenges that must be managed properly 
(Fiore, Salas, Cuevas, & Bowers, 2003). For instance, geographically distributed teams have 
to rely on technology (phone, computer, and video) to communicate instead of being able 
to talk face-to-face like co-located teams. The use of technology has an important impact 
on the sharing and interpretation of information (Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008). In the 
next section I will elaborate more on these specific challenges by turning to the literature 
on Multiteam Systems.
1.3.3  the Dutch railway system as a multiteam system
Each control centre can be seen as a team pursuing their own sub-goals and tasks (manag-
ing train crew or optimizing rail traffic flows). These individual teams are tied together by a 
collective goal, which in this thesis is the management of a disruption. This tightly-coupled 
network of control centres forms a Multiteam System (MTS). Multiteam systems have been 
defined as two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently in response to 
environmental contingencies in order to accomplish collective goals (Mathieu, Marks, & 
Zaccaro, 2001). Multiteam systems differ from most other organizational forms in that 
they work in highly dynamic and complex environments and thus must be able to respond 
rapidly to changing circumstances under high time-pressure. This places a premium on the 
teams’ ability to bring together their skills and knowledge to tackle novel and surprising 
events (Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012). Moreover, as in the Dutch railway system, MTSs 
are often made up of teams from different organizations.
As Mathieu and colleagues (2001) state, the high interdependency between teams 
makes MTS more than just the sum of individual team activities. It is therefore necessary 
to examine the teams’ joint efforts in order to understand the workings of the system as a 
whole. As such, MTSs form a new and unique level of analysis with their own unique chal-
lenges, which might not be fully explained by traditional team or organizational research 
literature. As Lanaj et al. (2013) observe, factors that contribute to processes within teams 
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might hinder processes between teams and therefore well-accepted theories on stand-
alone teams (e.g. on leadership, communication, and coordination) might not apply to MTS. 
For instance, while HRO literature stresses the importance of a free flow of information 
between operators to coordinate activities and pick up warning signs, research has shown 
that geographically separated teams experience difficulties in distributing information 
evenly, accurately and on time (Hinds & McGrath, 2006). Moreover, a system with different 
specialized component teams may also lead to diverging definitions of shared problems 
and a focus on in-group goals at the expense of collective goals (Davison, Hollenbeck, 
Barnes, Sleesman, & Ilgen, 2012).
While MTS might have been around for decades, team researchers only defined the con-
struct at the beginning of this century and therefore MTS research is a relatively new field. 
Initial research adopted a grounded approach to study this organizational form in practice, 
but much of the subsequent work has either been done in laboratory settings or is theoreti-
cal (Shuffler, Rico, & Salas, 2014). Although MTSs operate in turbulent environments, not 
much research has focused on how these systems adapt or fail to adapt to contingencies 
(Shuffler, Jiménez-Rodríguez, & Kramer, 2015). Hence, there is still much to learn about the 
unique properties and challenges of MTS in a real-world context.
As has been mentioned in the previous section, an effective and timely response to a 
disruption requires a thorough understanding of the situation. In the Dutch railway system 
multiple teams adapt to changes in the environment. This means that sensemaking is not 
only distributed over multiple roles, but also over multiple control centres. Consequently, 
operators and teams need to share important information on their understanding of the 
dynamic environment in order to align their activities. This understanding of a complex 
and dynamic situation is called situation awareness (Uitdewilligen, 2011). For example, 
while it might be beneficial for one team to deviate from procedures, this decision could 
result in a great deal of confusion among the other teams and have a negative effect on the 
system’s overall performance if it is made in isolation (Woods & Shattuck, 2000). Effective 
disruption management thus not only depends on the capabilities of single teams to create 
a good understanding of the situation and decide on an appropriate response, but also on 
how these decisions are coordinated with other teams. In this thesis we will zoom in on 
the role of sensemaking and the difficulties inherent to creating and maintaining a shared 
understanding between distributed teams.
In terms of the second trade-off, the need for both centralized and decentralized forms of 
control places an emphasis on the capacity of supervisory or leader teams (cf. Davison et al., 
2012; DeChurch & Marks, 2006; DeChurch et al., 2011) to balance autonomy and authority 
between local and central control centres (Shattuck & Woods, 2000). Too much autonomy 
for local teams when adapting to local situations could lead to a fragmented response to 
a disruption, while centralized control through centralized decision-making and planning 
might be too rigid to deal with unanticipated situations. Leader teams thus need to balance 
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the risk of teams working at cross-purposes against that of implementing an inadequate 
response to changing conditions. Making this trade-off is not only difficult for leaders in 
single teams, but is especially difficult for remote leader teams as they have to make sense 
of the situation from a distance. In this thesis we will look at the challenges that leader 
teams encounter when balancing this trade-off and compare five European rail systems on 
how they structure the relationship between local and centralized control.
1.4  INveStIGatING a CoMPLex MuLtIteaM SySteM uSING SoCIaL NetwoRk 
aNaLySIS
Examining a complex multiteam system does not only provide a unique level of analysis, 
but also presents the unique challenges of studying such a system. The large size of a 
MTS, along with the specialized nature of the task and goals of the operators and teams, 
makes it difficult to analyze complex socio-technical systems. As mentioned earlier, MTSs, 
like any other complex system, are more than the sum of individual team efforts. The dif-
ferent teams need to maintain a shared situation awareness in order to coordinate their 
activities. They do this by exchanging information. Hence, it is important to study the 
interactions between the different teams and the resultant emergent behaviour (Stanton, 
2014). One of the methods commonly used to study flows of information is Social Network 
Analysis (SNA). SNA has been used to study coordination in a wide variety of fields, such as 
emergency response management (e.g. Kapucu, 2005; Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) and hospitals (e.g. Hossain, Guan, & Chun, 2012). SNA is seen as a valuable tool for 
studying coordination, but as far as I know it has not been applied to studies on railway 
disruption management. That is why in this thesis it is argued and shown how SNA can be 
applied to study railway disruption management.
The way in which information is communicated and distributed affects team perfor-
mance (Parush et al., 2011). This makes it important to understand how information is 
shared between teams and how this affects team dynamics. SNA makes it possible to 
obtain a systematic overview of the network of control centres and their relationships 
(linkages) as they respond to a disruption. These linkages affect the kind of information 
that is being exchanged, between whom and to what extent (Haythornthwaite, 1996). 
SNA is not only a method for visualizing networks, but also for quantitatively assessing the 
communication patterns and the role of actors within a network. This makes it possible to 
investigate the involvement of a specific actor or how flows of information deviate from 
formal procedures. This renders SNA especially suitable for studying coordination in a dis-
tributed setting as these kinds of insights may help to identify problems that are inhibiting 
coordination (Hossain & Kuti, 2010).
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SNA, however, has its limitations (cf. Schipper & Spekkink, 2015). It focuses on mapping 
networks and measuring their characteristics. This emphasis on the structure of networks 
has mostly resulted in static representations of networks to understand how these struc-
tural properties affect certain outcomes. In this chapter we have repeatedly argued that 
disruption management is an emergent and dynamic process. Hence, the changing pat-
terns of communication and roles of actors or teams within the network are lost when only 
a snapshot of the network at one point in time is provided. We will show in chapter 2 how 
the role of time can be included to capture the network’s dynamics during the manage-
ment of disruptions. A better understanding of these network dynamics can help improve 
coordination between the teams (Abbasi & Kapucu, 2012).
Secondly, although network analysis is a great method for revealing and quantitatively 
assessing communication patterns, it is largely blind to the content of the information 
being shared, how the information is communicated, and how actors respond to this 
information. Each actor interprets and uses the information in their own way based on 
their roles, tasks, and experience (Salmon et al., 2008). This is why actors have to collec-
tively make sense of the information being shared. Hence, a quantitative analysis of the 
information flows should be combined with a qualitative analysis of the interactions (e.g. 
communication content and style) between actors. In the last couple of years there have 
been increased calls for a more qualitative approach to SNA (e.g. Crossley, 2010; Edwards 
& Crossley, 2009; Heath, Fuller, & Johnston, 2009). Nevertheless, the number of studies 
providing such a mixed-method approach is limited. In this thesis it is shown how dynamic 
network analysis can be combined with a qualitative analysis of how actors made sense of 
the information being shared.
1.5  MethoDoLoGICaL ChaLLeNGeS IN StuDyING DISRuPtIoN 
MaNaGeMeNt
To assess a system’s adaptive capacity, a common practice is to look at how it responds to 
disruptions (Woods & Cook, 2006). Such an analysis provides information on how well the 
system copes with increasing demands and reveals important coordination patterns and 
challenges. Disruptions that push the system near the limits of its performance boundaries 
are especially important, as they provide insight into both hidden sources of adaptiveness 
and a system’s capacity limits (ibid). Large-scale, non-routine disruptions are thus particu-
larly suitable for revealing these boundary conditions, as effective coordination becomes 
especially important and difficult to maintain during these situations (Uitdewilligen, 2011). 
The analysis of disruption management fits within a Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
or Macrocognition approach (cf. Klein & Wright, 2016; Schraagen, Klein, & Hoffman, 2008). 
Macrocognition is concerned with cognitive processes, such as sensemaking, coordination, 
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adaptation, planning and replanning, by experts in complex real-world settings under 
time pressure and uncertainty, as opposed to often applied controlled laboratory studies of 
isolated cognitive functions. Macrocognitive research thus tries to better understand how 
teams work together and adapt to situations in natural settings.
Studying disruption management in practice poses certain methodological challenges, 
given the unexpected nature of disruptions and the difficulties in collecting data. One of the 
most commonly used methodological approaches to collecting data on operators’ activities 
is direct observation (Branlat, Fern, Voshell, & Trent, 2009). While observations are valuable 
for collecting data on the behaviour of one operator or a small group of operators work-
ing in close proximity, it is far more challenging to observe the work of operators who are 
geographically separated. It is difficult to plan these observations given the uncertainty of 
when and where a disruption will occur. As such, direct observation requires several trained 
researchers to spend a lot of time at the various control centres. This is a problem given the 
limited amount of resources available. Another well-known method of data collection is 
the use of retrospective interviews. Nevertheless, as we noticed during our research and as 
has been shown in other studies, people working under stress tend to find it more difficult 
to recall details accurately. As Aiken & Hanges (2012) observe, the pressure of the moment 
might override rational thought and response. This makes it difficult to ask respondents to 
reconstruct specific events or apply self-report measurements, and even more difficult to 
try to reconstruct flows of information solely on the basis of interviews or surveys.
Luckily, after a year we were granted restricted access to recordings of telephone con-
versations between ProRail operators. Unfortunately, NS could not make their recordings 
available. The telephone conversations had been recorded for legal (safety critical com-
munication) and training purposes. For my research they were a crucial source of data 
that enabled me to study the flows and content of the communication between operators 
working at different control rooms and to understand how they collectively made sense 
of this information. Nevertheless, studying the communication between operators in the 
Dutch rail system proved to be a challenge on its own. The rail system is known for its use 
of jargon, speaking in terms of train numbers and an excessive use of abbreviations. For 
operators this jargon is part of their identity and even a way to exclude outsiders. This 
meant that I had to quickly learn the language used in the Dutch rail system.
Another challenge when studying a multi-team system is that people can perfectly 
explain their own role in a process, but are only able to give a very general overview of 
how the entire system works. This meant that I had to become familiar with the different 
roles and teams within the system in order to understand what they do and how they 
work together. I also had to familiarize myself with the technological systems they use, as 
these systems are critical in their daily work. This is why, in addition to analyzing large-scale 
disruptions, I also made several site visits to the various control centres of both ProRail and 
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NS, spent numerous hours observing and interviewing operators during their daily work 
and attended their training sessions.
ProRail granted us unrestricted access to the OCCR and appointed a research coach who 
showed us around and quickly made us familiar with the different parties located in the 
national control centre. Our research coach also played an important role in updating us on 
important developments in the rail system and helping us to get in contact with people. 
The OCCR proved to be a great site to learn a lot about disruption management and to 
talk with operators from the different teams involved in the process. At this early stage in 
the research interviews were often open and informal. I asked operators to tell me about 
their role in general and more specifically during the management of a disruption. Another 
important topic concerned the difficulties encountered when managing disruptions and 
the relationship with the other teams involved in the process. Detailed notes were made 
of the interviews and observations. Sometimes I would observe and interview an operator 
during his or her shift, which could start early in the morning (7 am to 3 pm) or late in the 
afternoon (3 pm to 11 pm). There were also days in which I would switch between opera-
tors or teams. Later on I arranged site visits to the regional control centres of both ProRail 
and NS. I usually met with the team or shift leader at the beginning of their shift. After I 
had carefully explained the reason for my visit, they would show me around, introduce the 
different roles in the control centres, and made it possible for me to observe and interview 
different operators.
The unpredictable nature of disruptions also poses some interesting challenges when 
selecting disruptions to investigate. Large-scale disruptions do not happen that often 
(although some passengers might think otherwise) and are therefore easy to miss. As I was 
not always present at the OCCR, I had to rely on other sources for information on disruptions 
that had occurred. I found that the mass media could be used as a source of information on 
major disruptions. To gain more details on the disruptions our research coach put me on a 
mailing list to receive OCCR shift reports four times a day, management reports on large-
scale disruptions, and management text messages. Of course, our research coach was also 
an important source of information on disruptions and he helped me to contact the people 
involved in the management of the disruption. These sources helped me to select cases to 
investigate further.
Despite having access to recordings of telephone conversations, interviews remained 
important as they allowed the operators to reflect on the course of events and provide 
clarification on matters. As mentioned before, it is difficult for operators who work un-
der stress to provide detailed accounts of events, especially when they have to deal with 
multiple disruptions on a daily basis. Hence, it was crucial to approach respondents soon 
after a disruption had occurred. This meant that disruptions which occurred a considerable 
time ago were less suitable cases for investigation. Understanding disruption management 
from a multiteam system perspective, i.e. how multiple teams function, also contributed 
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to the difficulties of collecting data. For example, access to the recordings of the telephone 
conversations and respondents depended on the willingness of the managers of each 
control centre to cooperate with the research.
1.6  outLINe of the DISSeRtatIoN
This thesis is article-based. This means that the four empirical chapters of this disserta-
tion are based on articles which have been submitted to international peer-reviewed 
journals. The four articles have been published in the following journals: European Journal 
of Transport and Infrastructure Research; Complexity, Governance & Networks; Cognition, 
Technology & Work, and Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management. Three out of 
the four articles have been co-authored, but as the first author I took the lead in the data 
collection, analysis, and writing of the manuscript. In one of the articles I am the single 
author. The articles stand alone and thus the chapters can be read independently, but each 
article builds on previous publications.
Chapter 2 starts with the first empirical study in which we will demonstrate the tools of 
Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) to study the flows of information during a minor disrup-
tion. DNA makes it possible to include the element of time in SNA and thus to take the 
dynamics of the information flows and the positions of actors in the network into account. 
We will use DNA to visualize and analyze the communication patterns between operators 
involved in the disruption management process and to identify potential coordination is-
sues.
Chapter 3 presents an in-depth case study of how a coordination breakdown between 
the different teams in the Dutch rail system led to the decision to stop the train service at 
two major stations during rush hour. In this study we apply a mixed-methods approach to 
explain this coordination breakdown by looking at both the flows of information between 
actors using DNA, as well as how actors collectively make sense of the information be-
ing shared. This study shows how teams, by deviating from standard procedures, create 
ambiguity for the other teams in the network and how they have to collectively make 
sense of the new situation in order to create a congruent understanding. In this study we 
will illustrate how specific labels and the procedures they trigger may actually hinder the 
development of a sufficiently-shared understanding between teams.
Chapter 4 addresses the need for polycentric control in order to secure a system’s adap-
tive capacity. Regional control centres are needed to quickly respond to disruptions, while 
leader teams are necessary to synchronize the activities of the regional control centres and 
to secure system level goals. In this study we will look at how operators in the OCCR provide 
leadership during the management of two large-scale, complex disruptions and the main 
challenges these leader teams encounter when providing leadership in a multiteam system.
Chapter 1
26
In Chapter 5 we will make a comparison of how disruption management is organized in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. This comparison is structured 
around the two trade-offs identified in this chapter: centralized versus decentralized and 
anticipation versus resilience. In this study we will show the differences and similarities in 
how the different rail systems have dealt with these trade-offs.
Finally, in the concluding chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 6), an answer will be 
provided to the main research question on the basis of the main findings of this study. We 
will also discuss the practical, methodological and theoretical implications of this research, 
along with suggestions for future research.


ChaPteR 2
A Dynamic Network Analysis of rail 
disruption management
This chapter is published as:
Schipper, D., Gerrits, L. & Koppenjan, J.F.M. (2015). A dynamic network analysis of the information 
fl ows during the management of a railway disruption. European Journal of Transport and 
Infrastructure Research, 15 (4), 442-464.
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aBStRaCt
Railway systems experience disruptions on a daily basis. We test the use of Dynamic 
Network Analysis as a methodological tool in order to investigate the communication 
patterns during the dynamic process of disruption management. The tool was applied to 
a simulated case of a catenary failure in the Dutch railway system. DNA provides a sys-
tematic overview of the communication patterns and tasks associated with the disruption 
management process. Key actors were identified and the overall structure of the network 
analyzed. The dynamic component to our network analysis revealed that information is be-
ing shared within disconnected parts of the network during the first few minutes, without 
those parts having a direct link to the source of the information. These findings show that 
employing only static analysis of networks obscures the real dynamics of information shar-
ing during railway disruptions and potential coordination problems. DNA therefore can be 
an important method and tool to reveal issues that need to be resolved.
31
A Dynamic Network Analysis of rail disruption management
Ch
ap
te
r 
2
2.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
The Dutch railway network is the busiest of Europe in terms of passenger kilometers per 
kilometer of railway track (Ramaekers et al., 2009). Accommodating all the different train 
services on the relatively small rail network makes it difficult to run according to schedule 
and delays can easily have knock-on-effects causing problems to spread to other parts of 
the network. This makes the Dutch railway system highly vulnerable to disruptions, i.e. an 
event or a series of events that leads to substantial deviations from planned operations 
(Nielsen, 2011). Nevertheless, the overall performance of the railway system in terms of 
punctuality has been good in the previous years. However, as the winter seasons often 
demonstrate: when things go wrong they tend to go wrong on a large-scale, leading to loss 
of control and long recovery phases.
These major disruptions lead to dissatisfaction among travelers, extra expenses, and rev-
enue losses. In response, train operating companies (TOCs), infrastructure provider ProRail, 
and the Dutch government have sought ways to improve operational performance. As the 
possibilities to expand the infrastructure capacity are limited, due to financial and envi-
ronmental constraints, most of these resources have been aimed at reducing the system’s 
vulnerability, i.e. increasing its robustness to absorb shocks and to improve its capacity to 
recover from disruptions. Simplification of the infrastructure (unbundling of nodes, reduc-
ing the number of switches), time table and logistics is considered to contribute to the 
robustness of the system (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011). One major vulner-
ability is the coordination between the different parties involved in managing disruptions 
(Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011). This process has become so complex that 
that it is considered unsuitable to anticipate and recover from disturbances (ibid.). A pos-
sible solution would be to reduce the number of actors involved and to introduce stricter 
procedures in an attempt to bring down the diversity in possible behavioral responses (Sut-
cliffe & Vogus, 2003). While this may help in coping with most of the common disruptions, 
research shows that optimization of existing systems has a limited impact, there is a trade-
off between optimization and brittleness in the face of novel events and uncertainties (cf. 
Csete & Doyle, 2002; Hoffman & Woods, 2011; Woods & Branlat, 2011a).
We understand the railway system as being a complex socio-technical system (cf. 
Comfort, 2005; Walker et al., 2008) that consists of several social subsystems, each with 
particular goals, perceptions, tasks and resources. These geographically separated subsys-
tems have to coordinate their activities during a disruption in order to return to the original 
operational plan as quickly as possible (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). Coordination relies 
on effective communication in such complex systems (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Gittell, 2011; 
Ren et al., 2008). While most policies and research focus on reducing this complexity, fewer 
(empirical) studies have focused on understanding and harnessing the complexity of dis-
ruption management. A comprehensive overview of who does what during a disruption 
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and of how information is being shared between actors in the Dutch railway system is 
therefore still missing.
In this article we want to propose and demonstrate a method with which such a com-
prehensive understanding of the complex communication patterns during disruption 
management can be mapped and analyzed. Visualizing and analyzing network structures 
can reveal properties of the operation of the railway system that might not be obvious from 
standards operating procedures (Houghton et al., 2006). Naturally, that requires collecting, 
structuring and analyzing a considerable amount of data. We propose Dynamic Network 
Analysis (DNA) as a promising method and tool for such an endeavor because it allows cap-
turing the irregular flows of information during a disruption, in contrast to the more static 
tools of traditional social network analysis. However, to our knowledge DNA (or even SNA) 
has not been applied to studies on railway disruptions. These considerations lead to us to 
the following research question: How can DNA help to investigate coordination between 
the geographically distributed teams involved in the management of a railway disruption? 
We will use an example of a failing catenary to demonstrate the various aspects of DNA.
We will first discuss the properties that make disruption management so complex and the 
need for DNA (section 2.2). Next, DNA will be presented (section 2.3), followed by the research 
methodology (section 2.4). A short overview of how disruptions are managed in the Dutch 
railway system is provided in section 2.5. The results of applying DNA to the catenary failure are 
presented in section 2.6 followed by a discussion (section 2.7), and the conclusions (section 2.8).
2.2  the CoMPLexIty of MaNaGING RaILway DISRuPtIoNS
There is a growing interest among theorist in conditions that influence organizations to 
reliably manage large and complex technical systems (cf. Hollnagel et al., 2011; La Porte, 
1994; Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Perrow, 1999; Rochlin et al., 1987; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). A breakdown of the services that such systems provide can 
cause very serious problems to the economy and society (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007). 
Consequently, protecting these systems against failures, or making sure that they can be 
rapidly restored, has become an important objective. Paradoxically, while there is a growing 
demand for high-reliable services, we have witnessed the dismantling of the organizations 
operating these systems (Schulman, Roe, Eeten, & Bruijne, 2004). Under the influence of 
restructuring policies, the provision of reliable services has shifted from a primarily intra-
organizational task to an inter-organizational challenge (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007).
These now multi-layered networked systems, such as the one this chapter focuses on, 
have to deal with dispersed authority, information asymmetry and consist of organizations 
with diverging goals and specialized tasks, which may be mutually conflicting (Branlat & 
Woods, 2010; De Bruijne, 2006; Ren et al., 2008; Woods & Branlat, 2010). Providing reli-
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able services therefore requires multiple teams who are separated by organizational and 
geographical boundaries, to align their goals and activities. However, as De Bruijne (2006) 
notes, a thorough understanding of how networks of organizations operate and coordinate 
their actions to reliably operate complex technological systems is still lacking.
The volatility and complexity of the networked system means that operators will increas-
ingly have to deal with unexpected conditions. In these cases they cannot always rely on 
predefined protocols or contingency plans. Schulman et al. (2004) & De Bruijne & Van Eeten 
(2007) point to the increasing importance of flexible response capabilities to maintain 
reliable services in complex networked systems. This means that operations move from 
long-term planning to real-time operations, with a central role for dispatchers and opera-
tors, who need to make constant adjustments to the planned operations.
Adaptation in networked systems however has it challenges. Each disruption is somehow 
unique and how it propagates is difficult to predict (Törnquist, 2007). A disruption is a de-
veloping situation where the knowledge of the state of the system only gradually becomes 
available (Nielsen, 2011). This means that adaptation is done under pressure in a dynamic 
environment, which affects the solution options available (Kohl et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2011). 
There is a considerable tension between fast decision-making and gathering the right 
information to make an informed decision. Decision-making therefore takes place under 
conditions of uncertainty, stress and imperfect information, which is also spread among 
the different organizations (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997).
Besides, there is the complication of subsystems being simultaneously autonomous and 
interdependent (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999). Subsystems operate independently of other 
subsystems. However, they do this in the context of networks of interdependencies with 
other subsystems and cross-scale interactions, which will have implications at the system 
level (Branlat & Woods, 2010). The thirteen traffic control centres of ProRail are a prime 
example of this. As each control centre has its own bounded geographical area for which it 
is responsible, traffic controllers will make decisions based on local information. However, 
most trains cross several control areas, so decisions made by one traffic controller will 
impact train traffic in another area. Each individual action may affect the ability of others 
to manage the system reliably (De Bruijne, 2006).
In addition, given the many subsystems and the complex relations between these in-
teracting subsystems (Perrow, 1984; 1999), local failures can easily cascade and reinforce 
through the system, e.g. local problems in one control area can be amplified unintentionally 
by the traffic controller in the next area, thereby creating a cascade of failures and correc-
tive measures (Nederlandse Spoorwegen et al., 2012). This explains the non-linear effect 
where two or more small disturbances can lead to a system breakdown, such as often oc-
cur during winter seasons, when initial disturbances are aggravated because the complex 
interactions and ambiguous couplings reinforce the non-linear relationship between local 
actions and the systemic whole (Leveson et al., 2009).
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The uncertainty, time pressure and the interdependence of activities during a disruption 
increases the need for coordination and thus the exchange of up-to-date information be-
tween the different actors in order to return to normal operation as soon as possible (Faraj 
& Xiao, 2006; Ren et al., 2008). However, sharing information in complex and dynamic 
situations has proven to be difficult (cf. Bharosa et al., 2010; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Kapucu, 
2006). These difficulties are reinforced by the poor communications endemic to those 
across organizational boundaries and between distributed teams (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 
2000). Distributed teams are known for having difficulties in sharing information evenly, 
accurately, and when needed (Hinds & McGrath, 2006).
It is necessary to understand how actors connect and share information during a disrup-
tion. As Ren et al. (2008) mention, most research focuses on the processes from the point of 
view of one focal actor or a co-located group to understand information exchange. Only a 
few studies have taken the whole network as their unit of analysis (cf. Hossain & Kuti, 2010; 
Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Following Hinds & McGrath (2006) and 
Hosain & Kuti (2010), we believe that the whole network needs to be studied in order to 
gain insights into how the communication structure affects its capacity to coordinate. We 
will introduce Dynamic Network Analysis as a method that allows such an analysis of the 
network. Not only does it enhance our understanding of the communication patterns and 
interdependencies of the network, but it also shows its dynamics during the process of 
disruption management.
2.3  DyNaMIC NetwoRk aNaLySIS
Dynamic Network Analysis or DNA, is rooted in Social Network Analysis or SNA. SNA was 
developed to highlight and analyze formal and informal relationships. It helps to collect 
and analyze data from multiple interacting individuals or organizations (Provan, Veazie, 
Staten, & Teufel-Shone, 2005). SNA focuses on relationships between actors instead of the 
attributes of individuals. As such, it emphasizes the importance of relationships for the 
exchange of resources like information (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It is these patterns of 
relationships (linkages) between actors (nodes) that affect the kind of information that is 
being exchanged, between whom and to what extent (Haythornthwaite, 1996). The pat-
terns of information flows through time and space can then be quantitatively analyzed. To 
this aim, several metrics have been developed for both the node level and the network level 
(Kim, Choi, Yan, & Dooley, 2011). Using these metrics makes it possible to quantitatively 
assess how the general network structure and the positioning of each organization within 
the network influence the information that is conveyed through the network (Provan et al., 
2007).
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Traditionally, SNA work is a strongly quantitative method focused on small, bounded 
networks, with a focus on one type of relation and a single type of node (Carley, 2005). DNA 
varies from SNA in that it can handle large dynamic, multi-mode, multi-link networks with 
varying levels of uncertainty (Carley, 2003). Multi-mode means that the socio-technical 
systems being analyzed can consist of a plurality of node types, such as people, organiza-
tions, resources and tasks. Any two nodes can have various types of connections; DNA is 
therefore well-suited to analyze the multi-link relations of socio-technical system (Carley, 
Diesner, Reminga, & Tsvetovat, 2007). Such systems can be represented by these many dif-
ferent networks, e.g. a social network (actor by actor) or a task network (actor by task). The 
collection of these networks is referred to as a meta-matrix (Tsvetovat & Carley, 2004). The 
added value of a ‘network of networks’ approach has also been acknowledged by others 
(cf. Salmon et al., 2011). The meta-matrix framework represents the network of relations 
connecting node entities (see Table 2.1). It is used to analyze the properties of the socio-
technical system and its interactive complexity.
Another important attribute of DNA is that it is able to deal with longitudinal data series. 
As the previous sections have shown, disruption management is a dynamic process. Here, 
networks are not static but continuously changing through interactions among its nodes 
(Knoke & Yang, 2008). What is needed is an understanding of how information flows are 
structured and how these structures change over time (Wolbers, Groenewegen, Mollee, 
& Bím, 2013). This makes traditional SNA less suitable to model communication during 
disruption management as it only provides one static snapshot (Effken et al., 2011). We can 
add time stamps to the data and groups these to create time slices (Wolbers et al., 2013). 
Time slices show the frequencies of information exchange in the network as it develops 
over time. The flow of information can then be analyzed by comparing these time slices.
2.4 Data CoLLeCtIoN aND StRuCtuRING
Gathering complete network data for inter-organizational networks is challenging (Hos-
sain & Kuti, 2010). Obtaining real-time data on the response network to a disruption 
requires several knowledgeable researchers, to be at different locations in the network at 
table 2.1 The meta-matrix framework
People task
People Social network
Who talks to whom?
Assignment network
Who is assigned to which task?
task Dependencies
Which tasks are related to which?
Source: Carley and Remminga, 2004 (edited by authors)
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the right moment. Disruptions also occur unpredictably, so gathering real-time data can be 
quite time consuming and costly. ProRail has therefore utilized value stream mapping to 
determine what happens from the moment a train driver notices a damaged catenary, until 
a contingency plan is implemented. With the help of a complete team of representatives 
involved in the process a map was created, using pen and paper, showing every step as 
it happens in reality. The process was broken down in to specific tasks and the flows of 
information were included in the map5. Creating the value stream map took several days 
for which a safe environment was created, so participants would feel free to provide as 
much detail as possible. ProRail gave us the permission to use the data from this value 
stream map for our DNA.
The data was converted into an edge list. Each row in an edge list represents a single tie 
in the network and it is possible to attach variables (such as the time of occurrence) to the 
ties. Every edge represents an actor x actor (who shares information with whom?), actor x 
task (who does what task?) or task x task (how are tasks related?) tie. Since the actor x actor 
ties represent the flow of information between actors, the edges are directed and valued, 
meaning that the information flows in a certain direction and that there might be multiple 
interactions between two actors. We have chosen to focus our analysis on the actors who 
check and implement the contingency plan. Consequently, the tasks related to the repair of 
the catenary and those on providing travel information are not included. The edge list was 
then imported into ORA6. ORA generated series of reports that contain multiple metrics, 
both on a node- and whole network level (Carley et al., 2007; Carley & Pfeffer, 2012).
Given the properties of disruption management in the Netherlands, we are interested 
in the centrality of actors. Centrality is fundamental to node-level metrics and reflects the 
relative importance of individual nodes (Kim et al., 2011). It is used to capture the flow of 
information in a network and estimate potential levels of coordination (Hossain, Wu, & 
Chung, 2006). Freeman (1979) identified three distinct facets of network centrality: degree, 
betweenness and closeness, with each of these measures having different implications for 
coordination. The three measures are conceptually operationalized in in Table 2.2.
Degree centrality allows us to measure the activity in communication of every node. 
Nodes that process and distribute a high amount of information feature a high in- and 
out-degree centrality. By combining the degree centrality of nodes with the actor by task 
5 ProRail initiated the so-called ‘Lean Transformatie’ program as a concerted effort to improve its 
operational performance and (as a result) to improve its customer relations. The mapping of a 
catenary failure was part of this program and aimed to identify the number and quality of interac-
tions following when staff develops a solution to such a failure. A better understanding of these 
interactions should then be used to implement a Kaizen-like way of working.
6 ORA is a dynamic meta-network assessment and analysis tool developed by CASOS at Carnegie 
Mellon University, Pittsburg (PA). This user-friendly software tool allows researchers to visualize 
and analyze networks over time.
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relationships, we can get an indication on the workload of every node. Betweenness cen-
trality shows which nodes will most likely have to pass along information for information 
to traverse disparate parts of the network. These nodes can become weak points in the 
process when they (unknowingly) distort information or are no longer able to process it. 
Finally, with closeness centrality we can assess whether the nodes that distribute the most 
information can actually do this within the least amount of time, given their position in 
the network.
Network level metrics are used in order to define the overall structure of the network. For 
these measures we turn to the work of Stanton et al. (2012) & Walker (2009), who showed 
that the following network-level metrics can be used to define a network of organizations: 
network density (distribution of information), diameter (patterns of interaction), and 
centralization (allocation of decision rights). Table 2.3 shows the conceptual definition of 
these three measures. Density measures how fragmented (or sparse) the network is, i.e. 
what the influence is of the indirect communication on the distribution of information 
through the network. The diameter of the network measures the maximum number of 
steps needed to travel from one node to another. Information will need to traverse a lot of 
actors in fragmented networks. Centralization calculates whether the network is central-
ized or decentralized.
table 2.2 Node-level metrics and their conceptual definition
Node-level 
metrics
Measurement Conceptual definition
Degree 
centrality
Measures the number of direct ties a given 
node has. The larger the number of direct ties 
an actor has the higher its degree centrality. 
In directed networks (networks that show the 
direction of information flowing), a distinction 
can be made between in-degree (information 
flowing to a node) and out-degree centrality 
(information flowing from the node).
The more central an actor is, the 
more potential it has for activity in 
communication (Mullen et al., 1991).
Betweenness 
centrality
Measures the extent to which a particular node 
lies in between the other nodes of the network
The more central an actor is, the 
more control or capacity it has to 
interrupt information flowing through 
the network. Betweenness reveals 
bottlenecks and structural weak points 
in information flows (Hossain & Kuti, 
2010), but also influential nodes that can 
coordinate group processes (Mullen et 
al., 1991; Hossain et al., 2006)
Closeness 
centrality
Measures the sum of distances from one node 
to all others, so closeness refers to the extent a 
node is close to all other nodes in the network.
The more central an actor is the more 
independence the actor has and the 
easier it can distribute messages in 
a minimal amount of time (Mullen, 
Johnson, & Salas, 1991).
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2.5  DISRuPtIoN MaNaGeMeNt IN the DutCh RaILway SySteM
It is essential to first give a brief overview of the nature of disruption management in the 
Dutch railway system in order to understand its complexity before discussing the analysis. 
Until the mid-1990s, NS used to manage the railway traffic. This unit was then split-off from 
the commercial passenger services into ProRail. ProRail controls and monitors all the train 
movements and its traffic controllers assign paths to all TOCs. During disruptions, these 
traffic controllers have to manage the overtaking, re-routing, short turning, or canceling of 
trains (Jespersen-Groth et al., 2009).
There are several companies that offer passenger and cargo services. NS is by far the 
largest provider of passenger services and operates all main railway lines. During a disrup-
tion the TOCs will have to guarantee that rolling stock is available and that crew schedules 
are adjusted. Infrastructure, rolling stock and train crew are highly interrelated in practice, 
which presents a complex puzzle that needs to be solved in a coordinated manner. Given 
the dominant position of NS and the historical bond between ProRail and NS, we will focus 
on how these two companies manage disruptions.
Besides the organizational divide between ProRail and NS, there is also a divide between 
the national level, and the regional level (Figure 2.1). ProRail has thirteen regional traffic 
control centres that are responsible for the railway traffic in specified geographical areas. 
Regional traffic controllers monitor the railway traffic in the designated areas and optimize 
traffic flows. In addition, train dispatchers are responsible for securing safe railway opera-
table 2.3 Network-level metrics and their conceptual definition
Network-level 
metrics
Measurement Conceptual definition
Network 
density
Measures the actual number of 
ties as a ratio to the maximum 
number of ties possible, ranging 
from 0 (no nodes are connected) 
to 1 (every node is connected to 
every other node).
Density measures how well connected a network 
is. This gives information about the rate of flow of 
information among nodes (Chung & Hossain, 2009). 
The denser a network is, the broader the dissemination 
of information will be possible, since there are more 
direct pathways between sender and receiver (Stanton 
et al., 2012).
Network 
diameter
Measures the largest number of 
nodes that have to be traversed 
when traveling from one node 
to another.
The higher the diameter of the network the more 
actors there are on the lines of communication 
(Stanton et al., 2012). Networks with a high diameter 
will need more steps to distribute information.
Network 
centralization
Measures the extent to which 
the overall connectedness is 
organized around particular 
nodes in a network.
Network centralization and network density are 
complementary. Whereas density is concerned with 
the cohesiveness of the network, centralization reflects 
distribution of power or control across the network 
(Kim et al., 2011). Highly centralized networks have a 
few influential nodes, while in decentralized networks 
power is more distributed.
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tions on the sections assigned to them. Train dispatchers control the train traffi c through 
switches and signals. This is mostly an automated process. Similarly, NS has fi ve regional 
control centres where the railway traffi c is monitored and where crew and rolling stock are 
managed. Coordinators have been assigned to important nodes (mostly large stations) to 
manage the shunting process and to inform employees on the platforms. Not only do these 
regional centres of ProRail and NS monitor different geographical areas, but this is also 
done from different locations or rooms. This means that information on the availability of 
infrastructure and rolling stock & crew has to be shared by phone or data links.
In 2010, ProRail and NS established a joint Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR). The 
OCCR is to serve as a boundary spanning platform that should encourage mutual commu-
nication, coordination and learning in order to reduce recovery time during disruptions. In 
the OCCR ProRail and NS monitor the railway traffi c on a national level and intervene when 
necessary. For instance, network traffi c controllers can overrule decisions made by regional 
traffi c controllers, if the decisions made by these regional traffi c controllers are confl icting. 
As such, the management of disruptions is done by two different organizations and each 
organization has its subsystems that have different responsibilities both in terms of tasks 
and geographical areas. The OCCR is meant to overcome some of the organizational divides.
We will now have a closer look at the process of disruption management as designed by 
ProRail and NS. In most cases, train drivers are the fi rst who are confronted with a disrup-
tion. They will have to inform the train dispatcher about the situation, who will apply the 
Network Traffic Control Network Operations 
Control
Regional Traffic 
Control
Regional Operations 
Control
Train Dispatcher
Node Operations 
Control
Applies 
safety 
measures
Logs the VDB
Checks VDB
Picks VSM
Check 
VSM
Check 
VSM
Check 
VSM
Check 
VSM
ProRail NS
figure 2.1 Communication fl ows during a disruption between ProRail and NS
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necessary safety measures. The train dispatcher will then alarm other actors according to a 
decision tree. Next, the train dispatcher and the regional traffic controller (RTC) assess the 
impact of the disruption on the traffic and decide to what extent services can continue on 
the affected section. The RTC will then log the decision concerning the new distribution of 
the capacity (VDB), which is then checked by the network traffic controller (NTC) to see if 
the chosen distribution does not conflict on a national level. The network operations con-
troller (NOC) of NS will then select a contingency plan (VSM). These are predefined plans 
for the most common disruptions. The NTC can adjust these contingency plans within the 
limitations set by the RTC in the VDB. Implementation of the VSM is done at the regional 
level, where it first has to be checked in terms of feasibility, e.g. whether train drivers are 
available to operate trains.
Defining, checking and implementing a contingency plan during disruptions leads to 
considerable information flows through the system as is illustrated by Figure 2.1. It shows 
there is a vertical two-way flow of information within both of the organizations (left column 
ProRail, right column NS), as well as horizontal flows of information between the different 
subsystems of ProRail and NS, as indicated by the black arrows. Diagonal communication 
has been reduced to a minimum in order to avoid misunderstandings. So, each division 
of ProRail should only communicate with its counterpart of NS in terms of geographical 
responsibility.
2.6  uSING DNa to aNaLyze aND vISuaLIze a CateNaRy faILuRe
The network shown in Figure 2.2 features all the actors (red round nodes) involved in the 
management of the disrupted catenary, i.e. the process leading up to the implementation 
of the contingency plan, and the tasks (blue triangular nodes) that these actors need to 
perform in this process (see appendix for the full name of the abbreviations). The dotted 
lines indicate task by task relationships. A first observation concerns the large number of 
actors that are involved in the process, something that is not surprising given the situ-
ation in the Dutch railway system. Besides the actors mentioned in Figure 2.1, there are 
numerous others that perform specific tasks (24 actors and 35 tasks), which results in a 
complex network of interdependent actors and tasks. The graph also shows that there is 
an asymmetrical distribution of the tasks and communication activity among the nodes.
Table 2.4 shows the centrality measures applied to the nodes in the network. The nodes 
with an asterisk have a higher than normal value, meaning the value is more than one 
standard deviation above the mean. Since this is a directed graph we calculated both the 
indegree (number of ties directed to the node) and outdegree (the number of outgoing ties 
of a node). The links have been inverted (1/w) when measuring betweenness and closeness 
centrality to take into account the valued data. This was necessary because ORA treats 
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line weight as distance while we treat it as the number of interaction between nodes. Tie 
strength therefore indicates a possibility of information to pass along. By inverting the links 
we can keep the interpretation of line weights as similarity information.
The train dispatcher has the highest centrality score for all measures, except for that 
of indegree centrality, followed by the regional traffic controller. The train dispatcher 
(total degree score 20) is the actor that communicates most frequently with other actors. 
The large number of outgoing ties of the train dispatcher illustrates its central role in 
distributing the information in the network. The high closeness centrality score supports 
this role, as the central position of the train dispatcher makes it possible to distribute the 
information within the least amount of time. The high betweenness centrality score of the 
train dispatcher shows that the train dispatcher acts as a hub in transmitting information 
between disparate parts of the network. These findings confirm the specialized role of 
the train dispatcher in disruption management as he or she is solely responsible for safe 
railway operations.
Table 2.5 shows the scores for the whole network measures. Density assesses the in-
terdependency of actors. The diagram shows that there is no diagonal communication 
between the actors, exactly as was designed in order to avoid miscommunication. This also 
influences the rate of flow of information, as in more sparse networks there will be less 
communication linkages. Because there are often no direct ties between nodes, multiple 
steps are necessary for information to flow through the network. The network is indeed 
sparse (density 0.08) indicating that the actual number of ties are a low percentage of the 
potential maximum number of ties. The diameter score of 13 shows that there are many 
nodes on the line of communication between the two most separated nodes, given the 
theoretically maximum diameter of 23 (number of nodes minus 1).
table 2.4 The most central nodes based on degree, closeness and betweenness centrality measures
total degree
centrality
Indegree
centrality
outdegree
centrality
Closeness
centrality
Betweenness
centrality
1 Train Dispatcher
(20)*
LRI
(8)*
Train Dispatcher
(12)*
Train Dispatcher
(0,236)*
Train Dispatcher
(0,259)*
2 RTC
(15)*
Train
Dispatcher 
(8)*
RTC
 (9)*
RTC
(0.241)*
RTC
(0,156)*
3 LRI
(12)*
RTC
(6)*
Node 
Operations
Control (7)*
ROC Monitor
(0,211)*
ROC Monitor
(0,116)*
4 Node Operations 
Control
(11)*
SMC
(5)*
ROC Monitor
(7)*
Node Operations 
Control
(0,206)*
NOC
(0,079)
5 ROC Monitor
(11)*
NTC
(4)
NOC
(5)
SMC
(0,204)*
Node 
Operations
Control (0,079)
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The centrality scores indicate how tight the network is organized around the most 
central node, the train dispatcher. The degree centralization scores are relatively low so 
there isn’t a particular node dominant in the network, i.e. the network is loosely coupled 
with information distribution (out-degree) being more dominated by a few nodes than 
information receiving (in-degree). The betweenness centralization is a bit higher, but there 
isn’t a dominant node that controls the flow of information. Closeness has the highest 
centralization score. Still the overall accessibility of information is moderately low.
We have visualized and described the whole network and the role of specific nodes 
within. However, the importance of a node in a network cannot be determined without 
reference to the dynamic patterns of communication during the different phases of the 
disruption management process (Borgatti, 2005; Wolbers et al., 2013), as described in sec-
tion 2.3. Therefore we have created six time slices to see how the network develops over 
time and how the position of nodes changes (see Figures 2.3 to 2.8).
The first time slice shows the train driver alarming the train dispatcher about the dam-
aged catenary. The train dispatcher subsequently applies the safety measures. At this initial 
stage, it is crucial that the train dispatcher collects accurate and detailed information about 
the situation from the train driver because other actors will use this information for their 
decisions and actions. It is therefore remarkable to see three isolated networks during time 
slice 1. It highlights actors acting without having a direct link to the train dispatcher (their 
official source of information). This is the result of the co-location of the RTC, the travel 
informant (RI) and the train dispatcher, which makes it possible for them to overhear the 
phone call of the train dispatcher with the train driver. So without having the full details on 
the situation, the RI and the RTC already start making preparations. After the official noti-
fication by the train dispatcher, information is quickly exchanged throughout the network 
in order to determine the consequences of the damaged catenary and to work towards the 
contingency plan (time slices 2 to 4). The network becomes fragmented again, when the 
plan for the disruption has been defined and checked and actors focus on their own specific 
task in the implementation phase. Apparently, this can be done in isolation from the other 
actors (time slices 5 and 6).
table 2.5 The results of the network-level metrics
Network-level metrics Results
Network density 0,08
Network diameter 13
Centralization, Indegree 0,078
Centralization, Outdegree 0,139
Centralization, Betweenness 0,242
Centralization, Closeness 0,373
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Table 2.6 shows the most central actor for each time slice in terms of degree-centrality 
and betweenness-centrality. Closeness centrality is not calculated as in most time slices 
the networks are disconnected, rendering closeness centrality problematic to calculate 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). There is a high correlation between both measures, 
but both show that the most central actor varies considerably in each time slice. This con-
firms the decentralized and fragmented nature of the network. The various (disconnected) 
sub-networks act rather autonomously in managing the disruption, without there being a 
central core (Wolbers et al., 2013).
table 2.6 Most central actors per time slice
time Nodes 
(actors)
Nodes
(tasks)
ties
(actor x actor)
total degree centraltity Betweenness centrality
t1 12 5 10 Train Dispatcher Train Dispatcher
t2 17 3 17 NOC NOC/NTC
t3 13 9 16 RTC/ Train Dispatcher RTC/ Train Dispatcher
t4 15 9 14 Node Operations Control Node Operations Control
t5 12 7 5 RTC, SMC, Stoco RTC
t6 6 7 2 SMC SMC
2.7  DISCuSSIoN
Three centrality measures (degree, betweenness and closeness) were used to assess the 
role of the actors in the disruption management process. For all measures, except indegree, 
the train dispatcher and RTC were the highest in centrality. This shows their importance 
in the processing and distribution of information. However, this important role is simul-
taneously a potential weak point in the flow of information. Given their hub functions, 
it is crucial that the train dispatcher and the RTC provide others with timely and accurate 
information. However sharing the right information can be difficult when confronted with 
an information-overload under high workload. Especially the train dispatcher can become a 
bottleneck instead of an efficient hub, because the train dispatcher also has the most tasks 
assigned to him or her (10).
The first priority of a train dispatcher during the first minutes of a disruption is to take 
all necessary safety measures and, secondly, to provide the other actors with detailed infor-
mation about the situation. During a severe disruption the workload of a train dispatcher 
influences its capacities to share information. In such situations they are often no longer 
able to rely on the automated traffic control system and thus have to solve the situation 
manually. It then becomes very challenging to perform an efficient control of the traffic 
(Kauppi, Wikström, Sandblad, & Andersson, 2006). The high workload in terms of manual 
control and oral communication makes it difficult to keep the other actors up-to-date on 
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the situation in order to create a shared understanding, in particular in a dynamic situation 
that requires constant adjustments. As Comfort et al. (2004) explain, when the information 
requirements for coordination increases, the cognitive capacity of human decision-makers 
to process the expanding amounts of information decreases. Under high workloads, 
actors are confronted with an information-overload in which it is difficult to determine 
what should be shared. Consequently actors limit themselves to their formal tasks and 
important but non-formalized information is no longer properly communicated (Bharosa 
et al., 2010; Steenhuisen, 2009; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). With components stretched to 
their performance limits, the system’s overall control of the situation can collapse abruptly 
(Branlat & Woods, 2010; Woods & Branlat, 2011a).
Another interesting finding, related to the previous one, is the low centrality scores for 
the actors in the OCCR (NTC and NOC). Closeness centrality can also be seen as indicating 
the independence of nodes. Nodes with a high closeness centrality can act autonomously 
and navigate freely across the network to access information in a timely manner (Kim et 
al., 2011). As a centralized monitoring centre we would expect the OCCR to be within close 
reach of the other actors in the network. The low closeness centrality scores (NTC, 0.170; 
NOC, 0.161) show that this is not the case, which means that the OCCR is heavily depen-
dent on the information it receives from the regional control and operating centres. The 
actors in the OCCR often need to actively collect the information from the regional centres. 
This can turn the OCCR in a bottleneck in the decision-making process when consider-
able exchanges of information are required and channels for this exchange are difficult 
to maintain (Branlat & Woods, 2010). An often heard complaint is that the OCCR makes 
decisions based on outdated information of local situations. The low centrality scores of 
the NTC and NOC in this particular case might however also have to do with the nature of 
this (small-scale) disruption.
In addition, we calculated the density, diameter and centralization in order to define 
the overall network structure. The low density score and high diameter of the network 
show that it is relatively loosely coupled. As there are often no direct ties between nodes, 
information will have to pass along many actors before reaching the intended recipient and 
actors will therefore have limited access to information. Given the large amount of nodes 
on the line of communication there is a high chance that information gets distorted, as 
errors typically accumulate in retellings. In addition the network might prove less efficient 
than a dense communication structure, as information might not reach actors in time. It is 
however difficult to decide upon the right amount of integration of a network, as more ties 
between nodes will also lead to a higher complexity and thus higher coordination needs 
(Carroll & Burton, 2000). For instance, Hinds & McGrath (2006), found that dense com-
munication between distributed teams was associated with more coordination problems, 
while hierarchy of communication led to smoother coordination.
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Finally, the time slices revealed that information is being shared within disconnected 
parts of the network during the first few minutes, without those parts having a direct link 
to the source of the information. We know from our observations that operators frequently 
make decisions based on experience. They anticipate that a situation will unfold itself ac-
cording to earlier experiences and already start to manage the disruption without having 
full knowledge on the situation. This ties in with the tension between fast-decision making 
and gathering the complete information to make an informed decision mentioned before. 
Inevitably, decisions based on incomplete information could also lead to ineffective or 
counterproductive solutions (Quaglietta, Corman, & Goverde, 2013).
2.8  CoNCLuSIoNS
We set out to test the utility of Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) as a network tool in order 
to investigate the communication patterns during the management of a disruption in the 
Dutch railway system and how this structure might influence coordination. The Dutch rail-
way system is a networked system in which several organizations and teams, separated by 
geographic and organizational boundaries, manage disruptions. It is therefore important 
to understand how these actors connect and share information during a disruption. DNA 
makes it possible to capture the irregular flows of information during a disruption. The tool 
was applied to a simulated case of a catenary failure to visualize and analyze the network 
of interdependent actors and tasks over time.
Our research question was: how can DNA help to investigate coordination between the 
geographically distributed teams involved in the management of a railway disruption? DNA 
as a method seems to perform well in describing and structuring the complex information 
flows during disruption management. Even the first, still static, overview of the overall 
network has given a systematic overview of the communication patterns and tasks during 
the development of a solution for the catenary failure. Key actors could be defined using 
the centrality values and the overall structure was described using network-level measures. 
This revealed the central roles of the train dispatcher and regional traffic controller, and the 
decentralized structure of the network along with the long lines of communication.
The dynamic nature of disruption management is captured through the time slices. The 
network changes shape over time and to understand this change requires such time slices. 
The analysis showed that there is a considerable variation in the centrality of actors per 
time slice. For instance, the train dispatcher is mostly active communicating in the first 
minutes of the disruption (T1 and T3). The time slices also showed the emergent character 
of the network. In the first time slices the network quickly becomes highly connected as 
information on the disruption is shared between the different teams, but the network 
quickly becomes more fragmented as actors return to their own specific task. Time slices 
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revealed that information is being shared within disconnected parts of the network dur-
ing the first few minutes, without those parts having a direct link to the source of the 
information. These dynamics do not appear in the static image of the network with which 
we started. However, it forms an essential link between the different parts of the network. 
This aspect confirms Wolbers et al. (2013) finding that employing only static analysis of 
networks obscures the real dynamics of communication and potential coordination prob-
lems. DNA therefore makes it possible to discover issues that can be resolved (cf. Hossain 
& Kuti, 2010).
For the sake of a fair evaluation, we should also point to a limitation of DNA such as we 
encountered during the case analysis. While DNA allowed us to structure the information 
flows, we were unable to say anything about the content of the information that flows 
through the ties, or how actors respond to this information because it would be difficult to 
incorporate this in analysis and it would require an enormous amount of data. DNA reduces 
the ties between actors to being either present or absent, which in our case means infor-
mation is flowing between actors or not. It is possible to classify the ties between actors by 
adding an attribute, i.e. information quality, but this mainly makes a contribution in terms 
of visualization and not for the analysis. For a comprehensive analysis of such disruptions, 
it would be necessary to combine a DNA with a qualitative analysis (Crossley, 2010).
Naturally, there are limitations on the data we used for this analysis and how the data was 
collected. The process mapping was focused on the first phase, directly after the catenary 
failure, and not on the return to the normal state after the disruption. We therefore cannot 
relate the findings from the network analysis to the performance of the network in terms 
of coordination outcomes. Secondly, process mapping might not give an exact representa-
tion of how actors behave during real-time operations, although it can be observed that 
actors have indicated that they deviate from procedures. Process mapping however makes 
it possible to create a detailed representation of the process and the information flows, 
which is supported by the whole team of representatives. Finally, the chosen case shows 
quite some resemblance with the standard operating procedures. Although many actors 
are involved, the case is relatively low in complexity. As such, solving it requires a great of 
deal of routine tasks. It can be expected that non-standardized disruptions force actors 
to deviate from their routines and procedures, which will most likely result in different 
network structures and information flows.
Given these considerations, we recommend applying DNA to larger and more complex 
disruptions and to combine DNA with qualitative data such as records of telephone conver-
sations, when attempting to understand how and with what results actors in the railway 
network coordinate their activities to get the system back to a normal state. Of course, DNA 
could be used in other networked infrastructures to make operations visible and to identify 
coordination issues.
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the Dutch railway system: Explaining 
coordination failure between teams 
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This chapter is published as:
Schipper, D. & Gerrits, L. (2017). Communication and Sensemaking in the Dutch Railway System: 
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aBStRaCt
Early in 2014, the Dutch railway system spiralled out of control after traffic management 
was confronted with the decision to take four double switches and two rail tracks out of 
service. A lack of coordination between the responsible teams resulted in the decision to 
stop all traffic in one of the busiest parts of the network during the rush hour. In this study 
we aim to understand why the teams in the Dutch railway system were not able to adopt a 
coordinated approach to reschedule rail services. To answer this question, we used a mixed-
methods approach by combining dynamic network analysis (DNA) with sensemaking. Our 
analyses show that a diverging framing of the situation accumulated over time, leading to 
inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions and a lack of effective communication. Infor-
mal and indirect communication spurred uncertainty and promoted negative emotions, 
which eventually resulted in a conflict between the actors. We discuss the difficulties of 
managing ambiguous events in multiteam systems.
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3.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
Early in 2014 the Dutch railway system spiralled out of control after the rail infrastructure 
manager decided to take four double switches and two rail tracks out of service. This de-
cision was taken early in the afternoon by the responsible track team who thought that 
the equipment no longer met the authority’s safety standards. These switches and tracks 
are located at three of the busiest train stations in the Netherlands in two different rail 
traffic control areas (from here on: areas A and B). Since their decision would have a huge 
impact on the train service, the track team decided to give the other teams several hours 
of preparation time. Regardless, what should have been a coordinated procedure, resulted 
in a loss of control. While the train dispatchers in area B managed the process adequately, 
train dispatchers in area A decided to stop the entire service during peak hours. Many pas-
sengers were stranded, which drew negative attention from the media and politicians. We 
aim to answer the following research questions: Why were the actors in the railway system 
unable to adopt a coordinated approach in order to adjust operations, and what explains 
the difference in response between the traffic control centres of areas A and B?
Like many other critical infrastructures (CIs) in Europe, the Dutch railway system has 
undergone major changes over the past decades under the influence of EU and national 
policies. The Dutch railway system has changed from a mostly large-scale integrated mo-
nopoly into a networked system consisting of multiple private and public organizations 
with diverging goals and specialized tasks, which may be conflicting (De Bruijne & Van 
Eeten, 2007; Schulman et al., 2004). Providing reliable services therefore requires multiple 
teams, who are separated by organizational and geographical boundaries, to continuously 
negotiate and renegotiate issues related to reliability (De Bruijne, 2006). However, this 
network of teams poses additional challenges in terms of coordination and communica-
tion. For example, studies have found that geographically dispersed teams have difficulties 
in distributing information evenly, accurately, and in time (Hinds & McGrath, 2006). We 
are therefore interested in how actors in such networks communicate. To study the flows 
of information, we use social network analysis tools, more specifically Dynamic Network 
Analysis (DNA).
The premise for this research is that coordination problems are not just the result of 
deficiencies in the quantity of information flows. Given the contextual differences in which 
people are working and their differences with regard to knowledge, goals and expertise, 
there is a considerable chance that information will be interpreted differently (Vlaar et al., 
2008). This could lead to different understandings of specific situations and therefore to 
potential conflicts regarding the course of actions to be followed. Successful coordination 
stems from a congruent framing of a situation (Cornelissen, Mantere, & Vaara, 2014). 
Consequently, the structural dimensions of communication need to be studied in conjunc-
tion with the attribution of meaning in order to understand coordination in a network of 
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diverse teams. In this study we therefore combine DNA with theories of sensemaking to 
understand how information is processed within and among actors in order to understand 
how their actions made sense to them at that time (Muhren, Eede, & Van de Walle, 2008).
This research contributes to the literature in three areas. First, we extend coordination 
beyond individual actors or co-located groups and look at coordination on the level of the 
whole network of geographically and organizationally separated teams, something which 
has received little attention (Gittell & Weiss, 2004; Zaccaro et al., 2012). Second, we use 
a mixed-methods approach by combining Dynamic Network Analysis with an analysis of 
sensemaking. Third, we answer the call for the integration of time dynamics into network 
studies using DNA, to see how the structure of the inter-organizational network changes 
over time and how the relative importance of actors within the network changes (Abbasi & 
Kapucu, 2012; Wolbers et al., 2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We will discuss the dynamics of 
communication and sensemaking in network coordination in section 3.2. The mixed meth-
odology is explained in Section 3.3 followed by an introduction to the case in Section 3.4 
We will identify key moments and actors by looking at communication patterns in Section 
3.5. The case is analyzed in Section 3.6 The discussion and conclusions are presented in 
sections 3.7 and 3.8
3.2  CooRDINatIoN aND SeNSeMakING BetweeN teaMS
Coordination can be achieved through pre-defined plans and procedures, but these formal 
modes of coordination are not always able to deal with the dynamics and uncertainty of 
specific situations and may severely limit the flexibility of organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 
2001; Johansson & Hollnagel, 2007). Adjusting to uncertain situations requires actors to 
mutually adapt and collectively improvise (Cornelissen et al., 2014). Communication plays 
a crucial role in the coordination of actions. Especially rich informal communication has 
been identified as one of the most important sources of resilient system performance (Roe 
& Schulman, 2008). Regular information updates to other team members help to create 
and maintain a shared understanding of problems and the actions needed to tackle them 
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2013). Thus, accurate information updates should be provided 
regularly and on time (Gittell & Weiss, 2004).
While previous researchers emphasized the importance of effective communication for 
successful coordination, they also found that geographically distributed teams face greater 
obstacles in sharing information effectively. Since communication between distributed 
teams is often technology-mediated, the information flows in these processes are restricted 
(e.g. number of communication lines) and the updating of information suffers from delays 
(Salas, Burke, & Samman, 2001). As Hinds & McGrath (2008) describe, distributed work set-
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tings lead to less informal and spontaneous communication in comparison to teams that 
are co-located People working at different locations will also have different information 
assumptions, preferences and constraints (Vlaar et al., 2008). Consequently, information 
is often distributed unevenly and communication patterns can be quite unpredictable 
(Powell, Piccoli, & Ives, 2004). Moreover, since information flows and format are mediated 
by technology, important visual and social cues associated with traditional face-to-face 
interaction methods that help to interpret communication and team members’ actions are 
absent (Fiore et al., 2003). In short, challenges of understanding and communication are 
more salient in a network of diverse teams, which could result in the development of a 
different framing of situations.
It is therefore important that the communicating parties can reach at least a congruent 
or compatible shared understanding during non-routine situations, (Fiore et al., 2003). 
Following Wolbers & Boersma (2013), we see this act of creating a sufficiently shared un-
derstanding as a process of sensemaking. Sensemaking means that actors try to understand 
events that are novel, ambiguous or contrary to expectations. They deal with this ambigu-
ity or uncertainty by creating plausible interpretations of reality through the extraction 
of cues from their environment to create an initial sense of the situation (Maitlis, 2005; 
Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2014; Weick et al., 2005). Cues trigger 
sensemaking as they indicate a discrepancy in the ongoing flow of events, which creates 
uncertainty about how to act. Actors then try to interpret and explain these surprising 
events by placing these cues in a mental model or frames of roles, rules, procedures and 
authority relations (Weick, 1993). These frames thus play an important role in terms of 
coordination as they trigger specific activities and expectations regarding the behaviour of 
others (Cornelissen et al., 2014). Finally, the sense made of the situation has to be put into 
action, to see whether it restores the interrupted event or if it is necessary to revise the 
interpretation. Sensemaking is therefore essentially an episodic process that occurs from 
the moment organizational activities are interrupted until they are restored or perma-
nently interrupted and contains three recurrent steps: noticing and bracketing cues from 
the environment, creating interpretations and action taking (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2014).
Sensemaking is a social process because actors interpret their environment in and 
through interactions with each other, thereby constructing shared accounts that allow 
them to comprehend the world and act collectively (Maitlis, 2005). Actors can therefore 
influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others, a process that is called 
sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Actors can also actively demand information and 
clarification, which is called sensedemanding (Vlaar et al., 2008). As Cornelissen et al. 
(2014) put it, successful or failed coordination depends on how actors individually and 
collectively frame and reframe situations as a basis for action. These accounts do not have 
to be completely overlapping, but they should be equivalent enough to allow coordinated 
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action (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). However, the creation of a shared understanding is 
a difficult task that requires much effort and interaction (Bechky, 2003). The responses to 
violated expectations or ambiguous events depend on a variety of factors, e.g. individual, 
social, or organizational identity and personal and strategic goals (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014). This means that sensemaking is tied to individuals and that meaning in organiza-
tions is often contested because of the different positions, interests and backgrounds of 
actors (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008).
To sum up, coordination in a network of diverse teams requires both effective infor-
mation sharing and acts of collective sensemaking in order to create a sufficient shared 
understanding of the task situation. In this study we therefore combine Dynamic Network 
Analysis to capture the flows of information with a qualitative analysis of how this infor-
mation is processed by the actors. In the next section we will explain how we gathered and 
analyzed the data for both the DNA and the sensemaking process and how we combined 
both methods.
3.3  ReSeaRCh MethoDoLoGy
We obtained recordings of all telephone conversations between all actors involved in 
the disruption. From these recordings, we selected the calls in which information on the 
switches and tracks was shared between actors. These recordings were transcribed (156 
telephone calls in total). In addition, we carried out 9 in–depth interviews with actors in-
volved in the case. Respondents were selected on the basis of their different roles and their 
geographically different locations. The interviews were used to reconstruct the events of 
the day from their respective locations. All interviews were transcribed. We also studied all 
relevant written documents, such as shift reports, e-mail conversations and logs. Finally, we 
attended a meeting during which actors reconstructed the day and shared their perspec-
tives on the events. We observed this meeting and took detailed notes.
In order to reconstruct the network, it is necessary to know “who talks to whom and 
at what time”. The telephone recordings offer rich and complete network data. Most of 
the files included information on the specific actors communicating and the time of com-
munication. We transcribed the recordings and then translated them into numerical data. 
Using these data, we created an edge list containing the sources and targets of information 
flows and the time of communication. The telephone conversations don’t cover the com-
munication between actors located in the same room. The interviews and documents fill 
in this data-gap.
Next, we created six time slices, each lasting half an hour, following the example of 
Wolbers et al. (2013). Comparison of the different time slices shows how the network 
evolved over time. We found that a thirty-minute time interval offered us enough detail 
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to show the general communication dynamics. We also created a two-mode network that 
shows which actors (mode 1) were involved during certain time periods (mode 2) of the 
process. The two-mode network was recorded as an incidence matrix, marking the pres-
ence (1) or absence (0) of actors in the different time periods (seen as events). The relation-
ship between the two modes shows how many actors were actively communicating during 
each specific period of time. To show the relative importance of a time slice, we divided 
the number of actors in a time slice by the maximum number of actors (Borgatti & Halgin, 
2011). This two-mode analysis required us to use time slices of fifteen minutes in order to 
obtain a more detailed picture of the network development. We used the software package 
ORA to structure the data.
The metrics from the DNA form the backbone for the analysis of the sensemaking pro-
cess. To this end, we performed a qualitative analysis of the telephone conversations. This 
allowed us to identify which frames emerged, persisted or disappeared throughout the 
day, and how that was caused by both sensegiving and sensedemanding activities. First, 
we coded cues or occurrences that interrupted the expectations of actors regarding normal 
work practices. This is where actors collect and bracket information to get an initial sense 
of the interrupted situation (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2014). We then focused on how these 
events were categorized as interruptions to define a specific situation. Following Corne-
lissen et al (2014), we coded words and expressions within communication that cued or 
prompted a cognitive or schema of interpretation. In this step we also looked for the factors 
influencing sensemaking as mentioned in the literature, i.e. identity and emotions. In the 
final step, we identified the actions taken by actors based on the framing of the interrupted 
situation and how this fed into the next phase. This allowed us to detect whether and how 
frames are updated with the help of new information.
3.4  INtRoDuCtIoN to the CaSe
The Dutch railway system is managed by the government-owned organization ProRail, 
which manages the maintenance of the railway network, assigns capacity to the train 
operating companies (TOC) and monitors and controls all train movements. Maintenance 
has been outsourced to contractors, but is monitored by ProRail’s track managers and track 
inspectors. Railway traffic is controlled by thirteen regional traffic control centres. Regional 
traffic controllers optimize traffic flows within their own region and train dispatchers are 
responsible for safe rail traffic on the sections assigned to them. The management of the 
railway system is decentralized, with considerable local autonomy. Over the years, this has 
led to problems with local optimization and working at cross-purposes. A national control 
room, the Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR), was established in 2010 to overcome 
such problems. In the OCCR, ProRail and NS (by far the largest TOC in the Netherlands) 
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monitor the railway system at the national level. We present the main actors in the Dutch 
railway system in Table 3.1.
We begin our study with a regular inspection by the contractor in area A on February 19th, 
2014. The contractor noticed that two rail tracks did not meet the safety standards defined 
by ProRail. This did not mean that there was an immediately unsafe situation, but action 
was required to assess the situation. The contractor informed the track inspector about 
these deviations at 8:30. At the same moment the track inspector was reading his monthly 
reports on four double switches (2 in area A and 2 in area B), which had been showing 
deviations from safety standards for some time. These switches were being monitored 
on a monthly basis. Large-scale renewal of switches had been scheduled for some years, 
but they had been postponed due to a lack of funds. Subsequently, the track team started 
to deviate from their own safety rules and had to increasingly rely on their own expert 
judgments. Audits conducted by the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate, in 
which they rebuked the maintenance team for not following their own rules, served as a 
wake-up call. This made the team aware of their own behaviour and changed their perspec-
tive on how to apply safety standards. Consequently, the track inspector and track manager 
decided that the switches and tracks should immediately be taken out of service and that 
large-scale renewal was the only viable option left.
table 3.1. The main actors involved in the case and a description of their role
Role abbreviation Role description
Track Manager WD 2 AM Is responsible for the quality of the railway infrastructure in 
order to assure safe usage
Track Inspector - Supports the track manager by monitoring deviations and 
consulting him on corrective measures
Regional Traffic 
Controller
Traffic 
Control
Is responsible for the optimization of rail traffic flows in specific 
geographical areas.
Train Dispatcher - Is responsible for the safe allocation of railway tracks to trains, 
primarily by using signalling and controlling switches
National Asset 
Manager Coordinator
RIIB Monitors incidents, malfunctions and maintenance work and 
their impact on railway traffic at national level in the OCCR
National Traffic 
Coordinator
RLVL Manages railway traffic at national level in the OCCR
National Traffic 
Controller
LVL Monitors the railway traffic on the main corridors of the railway 
system in the OCCR
Power switching and 
monitoring centre
SMC Takes calls on malfunctioning infrastructure and reports them to 
the contractors
National Train 
Operating Coordinator
LBC Manages the train operations for NS at national level in the 
OCCR.
Team Leader TL Team leader of the regional traffic control centres
Node Coordinator NC Manages the shunting of trains at the large stations
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The formal procedures prescribe that train dispatchers should be notified immediately in 
the event that rail infrastructure is no longer safe to be used. This allows them to immedi-
ately take the required safety measures to prevent trains from running over the designated 
switches and tracks. The SMC should provide the train dispatchers with a specific reference 
number (RVO number), which is also used by the contractor. In view of the huge impact 
of their decision on the train service, the track inspector and track manager decided that 
the switches and tracks could be used until 18:00 to give themselves and others some 
preparation time. Hence, they decided to issue an early warning to the OCCR, to let them 
coordinate the whole process. As the track inspector explained: “In my opinion when you 
call the OCCR, which is our big institute, the coordination centre, they will manage things. 
They will make sure that the loop is closed and the train dispatchers are informed.”
However, the train dispatchers were not officially informed about the switches and 
tracks until just half an hour before the 18:00 deadline. Minutes before the deadline, the 
train dispatcher in area A deemed it necessary to suspend all rail traffic in the middle of 
rush hour. We will analyze the events leading up to this decision.
3.5  IDeNtIfyING key MoMeNtS aND aCtoRS IN the PRoCeSS
We start our analysis by making a reconstruction of the flows of information between the 
different teams and organizations leading up to the decision. The quantitative network 
analysis acts as a first stage in our research to identify key moments and actors in the 
process, which serve as important starting points for a more in-depth qualitative analysis 
of how the information was processed. We identified a total of 156 instances of informa-
tion sharing among 40 actors. To grasp the dynamics in the spreading of information we 
created six time slices of half an hour each (from 15:15 until 18:15). Each time slice shows 
all the information exchanges between actors or nodes in that period. Network graphs of 
each time slice, showing the development of the communication network over time, are 
presented in Figures 3.4 through 3.9. In the figures each node represents an individual per-
forming a specific role in the process. The round nodes are actors of traffic management, 
the square nodes are asset management, triangular nodes are NS and the diamond-shaped 
nodes are contractors. The arrows show who provided whom with information during that 
specific time period.
We then used several network metrics to quantitatively assess the development of the 
network over time. As Figure 3.1 shows, the number of actors involved and interactions 
fluctuated throughout the process, with a peak in the number of interactions at time slice 
6 (17:45-18:14). The spike in the number of actors involved and information exchange 
between time slices 2 and 3 (15:45-16:44), as well as the sudden drop at T4 (16:45-17:14), 
are especially remarkable and need further investigation.
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Figure 3.2 shows the density and betweenness centralization scores of the networks. 
Density describes the number of links between nodes as opposed to the maximum number 
of linkages possible. A dense communication structure enables a free flow of information 
between actors and can therefore facilitate coordination. Furthermore, a dense network 
also gives actors more opportunities to engage in sensemaking dialogue with others. As 
Figure 3.2 illustrates, density increased slightly during T1 – T2, but then fell to five percent 
at T5. Overall, the density is very low, which shows that many actors were not directly com-
municating with each other, i.e. the network was rather sparse, resulting in long commu-
nication lines. Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a particular node lies 
in-between the other nodes in the network. The more central an actor is, the more control 
he or she has over information flows through the network and the more able to coordinate 
group processes (Hossain et al., 2006). Networks with a high betweenness centralization 
thus have one node or a small group of nodes that have more potential to control the flows 
of information. Figure 3.2 shows that the network features high centralization at T1 and T2, 
before becoming more decentralized in the following time periods. The overall low percent-
ages as opposed to the theoretical maximum indicate that there was little potential for a 
single actor or a small group to control the information flows. This was confirmed by one 
of the actors.
National Coordinator Rail: “It is true that everyone had received some information, 
but they were just bits and pieces of information. We all knew that something was 
going on, but there was no one in control of the process.”
It is also important to identify the most central nodes or actors in each time slice. Table 3.2 
shows the three most central actors based on their degree and betweenness centralities. 
Although there are differences in the rankings between the time slices, some actors show 
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figure 3.1 Number of actors and interactions throughout the process.
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a high level of consistency in terms of centrality. These are the National Asset Manager 
Coordinator (RIIB 2), National Traffic Controller (LVL 1), and the National Traffic Coordinator 
(RLVL) in the OCCR and the Regional Traffic Controller of area A. Their consistency can be 
seen as an indication of their ability to digest and distribute information in different time 
periods (Wolbers et al., 2013). As such their central position in the network makes them 
important in terms of sensedemanding and sensegiving and we should therefore follow up 
on the role of these actors in the sensemaking process.
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figure 3.2 Density and betweenness centralization of the network over time.
table 3.2 The most central actors per time slice in terms of degree and betweenness centrality
time Slice Degree Betweenness
t1
(15:15-15:44)
1. RIIB 2
2. RLVL
3. WD 2 AM
1. RIIB 2
2. RLVL
3. LBC
t2
(15:45-16:14)
1. RIIB 2
2.
3.
1. RIIB 2
2.
3.
t3
(16:15-16:44)
1. Traffic Control A
2. RLVL
3. LVL 1
1. Traffic Control A
2. LVL 1
3. RIIB 2
t4
(16:45-17:14)
1. RIIB 2
2. Traffic Control A
3. LVL 1
1. Traffic Control A
2. LVL 1
3. RLVL
t5
(17:15-17:44)
1. WD RBI VL
2. RIIB 2
3. RLVL
1. WD RBI VL
2. RLVL
3. RIIB 2
t6
(17:45-18:14)
1. RLVL
2. LVL 1
3. RIIB 2
1. RLVL
2. Train Dispatcher A1
3. RIIB 2
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Finally, we created a two-mode network on the basis of time slices of fifteen minutes 
to identify the critical moments of coordination in more detail. Critical periods are the 
ones when many actors are connected together and information can be shared to create 
a common understanding. Figure 3.3 displays the time slices ordered according to their 
normalized degree and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality shows the number of 
direct ties that a node has. In this case nodes are the time slices and direct ties indicate the 
number of actors sharing information during that time period. For betweenness centrality 
calculations, we follow Wolbers et al., (2013), by understanding time slices with a high 
betweenness centrality as critical periods in which actors could relay information to others 
since they were only linked to each other at that time period.
Figure 3.3 reveals that time slice 5 (16:15-16:29) features the highest degree centrality, 
with half of the actors involved during this time period. This means that the spike in the 
number of actors communicating occurred quite early on in the process. The large gap 
between the degree centrality of T4 and T5, represents a sudden increase in the number of 
actors involved during T5, as could also be seen in Figure 3.1. During time slices T6 and T8 
(16:30-17:14) there is a drop in the number of actors communicating, with the time slices 
T9-T12 (17:15-18:14) showing once again a large number of actors present in these time 
periods. The betweenness scores show that time slices 5 and 9-12 were critical periods of 
information sharing and collective sensemaking. We used these critical periods to divide 
the whole process into specific episodes of collective sensemaking to study how actors 
make sense of a situation, the actions they subsequently undertake, and the revisions that 
may be made to these interpretations.
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figure 3.3 Degree and betweenness centrality in a two-mode network (15 minute time slices)
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figure 3.4 Time Slice 1 (15:15-15:44)
figure 3.5 Time Slice 2 (15:45-16:14)
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figure 3.6 Time Slice 3 (16:15-16:44)
figure 3.7 Time Slice 4 (16:45-17:14)
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figure 3.8 Time Slice 5 (17:15-17:44)
figure 3.9 Time Slice 6 (17:45-18:14)
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3.6  MakING SeNSe of the DeCISIoN to StoP the tRaIN SeRvICe
Having covered the structural and quantitative features, it is now time to turn to the con-
tent of the communication, i.e. the sensemaking processes. Table 3.3 describes the process 
leading to the train dispatchers’ decision to stop the train service. This table is based on the 
one Cornelissen et al. (2014) developed for their analysis of sensemaking in the Stockwell 
Shooting. Using the findings from the DNA, we divided the process into three episodes. 
The first episode starts with the first phone call from the Track Manager to the Asset 
Management Coordinator (RIIB) in the OCCR and ends at time slice four (Figure 3.3, time 
16:14) when the schematics with all the details were sent to the OCCR. Episode 2 starts 
at T5 (16:15), when there was a sudden peak in the number of actors and interactions, 
marking the start of the official procedure. The second episode ends at T8 (17:14), when 
it was discovered that no one had taken responsibility to inform the train dispatchers. The 
third episode consists of time slice T9-12 (17:15-18:14) during which there was consider-
able communication. It starts with the Track Inspector informing the train dispatchers and 
ends with the decision by the train dispatchers in area A to suspend the rail traffic during 
rush hour. For each episode we look at how the key actors (as identified in Table 3.2) try to 
make sense of the disrupting events or how they shape the meaning construction of others 
(sensegiving). The last column describes the actions that followed from the initial sense 
made by the key actors, from which a new cycle of sensemaking commenced.
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e 
sw
it
ch
es
.
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 c
on
su
lt
 w
it
h 
hi
s 
su
pe
ri
or
, t
he
 T
ra
ck
 M
an
ag
er
.
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0 
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00
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
di
sc
us
se
s 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
re
su
lt
s 
w
it
h 
th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
.
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
an
d 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
A
ft
er
 a
 lo
ng
 d
eb
at
e 
th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
an
d 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 
co
nc
lu
de
 t
ha
t 
it
 is
 t
oo
 g
re
at
 a
 r
is
k 
to
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
us
in
g 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 t
ra
ck
s.
 H
en
ce
, t
he
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 
se
rv
ic
e,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 g
iv
en
 t
he
 im
pa
ct
 t
hi
s 
w
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 o
n 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
se
rv
ic
e.
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
an
d 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 s
ta
rt
 
gi
vi
ng
 t
he
 o
th
er
 p
ar
ti
es
 in
 t
he
 ra
il 
sy
st
em
 a
n 
ea
rl
y 
w
ar
ni
ng
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 t
ra
ck
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
 a
t 
18
:0
0.
Ep
is
od
e 
1:
 A
n 
ea
rl
y 
w
ar
ni
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
O
CC
R
15
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9
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 (W
D
 2
 A
M
) 
gi
ve
s 
an
 e
ar
ly
 w
ar
ni
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
A
ss
et
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Co
or
di
na
to
r 
in
 t
he
 O
CC
R 
(R
IIB
).
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 
an
d 
RI
IB
Th
e 
RI
IB
 w
as
 t
ol
d 
th
at
 t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 v
er
y 
se
ri
ou
s 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
a 
hu
ge
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
us
ed
 t
he
 t
er
m
 re
d 
fl
ag
 o
ft
en
: “
W
hi
le
 y
ou
 
ar
e 
se
at
ed
, I
 w
an
t 
to
 s
ha
re
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 w
it
h 
yo
u 
(…
). 
W
e 
ha
ve
 fo
ur
 re
d 
fla
gs
 a
t 
th
is
 m
om
en
t 
(in
 a
re
a 
A
) a
nd
 it
’s 
pr
et
ty
 s
er
io
us
. T
he
re
 h
av
e 
be
en
 in
sp
ec
ti
on
s 
la
st
 n
ig
ht
, 
w
hi
ch
 s
ho
w
ed
 m
aj
or
 d
ev
ia
ti
on
s 
fr
om
 s
ta
nd
ar
d.
 In
 t
er
m
s 
of
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
w
e 
ha
ve
 t
o 
pl
an
t 
a 
re
d 
fla
g 
no
w
.”
Th
e 
RI
IB
 h
an
ds
 t
hi
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ov
er
 t
o 
hi
s 
co
lle
ag
ue
 w
or
ki
ng
 t
he
 n
ex
t 
sh
if
t 
(R
IIB
 2
).
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Th
e 
RI
IB
 2
 a
sk
s 
fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
 s
it
ua
ti
on
 
fr
om
 t
he
 T
ra
ck
 M
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 
sc
he
m
at
ic
s 
sh
ow
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 
sw
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 t
ra
ck
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
.
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 
an
d 
RI
IB
 2
Th
e 
RI
IB
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
he
si
ta
te
 t
o 
ab
id
e 
by
 t
he
 t
ra
ck
 t
ea
m
’s
 
de
ci
si
on
 a
nd
 w
an
ts
 t
o 
st
ay
 in
 c
on
tr
ol
 o
f t
he
 s
it
ua
ti
on
: 
“I
t’s
 ju
st
 a
 fa
ct
 t
ha
t 
th
is
 re
d 
fla
g 
w
ill
 b
e 
pl
an
te
d,
 b
ut
 w
he
n 
w
e 
ha
ve
 m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
pr
ep
ar
e 
ou
r 
lo
gi
st
ic
s.”
Th
e 
RI
IB
 w
ar
ns
 h
is
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s 
in
 t
he
 O
CC
R 
of
 
Tr
af
fi
c 
Co
nt
ro
l a
nd
 N
S 
(R
LV
L 
an
d 
RL
BC
).
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ta
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3 
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
Ti
m
e
Ev
en
t
Ke
y 
A
ct
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(s
)
Se
ns
em
ak
in
g
A
ct
io
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O
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e
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0
Th
e 
RL
V
L 
ca
lls
 t
he
 T
ea
m
 L
ea
de
r 
of
 
Tr
af
fi
c 
co
nt
ro
l a
re
a 
A
.
RL
V
L 
an
d 
Te
am
 
Le
ad
er
Th
e 
RL
V
L 
fe
el
s 
th
at
 t
he
re
 is
 s
ti
ll 
no
t 
en
ou
gh
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 ju
st
if
y 
al
ar
m
in
g 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s:
 “
W
e 
do
n’
t 
kn
ow
 
ex
ac
tl
y 
w
ha
t 
is
 g
oi
ng
 o
n 
an
d 
w
hy
, s
o 
w
e 
fir
st
 w
an
t 
to
 g
at
he
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 B
ec
au
se
 im
ag
in
e 
if 
it
 (r
ed
 fl
ag
 - 
au
th
or
s)
 
is
n’
t 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y,
 t
he
n 
w
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ak
in
g 
a 
lo
t 
of
 fu
ss
 a
bo
ut
 
no
th
in
g,
 a
nd
 I 
w
ou
ld
 re
gr
et
 t
ha
t.”
Th
e 
RL
V
L 
te
lls
 t
he
 T
ea
m
 L
ea
de
r 
to
 k
ee
p 
hi
s 
ey
es
 a
nd
 e
ar
s 
op
en
, w
it
ho
ut
 le
tt
in
g 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
kn
ow
 a
ny
th
in
g.
15
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1
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s,
 t
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 a
 re
d 
fl
ag
 w
ill
 b
e 
pl
an
te
d 
in
 t
he
 ra
il 
tr
ac
ks
 re
ac
he
s 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 c
on
tr
ol
 c
en
tr
e 
of
 A
re
a 
A
.
Re
gi
on
al
 T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r 
an
d 
RL
V
L
Bo
th
 a
gr
ee
 t
ha
t 
si
nc
e 
th
is
 is
 a
 s
af
et
y 
is
su
e,
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 
di
sp
at
ch
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ca
lle
d 
fi
rs
t 
an
d 
th
at
 t
he
 O
CC
R 
sh
ou
ld
n’
t 
be
 t
he
 fi
rs
t 
in
 t
he
 li
ne
 o
f c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 T
he
y 
al
so
 fi
nd
 it
 s
tr
an
ge
 t
ha
t 
tr
ai
ns
 a
re
 s
ti
ll 
ru
nn
in
g 
ov
er
 t
he
 
sw
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 t
ra
ck
s 
de
sp
it
e 
th
e 
ap
pa
re
nt
 s
af
et
y 
ri
sk
s.
Bo
th
 t
he
 R
eg
io
na
l T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r 
an
d 
th
e 
RL
V
L 
st
ill
 b
el
ie
ve
 it
 t
o 
be
 a
 re
gu
la
r 
si
tu
at
io
n 
in
 w
hi
ch
 a
 m
ec
ha
ni
c 
ha
s 
ju
dg
ed
 t
he
 s
w
it
ch
es
 
an
d 
ra
il 
tr
ac
k 
as
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 s
af
e 
an
d 
th
at
 t
he
 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
 w
ill
 b
e 
ca
lle
d 
an
yt
im
e 
so
on
.
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Th
e 
RI
IB
 re
ce
iv
es
 s
ch
em
at
ic
s 
w
it
h 
de
ta
ils
 o
n 
th
e 
fo
ur
 s
w
it
ch
es
 
an
d 
tw
o 
tr
ac
ks
 a
nd
 d
is
cu
ss
es
 
th
em
 w
it
h 
th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
.
RI
IB
 a
nd
 T
ra
ck
 
M
an
ag
er
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
M
an
ag
er
 o
nc
e 
m
or
e 
w
ar
ns
 t
ha
t 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
sa
fe
ty
 
ri
sk
s 
an
d 
th
at
 t
he
y 
ac
tu
al
ly
 s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 a
ct
ed
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
, 
bu
t 
th
at
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 g
iv
en
 a
 d
ef
er
m
en
t 
un
ti
l 6
 p
m
: “
Yo
u 
kn
ow
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ru
nn
in
g 
(o
ve
r 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 t
ra
ck
s)
 
al
l m
or
ni
ng
, s
o 
I e
xp
ec
t 
th
em
 t
o 
ho
ld
 fo
r a
no
th
er
 c
ou
pl
e 
of
 
ho
ur
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, i
f t
he
 In
sp
ec
to
ra
te
 s
aw
 t
he
se
 v
al
ue
s, 
w
e 
w
ou
ld
 g
et
 a
 b
ig
 fi
ne
.”
Th
e 
RI
IB
 a
pp
re
ci
at
es
 t
he
 p
os
tp
on
em
en
t 
of
 
th
e 
re
d 
fl
ag
s 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
ke
ep
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 s
er
vi
ce
 
in
 c
on
tr
ol
. H
e 
sh
ar
es
 t
he
 la
te
st
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
it
h 
hi
s 
co
lle
ag
ue
s 
in
 t
he
 O
CC
R 
du
ri
ng
 t
he
 
st
an
da
rd
 m
ee
ti
ng
 a
t 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 t
he
ir
 
sh
if
ts
.
Ep
is
od
e 
2:
 T
he
 o
ffi
ci
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 is
 s
ta
rt
ed
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3
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
ca
lls
 t
he
 S
M
C 
to
 s
ta
rt
 t
he
 o
ffi
ci
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
.
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
an
d 
SM
C
Th
e 
Tr
ac
k 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
en
um
er
at
es
 w
hi
ch
 s
w
it
ch
es
 a
nd
 
tr
ac
ks
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
 lo
ng
er
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
ft
er
 6
 p
m
 a
nd
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
g 
sw
it
ch
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 lo
ck
ed
 t
o 
pr
ev
en
t 
tr
ai
ns
 
fr
om
 p
as
si
ng
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
. W
he
n 
th
e 
SM
C 
as
ks
 w
ho
 
w
ill
 in
fo
rm
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 d
is
pa
tc
he
rs
, t
he
 T
ra
ck
 In
sp
ec
to
r 
st
at
es
 t
ha
t 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
 t
he
 O
CC
R 
an
d 
th
us
 t
he
 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 t
he
 s
it
ua
ti
on
 a
nd
 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
ns
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 o
ng
oi
ng
 t
o 
ad
ju
st
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 s
er
vi
ce
.
Ba
se
d 
on
 a
dv
ic
e 
fr
om
 t
he
 S
M
C 
it
 is
 d
ec
id
ed
 t
o 
fo
llo
w
 t
he
 s
im
pl
er
 R
VO
 p
ro
ce
du
re
, i
ns
te
ad
 o
f 
th
e 
m
or
e 
ti
m
e-
co
ns
um
in
g 
BU
TA
 p
ro
ce
du
re
, 
th
e 
la
tt
er
 b
ei
ng
 t
he
 n
or
m
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 in
 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f d
ef
er
re
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 w
or
k.
 
In
 c
on
tr
as
t 
to
 w
ha
t 
th
e 
RV
O
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 
pr
es
cr
ib
es
, t
he
 S
M
C 
be
lie
ve
s 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
no
 
ro
le
 in
 in
fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n.
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O
nc
e 
ag
ai
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
 
re
d 
fl
ag
s 
re
ac
he
s 
th
e 
tr
af
fi
c 
co
nt
ro
l c
en
tr
es
 o
f a
re
as
 A
 a
nd
 
B 
fr
om
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
. B
ot
h 
re
gi
on
al
 t
ra
ffi
c 
co
nt
ro
l c
en
tr
es
 a
re
 s
ur
pr
is
ed
 
to
 re
ce
iv
e 
th
is
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
di
re
ct
ly
 a
nd
 t
o 
he
ar
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
re
d 
fl
ag
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
de
fe
rr
ed
 u
nt
il 
6 
pm
.
Re
gi
on
al
 T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
rs
 
of
 a
re
as
 A
 
&
 B
 a
nd
 t
he
 
N
at
io
na
l T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r 
(L
V
L)
.
Th
e 
N
at
io
na
l T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r 
as
su
re
s 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 
tr
af
fi
c 
co
nt
ro
lle
rs
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
no
rm
al
 R
VO
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 w
ill
 b
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
: “
W
e 
ex
pe
ct
 a
 p
ho
ne
 c
al
l f
ro
m
 y
ou
 la
te
r o
n 
th
at
 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
in
fo
rm
ed
 o
n 
w
ha
t 
w
ill
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
 a
t 
6 
pm
. I
 ju
st
 re
ce
iv
ed
 a
 w
ho
le
 b
un
ch
 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 s
ai
d 
so
rr
y 
le
t 
th
em
 s
pe
ak
 w
it
h 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
.”
Th
e 
RL
V
L 
an
d 
LV
L 
fe
el
 t
ha
t 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
no
 ro
le
 
in
 t
he
 p
ro
ce
ss
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
in
fo
rm
ed
. T
he
y 
th
er
ef
or
e 
de
ci
de
 
no
t 
to
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 t
ra
ffi
c 
co
nt
ro
lle
rs
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 in
fo
rm
ed
 a
nd
 it
 is
 c
le
ar
 w
hi
ch
 s
w
it
ch
es
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
.
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By
 n
ow
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 d
is
pa
tc
he
rs
 in
 
ar
ea
 A
 a
re
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
to
 lo
ok
 fo
r 
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 ‘t
ro
ub
lin
g 
m
es
sa
ge
s’
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 re
ce
iv
ed
 
ab
ou
t 
se
ve
ra
l r
ed
 fl
ag
s 
w
it
h 
th
e 
SM
C
Tr
ai
n 
D
is
pa
tc
he
r 
an
d 
SM
C
Th
e 
SM
C 
ca
n’
t 
gi
ve
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 d
is
pa
tc
he
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
st
ea
d 
bl
am
es
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 d
is
pa
tc
he
r 
fo
r 
ac
ti
ng
 o
n 
ru
m
ou
rs
. H
e 
as
su
re
s 
th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
 t
ha
t 
of
fi
ci
al
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
nd
 li
ne
s 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ill
 b
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
.
Th
e 
tr
ai
n 
di
sp
at
ch
er
s 
ha
ve
 t
he
 fe
el
in
g 
th
at
, 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
m
an
y 
ru
m
ou
rs
, o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s 
ha
ve
 m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
 s
w
it
ch
es
 
an
d 
tr
ac
ks
 a
nd
 t
ha
t 
th
ey
 a
re
 in
te
nt
io
na
lly
 
be
in
g 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 fr
om
 t
he
 p
ro
ce
ss
: “
I g
ot
 t
he
 
im
pr
es
si
on
 t
ha
t 
ev
er
yo
ne
 k
ne
w
 w
ha
t 
w
as
 
go
in
g 
on
 a
nd
 w
e,
 t
he
 t
ra
in
 d
is
pa
tc
he
rs
, k
ne
w
 
no
th
in
g!
 W
ho
 is
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r s
af
et
y?
 A
nd
 
ho
w
 is
 it
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 w
e 
ca
n 
us
e 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
 
un
ti
l 6
 p
m
?”
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:3
0
Th
e 
RI
IB
 a
sk
s 
th
e 
Ba
ck
 O
ffi
ce
 o
f 
Pr
oR
ai
l t
o 
m
ak
e 
a 
lo
gg
in
g 
in
 t
he
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ex
ac
t 
nu
m
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 s
w
it
ch
es
 
an
d 
tr
ac
ks
 t
ha
t 
ha
ve
 t
o 
be
 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
, w
hi
ch
 c
an
 
be
 re
ad
 b
y 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 t
ra
ffi
c 
co
nt
ro
lle
rs
.
Re
gi
on
al
 T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
rs
, 
Tr
ai
n 
D
is
pa
tc
he
rs
, 
N
at
io
na
l T
ra
ffi
c 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r
Th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 t
ra
ffi
c 
co
nt
ro
l r
oo
m
s 
ar
e 
st
ill
 in
 d
ou
bt
 a
s 
to
 
w
he
th
er
 t
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 
is
 c
or
re
ct
 a
nd
 if
 s
o,
 in
 w
hi
ch
 p
os
it
io
n 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
es
 w
ill
 
be
 lo
ck
ed
. T
he
 la
tt
er
 is
 o
f g
re
at
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 in
 t
er
m
s 
of
 
ra
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3.7  DISCuSSIoN
As the summaries in Table 3.3 show, even though it was rooted in good intentions, the track 
team’s decision to give an early warning to the OCCR created an ambiguous situation for the 
other actors in the system. The early warning violated expectations in several ways. Firstly, 
an early warning is not a regular practice in the Dutch railway sector. Secondly, although 
the track team designated the situation as a ‘red flag’, they also allowed a six-hour delay. 
This sent a contradictory message. Thirdly, informing the OCCR created a top-down flow 
of information, which deviated from the formalized bottom-up approach for maintenance 
work. In such situations people have to ask themselves and others: “what is going on?” As 
the case has shown, the term ‘red flag’ played a very important role in the sensemaking 
process. A red flag is jargon for a situation in which the safe usage of a railway track or 
switch can no longer be guaranteed and so trains are forbidden to run over the track or 
switch. By framing their actions as placing several red flags the track team thus created the 
impression of an immediate safety risk. As one of the managers explained: “A red flag can 
be like a red rag to a bull. A red flag means an unsafe situation”.
Labels, like the term red flag, carry their own implications for action. They focus atten-
tion and shrink the number of possibilities as to what is occurring (Weick, 2001). In this 
case the term red flag triggered a routine procedure in which the train dispatchers should 
take the lead according to formal procedures and be informed by a mechanic or the SMC. 
This frame was dominant among the actors in the OCCR throughout the entire process 
and was reinforced through their communication and actions. For instance, there was a 
strong commitment to restoring action to familiar practices, i.e. to make sure that the 
train dispatchers were officially notified by the SMC or a mechanic in order to start the 
official procedure. This frame was also shared with the regional traffic control centres. Even 
when the regional traffic control centres confronted the national traffic controllers with 
the absence of an official notification and the contradictory signals they had received, the 
national traffic controllers repeatedly reinforced the frame of a routine procedure. In fact, 
they decided to reduce communication with the regional control centres (as could be seen 
in Figure 3.1, fourth time slice) when confusion started to increase, agitation grew among 
the regional operators, and communication became mainly focused on blaming instead of 
problem solving.
The dominance of the frame also explains why the National Asset Management Coordi-
nator and the National Traffic Control Coordinator did not use their central position in the 
network (Table 3.2) to provide others with this crucial information, despite them having 
full details on the switches and tracks. They simply did not believe that it was their role, or 
that they had the authority to do so. Instead, communication and actions were aimed at 
restoring standard procedures, which conflicted with the intentions of the track team for 
an improvised course of action with the OCCR coordinating the process and informing the 
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regional control centres. The latter framing of the situation was also shared with the SMC 
by the track inspector. As a result of these different interpretations of the situation, ac-
tors started to make wrong assumptions about what others knew and which actions they 
would take. Consequently, the task of informing the train dispatchers was not assigned to 
anyone. In addition, the strategy of waiting until the train dispatchers had been officially 
notified was severely undermined by the many rumours that were circulating, because 
other actors in the system were checking, updating and revising their sense of events. The 
time slices show that the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers in areas A and B 
were approached several times by train operating companies seeking confirmation of the 
‘rumours’ they had heard about the red flags (Figures 3.4 through 3.9).
However, the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers could not officially confirm 
any information to the train operating companies, as they had still not been officially noti-
fied of the situation. The sensedemanding of the train operating companies caused a chain 
of reactions, which explains the sudden increase in the number of interactions between 
time slices 2 and 3 (Figure 3.1). More and more actors became involved and information 
on the red flags spread through the network uncoordinatedly. With information being 
dispersed among people and locations, sensemaking became fragmented, i.e. diverse ac-
counts of the situation existed among the actors in the railway system. As a result, the train 
dispatchers felt isolated and lost grasp of what was happening. Train dispatchers rely on a 
strong dichotomy between safe or unsafe, as they are held responsible for safe operation. 
Hence, for them it is very difficult to understand that they are running trains over a piece of 
infrastructure, the safety of which cannot be guaranteed. Although they knew that there 
were issues with the safety of some switches and tracks, they had not received any official 
information or a reference number, and therefore they could not fulfil their role.
What explains the difference in response between the train dispatchers in areas A and 
B? The telephone conversations revealed that there were considerable negative emotions 
among the train dispatchers in area A, and this negativity increased during the day. These 
emotions were fuelled by the fact that critical information was not shared with them. This 
was not only seen as a threat to their social identity, but also created a state of anxiety 
which was widely shared among the train dispatchers in the control room. The literature 
on sensemaking points to the importance of emotions (Cornelissen et al., 2014; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis, Vogus, & Lawrence, 2013; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Weick 
et al., 2005). These studies show that emotions are an important factor in individual and 
collective sensemaking. Negative emotions, in particular, are contagious and can easily 
spread among group members (Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2006). In this 
case, a collective belief that emerged among the train dispatchers of area A was that non-
compliance and strictly following procedures was the best course of action. Hence, they 
continued to operate the switches and tracks and rejected the track inspector as an expert. 
Such negative emotions were less prominent in area B. An important explanatory differ-
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ence is that area B had a team leader on-site, while in area A the team leader was on call. As 
the team leader of area B explained: “After receiving the phone call from the RLVL I was busy 
tempering emotions, saying ‘Guys keep on going, don’t get carried away by emotion because 
of this uncertainty about what we can and can’t do. Make sure that the trains keep running!’”
The lack of contextual information made it difficult for the team leader of area A, who 
was on call, to identify the specific coordination issues and to recognize the negative emo-
tions emerging among his train dispatchers. In area A, the regional traffic controller played 
an important role in the line of communication between the train dispatchers and the 
OCCR, as can be seen in the graphs and Table 3.2. The regional traffic controller, however, 
was very busy with his preparations to adjust the train service and showed resistance in his 
communication. Therefore, national traffic control did not want to antagonize him. Instead, 
new actors who were able to circumvent the formal lines of communication, such as the 
regional manager, stepped in to help create some common ground between the track team 
and the train dispatchers and to mediate in their conflict. However, the regional manager 
failed to develop a congruent understanding of the situation with the train dispatcher and 
actually contributed to the growing negative emotions. In the end the lack of a common 
ground between the track team and the train dispatchers resulted in the decision by the 
train dispatchers in both areas A and B not to comply (each in their own manner) with the 
track inspector’s six o’clock deadline.
The unexpected split-second decision taken by the train dispatchers of area A to suspend 
the rail traffic, also cascaded into area B, where the dispatchers and regional traffic control-
lers were struggling to keep the traffic flowing. Large service cuts had to be made in order 
to cope with the reduced capacity in an orderly fashion. As a result, many passengers were 
stranded. Altogether, it took more than an hour for the train dispatchers in area A to receive 
the correct information and reference numbers so that they could gradually restart the 
train service. A nightly inspection of the switches by ProRail revealed that three out of the 
four switches could be put back into service by applying new broadened safety standards 
that were scheduled to enter into effect two months later.
3.8  CoNCLuSIoNS
We have demonstrated how and why the actors involved were unable to create a shared 
understanding on which to base coordinated action. The OCCR’s framing of the situation 
as a normal procedure on the basis of the term ‘red flag’ and their desire to restore action 
to familiar practices was in conflict with the track team’s intention to find an improvised 
way of managing the process. We have shown how these different understandings of the 
situation accumulated over time, leading to inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions 
and a lack of effective communication. Our DNA results show how information spread 
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among the actors in the system, rapidly and uncoordinatedly. Consequently, actors held 
different pieces of information and created fragmented accounts of the situation. We 
found that informal and indirect communication (sensedemanding) negatively influenced 
the process, as it increased uncertainty among the train dispatchers about the course of 
action to be followed and their role in the process. We observed two different responses to 
this uncertainty and the time pressure: one in which procedures were strictly followed and 
the track inspector was excluded as an authority, which eventually resulted in the decision 
to stop the train service (area A), and one in which safety concerns triggered improvisation 
(area B).
The findings in this research confirm earlier work on networks of teams, in that there 
are additional challenges for effective coordinated action between multiple teams with 
a variety of skills, functions, and knowledge (Shuffler et al., 2014; Zaccaro et al., 2012). In 
order for these teams to work together effectively, it is important to develop shared men-
tal models on expected behaviour patterns concerning task procedures, team and team 
member behaviours and needs, and patterns of communication (Rentsch & Staniewicz, 
2012). Shared mental models thus help individuals to choose actions that are coordinated 
with other team members. As we show in our study, failure to develop a common set of 
assumptions and expectations may lead to role violations, communication failures, and 
even conflicts between teams. Building shared mental models in a large system with many 
diverse teams can, however, be a challenge. It is therefore important to ensure that com-
mon understanding is established around a congruent framing of the situation through 
collective sensemaking (Cornelissen et al., 2014).
However, strict adherence to a framing can also have a negative outcome. Commitment 
to frames reduces the number of cues that are considered and so it ties actors to a certain 
repertoire of actions and assumptions regarding the behaviour of others (Cornelissen et 
al., 2014). In our case, adherence to the initial framing of the situation by the actors in the 
OCCR, and their attempts to restore procedures, along with the long and indirect lines of 
communication, created blind spots that led people to miss the signs that they were not 
dealing with a routine situation. Hence, it is important to be able to update frames when 
dealing with ambiguous events (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). This particularly applies to 
networks of teams. As teams are geographically separated it is often difficult to quickly 
identify misunderstandings and prevent escalation. Hence, it is important that actors feel 
free to doubt and question the information they receive from their partners and to take the 
time to deliberate with them on the framing, instead of blaming each other for not follow-
ing procedures or diminishing communication (Weick, 1993; 2005). This is not something 
that is easily achieved, but in the long run it can help to improve the adaptive capacity of 
the system.
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aBStRaCt
Rail traffic is controlled by operators working in multiple control centres. Although each of 
these control centres enjoy quite some autonomy and authority, their activities are highly 
interdependent. This is especially the case during the management of disruptions. In this 
study, we look at the role of leader teams with system-wide responsibilities and the task 
of synchronizing the control centres’ activities. Research on leadership in this multiteam 
setting of networked control centres, which operate in a dynamic and time-compressed 
environment, is limited. Hence, this study explores the behaviours and functions of these 
leader teams during the management of two large-scale disruptions in the Dutch railway 
system. We will show how various factors influence the ability to provide leadership within 
this specific real-world context. This study demonstrates that combining insights from the 
literature on multiteam systems and resilience engineering can contribute to our knowl-
edge of the critical challenges of control in polycentric adaptive systems.
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4.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
The Dutch railway network is one of the busiest in Europe in terms of rail traffic. Accommo-
dating all the different train services on the relatively small rail network makes it difficult 
to run according to schedule. Moreover, delays can easily have knock-on-effects causing 
problems to spread to other parts of the network. This makes the Dutch rail network 
highly vulnerable to disruptions. Disruptions are an event or a series of events that lead to 
substantial deviations from planned operations (Nielsen, 2011). These disruptions result 
in growing dissatisfaction among travellers, extra expenses, and revenue losses. Conse-
quently, responding to disturbances in a timely manner in order to restore services rapidly 
has become an important objective. To do so operators must assess the nature and state 
of the disruption and adjust operations before it becomes impossible to control (Johans-
son & Hollnagel, 2007). Under the influence of restructuring policies the Dutch railway 
system has undergone major changes over the past decades, resulting in the separation 
of infrastructure management and rail operations activities. This has turned disruption 
management into an inter-organizational challenge (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Schul-
man & Roe, 2007a).
Railway disruption management involves the rescheduling of three interdependent key 
resources: (1) rail infra capacity, which is managed by ProRail, the infrastructure manager 
(2) train crew, and (3) rolling stock, which is managed by the train operating companies 
(TOC)7. Control of these key resources is distributed among multiple, geographically-
separated control centres of both organizations, all of which enjoy partial autonomy and 
have the authority to adapt plans. The tight coupling between resources makes disruption 
management a complex puzzle and requires control centres to work closely together. Coor-
dination can be achieved through pre-defined plans and procedures, but given the dynamic 
and uncertain environment in which operators work, real-time adaptation of plans is often 
necessary (Johansson & Hollnagel, 2007). In practice, situations during a disruption often 
changed faster than the involved parties could communicate and the decentralized control 
made it difficult to manage disruptions with a national impact.
This is why ProRail and NS established a joint Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR) 
in 2010. The co-location of both parties was intended to encourage communication and 
coordination in order to reduce recovery time during disruptions. In the OCCR, ProRail and 
NS monitor railway traffic at a national level and can intervene in local operations when 
necessary. This makes it possible to synchronize adaptation by the different local control 
centres, while safeguarding the ability of local operators to quickly respond to small disrup-
tions. In the literature, this kind of control has been termed polycentric control (Branlat & 
7 In the Netherlands Netherlands Railways (NS) is by far the largest provider of rail passenger ser-
vices.
Chapter 4
84
Woods, 2010; Woods & Branlat, 2010). Polycentric control seeks to sustain a dynamic bal-
ance between the two layers of control - those closer to the basic processes with a narrower 
field of view and scope and those farther removed with a wider field of view and scope - as 
situations evolve and priorities change.
Nevertheless, this kind of large-scale coordination is not easy when working in a complex 
and dynamic environment (Ritter et al., 2007). It also depends on how geographically and 
organizationally separated teams carry out their roles and manage interdependencies 
across the different levels of control (Johansson & Hollnagel, 2007; Woods & Branlat, 2010). 
During the past year there have been several large-scale disruptions in the Dutch railway 
system where the situation became ‘out of control’ and no one really knew what was going 
on or what should be done. Effective leadership is thus important to orchestrate the actions 
of the multiple teams involved in the management of a disruption (Wilson, Salas, Priest, & 
Andrews, 2007). The number of studies on leadership in multiteam systems - operating in 
non-routine and dynamic environments - is however very limited and multiteam system 
research is a relatively new field of research based primarily on laboratory research (Zac-
caro & DeChurch, 2012). As such, much can be learned about how leadership processes 
manifest themselves and influence the adaptation process in a real-world context.
In this paper we are interested in the role of leadership behaviours of the OCCR during the 
management of large-scale disruptions. This leads us to the following research question:
How do leader teams in the OCCR provide leadership during the management of disrup-
tions and which challenges affect their leadership?
To answer this research question we have analyzed the management of two large disrup-
tions. Before we introduce these cases we will first take a closer look at the development of 
the OCCR and its established role and responsibilities in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we will 
look at adaptation in a multiteam system and the role of leadership. This section provides 
a framework for studying leadership behaviours. The methods are described in section 4.4, 
followed by brief case descriptions in section 4.5. The results of the study are provided in 
section 4.6 and discussed in section 4.7. The conclusions are presented in section 4.8.
4.2  DISRuPtIoN MaNaGeMeNt IN the DutCh RaIL SySteM
The establishment of the OCCR has created a structure with three layers of control on a 
regional and national level (see Figure 4.1). ProRail currently has thirteen regional traffic 
control centres that are responsible for the railway traffic in specified geographical areas. 
ProRail controls and monitors all the train movements and its traffic controllers assign 
paths to all TOCs. Regional traffic controllers monitor the railway traffic in their designated 
areas and optimize traffic flows. In addition, train dispatchers are responsible for the safe 
allocation of railway tracks on the sections assigned to them. Similarly, NS has five regional 
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operations control centres that monitor railway traffi c and manage train crew and rolling 
stock schedules. Operators of ProRail and NS in the OCCR also monitor traffi c and opera-
tions on a national level. They coordinate the activities of the different regional operators 
and regulate shared resources, such as rolling stock. Secondly, the creation of the OCCR 
means that many parties involved in the management of railway disruptions who used to 
be physically separated, are now co-located. They not only include ProRail’s traffi c control 
and NS’ operations control, but also teams responsible for Incident Management, Asset 
Management and contractors.
If a disruption occurs, ProRail’s train dispatchers and regional traffi c controllers assess its 
impact on rail traffi c. Only the train dispatchers have real-time information on the position 
of trains and therefore play a central role in the communications with people at the loca-
tion of the incident (Schipper, Gerrits & Koppenjan 2015). A notifi cation with details on the 
disruption is placed in the communication system (ISVL) by the Back Offi ce, which can be 
accessed by most parties in the rail system. During this fi rst phase of the disruption man-
agement process the regional control centres of ProRail and NS take the lead to prevent the 
disruption from propagating. Nevertheless, the operators in the OCCR have the authority to 
overrule all decisions made by the regional control centres. The regional traffi c controller will 
then share an overview of the remaining rail infrastructure capacity with the national traffi c 
control and operations control in the OCCR. The national traffi c controller will check if this 
distribution of the remaining capacity does not negatively impact other regions. National 
traffi c controllers have a global overview of traffi c fl ows using time-distance diagrams. A 
contingency plan is then selected, together with NS’ network operations controllers. These 
predefi ned plans contain alternative timetables for the most common disruptions. Before 
Network Traffic Control
Regional Traffic 
Control
Train Dispatcher
ProRail
Network Operations 
Control
Regional Operations 
Control
Node Operations 
Control
NS
OCCR
Regional Traffic 
Control Centre
Regional 
Operations 
Control Centre
Communication
figure 4.1 The different roles involved in the traffi c management and their lines of communication.
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the contingency plan is implemented, a final check with the regional control centres is made 
to check feasibility, e.g. whether train drivers are available to operate trains. The implemen-
tation of the contingency plan initiates the second phase of the disruption management 
process in which recovery of the rail infrastructure commences. Once rail capacity is fully 
recovered, rail services are fully restored, this being the third phase8.
4.3  LeaDeRShIP IN a MuLtIteaM SySteM
The adaptive capacity of complex systems has been found to depend on the balance 
between the distribution of authority and autonomy across local control centres and the 
capacity to avoid a fragmented response to disruptions (Woods & Branlat, 2011b). In the 
literature on resilience engineering the answer to this trade-off is sought in polycentric 
control (Branlat & Woods, 2010; Ostrom, 1999; Woods & Branlat, 2010). Polycentric control 
seeks to sustain a dynamic balance between local and distant centres of control, as they 
are in a constant interplay as situations evolve and as a result of activities and progress 
at each centre (Branlat & Woods 2010). Although research is building up on polycentric 
control, still little is known about its workings and how a dynamic balance should be 
maintained between both layers of control. As mentioned in the introduction, managing 
the interactions of the control centres (both horizontally and vertically) is not an easy task. 
It requires multiple teams working at different locations and with different organizational 
backgrounds, goals and responsibilities to effectively align their activities.
There is a growing body of literature on these so-called Multiteam Systems (MTS), i.e. 
networks of distinct yet interdependent (component) teams that address highly complex 
and dynamic environments (Shuffler et al., 2014; Zaccaro et al., 2012). MTS are officially 
defined as: “two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently in response 
to environmental contingencies toward the accomplishment of collective goals” (Mathieu 
et al., 2001: 290). Contrary to most of the studies on teamwork, which focus on individu-
als within a single team, MTS research looks at how multiple teams function to grasp the 
unique opportunities, challenges and complexities of these systems (Marks, DeChurch, 
Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005). For instance, although teams might be effective at 
within-team coordination, the system itself may still fail to adapt to a disruption, due 
to an inability to meet between-team coordination requirements (Luciano, DeChurch, & 
Mathieu, 2015). MTS research has stressed the importance of leader teams (e.g. representa-
tives of the component teams), situated hierarchically above the component teams, who 
have system-wide responsibilities and the task of managing the interdependencies among 
component teams (Davison et al., 2012). Studies have shown that effective leadership has a 
8 For a more detailed description of the disruption management process, see Chapter 2
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positive influence on inter-team coordination and overall MTS performance (e.g. DeChurch 
& Marks, 2006; DeChurch et al., 2011). It is therefore important to look at the behaviour of 
these leaders in the adaptation process of a MTS (Zaccaro & DeChurch, 2012).
Location, timing, and the type and severity of the incident will all influence the adaptation 
process and the capacity of the system to adjust operations before it becomes impossible 
to control (Golightly et al., 2013). The way in which operators respond to a disruption (both 
individually and as a team) will also be context-specific, depending on individual character-
istics such as experience, knowledge, and flexibility (Maynard, Kennedy, & Sommer, 2015). 
Nevertheless, Burke and colleagues (2006) argue that each team adaptation follows a cycli-
cal process consisting of four phases: a) situation assessment, b) plan formulation, c) plan 
execution, and d) learning. In this study we will look at the first three phases. In their model 
Burke and colleagues stress the importance of teamwork competencies, such as mutual 
monitoring, communication, back-up behaviour, and leadership during the phase of plan 
execution. We believe that these teamwork competencies are also important in MTS set-
tings, but argue (and will show later in the paper) that they are not only important during 
plan execution, but also during the phases of situation assessment and plan formulation.
First of all, adaptation requires the ability to quickly recognize cues that signal the need 
for adaptive actions. However, as Uitdewilligen & Waller (2012) observe, since there are 
many component teams in a MTS, situation assessment will be highly distributed and 
therefore the situation awareness of teams will also be distributed. In order to create a 
compatible understanding of the situation between teams it is essential to share crucial 
information. Exchanging appropriate information and providing each other with regular 
updates helps to maintain a compatible situation awareness of the dynamic environment 
to ensure coordinated behaviour. MTS leaders can facilitate communication and the timely 
and accurate exchange of information between component teams to maintain situation 
awareness. Moreover, during moments of stress, component team members might not 
be able to uphold an awareness of the system (Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2012). Leader 
teams can act as an information hub in order to create an overall understanding of the 
operational environment and potential future development trajectories of the system. The 
latter is important to formulate a plan or pick a contingency plan that brings the MTS’s 
capabilities, resources and actions into line with the emergent dynamics in the operating 
environment. The quality of this plan depends on how well it fosters and maintains this 
alignment (Zaccaro & DeChurch, 2012).
Leader teams also have an important role in monitoring the performance of component 
teams in terms of their progress towards system level goals (Zaccaro & DeChurch, 2012). 
For example, leader teams can provide feedback in the form of verbal suggestions or cor-
rective behaviours in the event of errors or performance discrepancies (Marks, Mathieu, & 
Zaccaro, 2001). Component team members may also struggle to perform their tasks due 
to a high workload. In this case leader teams can provide back-up behaviour by prompting 
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other component teams to provide help, by shifting workload to other teams or by proac-
tively offering help with specific tasks. Finally, given the dynamic environment in which 
MTSs operate, it is crucial that this is continuously monitored, both internally (status and 
needs of teams) and externally (environmental conditions) (Marks et al., 2001). If unex-
pected changes occur within an MTS’s performance environment and the contingency plan 
no longer seems appropriate, it must be decided whether to reconsider, abandon, or adjust 
the original plan (ibid.). Leader teams play an important role in monitoring the system, 
identifying impending and actual blockages to goal accomplishment, and perhaps adapt-
ing the course of action when necessary (Zaccaro & DeChurch, 2012).
In Table 4.1 we have summarized the above-mentioned leadership functions and 
provided behavioural markers. Behavioural markers are descriptions of observable leader-
table 4.1 Important components of effective leadership and their behavioural markers
Component Description Behavioural markers References
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Managing communications 
about team actions and 
goal progress across all 
component teams
•  The leader teams gather information 
about the MTS’s performance 
environment to create a ‘big picture’ 
understanding
•  The leader teams manage the flows 
of information between component 
teams to facilitate the timely and 
accurate exchange of information.
(DeChurch et al., 
2011; Dietz et al., 
2015; Rosen et al., 
2011)
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
m
on
it
or
in
g
The ability to develop a 
shared awareness of the 
teams’ environment and the 
strategies used to maintain 
an awareness of component 
teams’ performance
•  Leader teams monitor goal progress 
and goal blockages
•  Feedback regarding component team 
actions is provided to facilitate self-
correction
(Alonso & 
Dunleavy, 2013; 
Salas, Sims, & 
Burke, 2005; 
Zaccaro & 
DeChurch, 2012)
Ba
ck
-u
p 
be
ha
vi
ou
r
Knowing how and when to 
back up teams and team 
members. This includes the 
ability to shift workload 
among teams to achieve 
balance during periods of 
high workload.
•  Leader teams recognize that there is a 
workload distribution problem within 
component teams.
•  Leader teams prompt component 
teams to provide back up and helping 
behaviour to other teams and to shift 
work to underutilized teams.
•  Leader teams proactively assist 
component teams with task work
(Salas et al., 2005;  
Wilson et al., 
2007;  Zaccaro & 
DeChurch, 2012)
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g
Decision making refers to 
the leader team’s ability to 
determine goals; develop 
plans and strategies for task 
accomplishment; identify 
contingencies, and to alter/
update a course of action 
in response to changing 
conditions.
•  Leader teams develop and share 
alternative plans for collective action 
in response to anticipated changes in 
the performance environment.
•  Leader teams remain vigilant to 
changes in the internal and external 
environment
•  Strategies and plans are adjusted 
to unanticipated changes in the 
performance environment
(Dietz et al., 2015; 
Marks et al., 2001; 
Salas et al., 2005; 
Wilson et al., 2007)
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ship behaviours (Dietz et al. 2015) in this particular case. Some of the markers have been 
adopted from theory on individual teams. We have translated these markers to make them 
suitable for the multiteam context of our study.
Leadership behaviours are assumed to have an important influence on the relationship 
between the adaptation process and outcome (Maynard et al., 2015; Zaccaro & DeChurch, 
2012). However, it is difficult to quantify and compare outcomes given the unique char-
acteristics of disruptions and their contexts. We therefore relate leadership to system 
performance by its ability to secure the adaptive capacity of the system. Woods & Branlat 
(2011a) have identified three basic patterns of adaptive failure in complex systems: (a) de-
compensation, (b) working at cross-purposes, and (c) getting stuck in outdated behaviours. 
These patterns can eventually lead to a system break-down and thus need to be avoided or 
recognized and escaped from. Decompensation occurs when disruptions grow and cascade 
faster than operators can respond. In this case the capacity of operators to maintain control 
can suddenly collapse and the capacity of the system to respond to immediate demands 
might be lost. Secondly, working at cross-purposes is the result of a lack of coordination 
between the different control centres (both horizontally and vertically) and results in con-
flicting goals that undermine the system’s over-arching goals. The last pattern is at play 
when people hold on to initial assessments of situations and lack the capacity to revise 
plans as conditions change. As a result, the tactics or strategies chosen do not match the 
actual challenges and so there is a risk of failure to adapt.
In this study we look at the adaption process in two cases, with an emphasis on the 
communication and coordination processes between the teams in the OCCR and the teams 
in the local control centres. We are especially interested in whether and how leadership 
behaviours are applied to prevent or correct the system from falling into one of the three 
maladaptive traps (see Figure 4.2).
Leadership behaviours
• Communication
• Performance monitoring
• Back-up behaviour
• Decision making
Adaptation process
• Situation assesment
• Plan formulation
• Plan execution
Adaptation failure 
outcomes
• Decompensation
• Working at cross-purposes
• Outdated behaviours
Trigger
Individual and
team 
characteristics
figure 4.2 Analytical framework
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4.4  MethoDS
4.4.1  Case selection
To examine leadership in the OCCR, two cases of large impact disruptions were studied. 
These disruptions were selected because of their non-routine characteristics and the rap-
idly changing environmental conditions, factors that increase the risk of adaptive failures 
and therefore necessitate effective leadership. In case 1 we examined leadership during 
a winter storm that challenged the ability of local operators to stay in control. In case 2 
we studied the management of a broken overhead wire at the largest train station in the 
Netherlands. Following Woods & Cook (2006), these cases do not serve as examples of 
successful or unsuccessful adaptation, but we believe that they are valuable for revealing 
patterns in teamwork and leadership behaviours in a naturalistic environment.
Many teams are involved in the management of disruptions, each with their own tasks 
and responsibilities. For instance, the ability to swiftly recover from a disruption depends 
greatly upon how quickly maintenance teams are able to repair rail infrastructure. As the 
focus of this study is on the leadership of leader teams in the OCCR, we have focused our 
analysis on the interactions between ProRail’s local and national traffic control teams and 
NS’ local and national operations control teams.
4.4.2  Data collection
To examine the leadership of the leader teams in the OCCR, ProRail provided access to re-
cordings of 102 telephone conversations between national and regional traffic controllers 
during both disruptions. Unfortunately, NS was unable to provide us with their recordings 
of the telephone conversations between their operators in the OCCR and the local control 
centres. However, a large number of documents were obtained from both ProRail and NS. 
We examined shift reports written by operators involved in managing the disruptions from 
both organizations, event reports on both disruptions, and the communication system 
logs. In addition to this, the winter storm case was evaluated internally by ProRail and 
NS. This evaluation report includes a careful examination of the communication between 
ProRail’s national and regional traffic controllers. This extensive evaluation report was used 
as complementary data. For the broken overhead wire case we conducted our own evalu-
ation, which includes 9 interviews with operators directly involved in the management 
of the disruption. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The evaluation was 
presented to a group of managers from ProRail and NS for expert feedback on the findings. 
Finally, 10 follow-up interviews were held with managers and operators to clarify events 
and leadership behaviours. As some of the interviews with operators were held during their 
shift, it was not possible to tape record them. Instead, detailed notes were taken of those 
interviews. All other interviews were recorded and transcribed.
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4.4.3  Data analysis
The telephone conversations (102 in total) were transcribed and then coded to capture 
the leadership behaviours. The software program ATLAS.ti was used to systematically code 
the data. Instead of the more common quantitative approach of measuring behavioural 
markers as a frequency or on a scale, a qualitative approach was chosen, which involved 
labelling the leadership functions. Pieces of the telephone conversations were labelled 
according to the markers (Table 4.1) provided for the leadership functions. For instance, 
if a national traffic controller informed a regional traffic controller that he would be re-
routing international trains, this piece of conversation was coded as proactively assisting 
component teams. This qualitative approach made it possible to provide a rich description 
of leadership behaviours and challenges to leadership on the basis of a systematic analysis. 
The telephone conversations were also used to identify indicators for the three adaptive 
traps. The latter may, for instance, be a request for help, if an operator is at risk of losing the 
capacity to adapt. In the second step we used our additional data to complement our initial 
findings, identify patterns in the behaviours of the leader teams, and relate this behaviour 
to the three adaptive traps.
4.5  CaSe DeSCRIPtIoNS
Before we move on to the results of our study, we will first give a brief description of both 
cases. A more detailed time line of the events in both cases is provided in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Case 1: Winter storm
The first case happened during a winter’s day in 2014. Around 5:30 a.m. a massive snow 
storm caused numerous malfunctions to switches and guarded crossings in the southern 
part of the Netherlands. This region is managed by two regional traffic control centres, 
Eindhoven and Roosendaal. Within two hours twenty-six malfunctions had been reported. 
Prior to the storm, cuts to the rail service had been made to add some slack to the system. 
Nonetheless, due to diminishing rail capacity, regional traffic controllers and train dispatch-
ers struggled to keep rail traffic flowing. Around 09:15, the regional traffic controller in 
Eindhoven temporarily stopped all rail traffic to get an overview of the situation and regain 
control. This came as quite a surprise to the operators in the OCCR as they were unaware 
of the severity of the situation. Around 11 a.m. the regional traffic control centres regained 
control and rail service was gradually restored. However, it took another six hours to get 
the rail service completely up and running due to the limited availability of train crew and 
rolling stock.
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Case 2: Broken overhead wire
Early on a Monday morning in 2015 a train broke an overhead wire upon entering Utrecht 
Central Station, the largest and most important station in the Netherlands. Power was 
automatically taken off the overhead system in the vicinity of the broken wire, depriving 
six platform tracks and two rail tracks of power. Normally it is possible to restore power to 
non-affected groups remotely, but due to construction work at the train station, groups 
had been rearranged and the power had to be restored manually. This made it difficult for 
the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers to estimate the available rail capacity 
and so it took almost one and a half hours to implement a contingency plan. Despite this 
contingency plan train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers kept struggling to keep 
the rail traffic flowing as there was often no crew on the trains. With all platform tracks 
table 4.2 The main events in the first case: Winter Storm
05:26 - 06:00 The train dispatchers are automatically notified of a malfunction in two guarded crossings.
06:29 – 07:27 A total of 26 guarded crossings and switches show malfunctions. This means that a lot 
of trains have to be rerouted over other tracks and train dispatchers have to give verbal 
instructions to train drivers at the crossings. This results in serious delays and crowded 
stations.
07:17 The national traffic controller makes a routine call to the regional traffic controller in 
Eindhoven. The situation is discussed, but no decisions are made on further actions.
07:33 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven calls the national traffic control for help, but 
the national traffic controller asks the regional traffic controller to make a logging in the 
communication system of the remaining rail capacity.
07:36 Regional controllers of ProRail and NS start to cancel trains.
07:48 National and regional traffic control in Eindhoven discuss the operational conditions, but 
again no decisions are made on further actions.
07:59 Despite a code red, the regional traffic controller in Roosendaal starts his shift at 08:00 
as if it is a regular day. Up until that moment, his area of control was being monitored by 
the regional traffic controller in Eindhoven. He immediately gives a situation update to 
the national traffic control and highlights the seriousness of the situation. No concrete 
decisions are made.
08:21 The regional traffic controller in Roosendaal warns the national traffic controller that he has 
lost sight of the overall picture. The national traffic controller promises to discuss matters 
with NS.
08:27 The regional traffic controller in Roosendaal again warns that he is losing control and has to 
stop most of the train services to regain sight of the overall picture. Help is offered by the 
national traffic controller, but declined. There is no further mutual consultation.
09:15 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven tells the national traffic control that they are 
losing control and suggests stopping all trains in the south of the Netherlands. The national 
traffic controller promises to consult the other parties in the OCCR.
09:19 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven informs the national traffic controller that he 
has stopped all train services in his area of control.
09:30 The OCCR decides to stop train services in the control areas of Eindhoven and Roosendaal.
17:00 Train services are restored.
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occupied, trains were queuing up to enter Utrecht Central Station. The overhead wire was 
repaired around noon, but it took several more hours to fully restore train services.
4.6  ReSuLtS
In this section we will show how different leadership behaviours manifested themselves 
during the management of the disruptions. To structure the description of our findings we 
use the three basic patterns of adaptive failure to see whether or not and how the different 
leadership behaviours were used to prevent or correct the system from falling in one of the 
three traps.
table 4.3 The main events in the second case: Broken Overhead Wire
05:56 Upon entering Utrecht train station sparks are noticed upon the roof of train 80408 and 
the train is stopped immediately.
05:56 Power is lost on the overhead wires at platforms 9-14. Two trains are unable to move and 
block additional platforms.
06:13 The train dispatcher is informed that a contact wire has been found on top of the roof of 
train 80408 and that power has to be restored manually. Mechanics are sent to the site.
06:18 The regional traffic controller in Utrecht warns the national traffic controller that the 
situation is more severe than anticipated.
06:40 Regional control centre gives an initial estimation of remaining rail capacity.
07:13 NS issues a code red to remain control over the train crew.
07:18 The first contingency plan has been formulated by the OCCR and is checked with regional 
control centres. Regional traffic controller Utrecht demands additional cuts.
07:23 Power is mostly restored, except for platforms 9, 10, and 11.
07:40 The contingency plan is accepted by all regional control centres and implemented.
07:50 Platform tracks remain occupied since many of the trains do not have a crew to operate 
them. Trains are queuing up to enter Utrecht Central Station. The regional traffic controller 
in Utrecht decides to make additional provisional cuts.
07:52 The regional traffic controller in Rotterdam informs the national traffic controller about 
the provisional cuts and that NS is dissatisfied about regional traffic control in Utrecht 
deviating from the contingency plan.
07:59 The national traffic controller and regional traffic control in Utrecht decide to hold on to 
these provisional cuts until 09:00 instead of making changes to the contingency plan.
09:00 The OCCR decides to revise the contingency plan as the management of train crew 
remains troublesome.
10:45 Repair work on the overhead wire is started.
12:06 Repair works are finished and all rail infrastructure is back in service.
12:30 NS develops a plan to restore its rail services.
15:33 All train services have been restored.
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4.6.1  Decompensation
The pattern of decompensation can be observed in both cases. For example, in the winter 
storm case, local operators of ProRail were confronted with cascading failures as the snow 
caused more and more malfunctions to switches and level crossings. As a result operators 
were quickly running behind the tempo of events. For instance, due to problems with cross-
ing barriers, train dispatchers had to give verbal instructions to each train driver in order for 
a train to pass a level crossing. These verbal instructions greatly increased their workload 
and caused severe delays to the train services. These delays and the loss of rail capacity 
made it very difficult for the regional traffic controllers to keep the rail traffic running. For 
the local operators of NS updating the crew schedules became quite a bottleneck during 
both disruptions. Since last-minute changes to the crew schedule must be announced by 
phone, the communication workload increased rapidly and operators struggled to get 
in contact with the train crews. Hence, there were too few operators to manage all the 
anomalies and the overview of the train crew was soon lost, as one of the coordinators of 
NS (LBC) explains:
LBC: “If you have one or two phone calls on paper, but not in the system, you are lost. 
A thousand people will start to phone you and they all just want one thing: they want 
to know what they should do and if they will be back on time at the end of their shift.”
As a result, trains often could not depart because there was no crew assigned to them. With 
the platforms still being occupied, arriving trains could not enter the stations. This caused 
a further escalation of the situation and an increase in workload, since train drivers and 
conductors on the trains queued outside the station had to be rescheduled.
Back-up behaviour by leader teams
To solve the above-mentioned deadlock and to prevent local controllers from completely los-
ing control, the coordinator of NS in the OCCR decided to switch to the highest emergency 
situation (code red M3 + P3) during both disruptions. This ‘code red’ procedure is designed 
get more and better control over the rescheduling of train crew. This procedure involves 
several measures. First of all, management tables were placed at the largest stations. This 
basically meant that all crew members arriving at the station had to report to this table to 
be registered. Registration at these tables enables local operators to update the systems 
and to re-assign crew to trains. Secondly, the coordinators of NS decided to redistribute the 
rescheduling of the crew on long-distance trains among the other local control centres and 
operators in the OCCR. In addition, operators in the OCCR took over the management of the 
rolling stock, so additional capacity at the regional control centres became available for the 
rescheduling of train crew. Nevertheless, as both cases have shown, it took quite some time 
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to fully regain control and sometimes it was even easier to just wait until the next shift of 
train crew and start with a clean sheet.
Likewise, although they were not acting according to a formalized procedure, we noticed 
that ProRail’s national traffic controllers proactively assisted the regional traffic control-
lers by rerouting international and cargo trains; updating the communication system 
(ISVL) with details on the disruption and verbal agreements; arranging locomotives to tow 
stranded trains and cleaning up the timetables. The latter is a task that is easily shed during 
periods of high workload.
Performance monitoring and recognizing workload problems
However, the cases also show that operators in the OCCR struggle to determine if local 
operators are exhausting their capacity to adapt and back-up needs to be provided. Since 
national traffic controllers only have a general overview of the traffic flows, they are not 
able to determine the seriousness of local situations by means of the traffic control sys-
tems. Hence, it is important to have regular contact with local operators to monitor their 
performance. Yet, as the overhead wire case clearly showed, national traffic controllers 
increasingly struggled to contact regional traffic controllers in order to create a shared 
understanding and discuss the need for back-up. Besides, national traffic controllers often 
passively waited to be called for help instead of proactively offering assistance. However, 
in the telephone conversations we only once identified a clear request for assistance by a 
regional traffic controller and sometimes the help offered was rejected even through the 
operators were faced with a huge workload. This greatly increases the risk of intervening 
when the capacity to adapt has already been lost.
As Branlat & Woods (2011) observe, it is important to detect a developing problem at an 
early stage to be able to respond and avoid a decompensation collapse. The key information 
then is how hard operators are working to stay in control. In both cases it was noticed that 
little time and effort was invested in discussing the performance of the regional control 
centres and potential future risks. For example, in the winter storm case the information 
being shared between the regional and national traffic controller mainly concerned an 
enumeration of all the malfunctions. Despite the fact that the network traffic controller 
acknowledged the seriousness of the situation at an early stage, they were unable to trans-
late this information to a shared understanding of the impact of all the malfunctions on 
the train service and the local operators’ ability to stay in control. Hence the national traffic 
controller was unaware that the regional traffic controllers were nearing their capacity 
limits.
Moreover, even when there are clear signals that local operators are struggling to stay in 
control, operators in the OCCR don’t always recognize the seriousness of the situation and 
immediately respond to these signals. For example, in the winter storm case the regional 
traffic controller specifically asked for help, but the national traffic controller responded by 
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asking the regional traffic controller to first make a logging of the remaining rail capacity 
in the communication system. So, instead of discussing the operational situation by phone, 
the national traffic controller had to make sense of the situation with the help of a simple 
text message. He therefore missed important contextual information. This reliance on 
communication systems to monitor the performance of the local control centres entails 
other risks. Due to the high workload, local operators were often unable to update the 
system with new information on disturbances and verbal agreements. Hence, operators in 
the OCCR might have made sense of the operational situation on the basis of outdated or 
incomplete information. Furthermore, the lack of new information in the communication 
system might falsely give the impression that everything is under control.
4.6.2  working at cross-purposes
Contingency plans form an important coordination mechanism in the Dutch railway 
system as they tell operators of ProRail and NS which trains should be cancelled and 
when and where trains should be short-turned. However, before a contingency plan can 
be implemented the disrupted area first has to be isolated to prevent congestion and a 
propagation of the disruption to other areas. The workload of local operators can really 
peak during this first phase of the disruption management process, especially if the disrup-
tion occurs at a major station, as in the second case, and trains have to be shunted and a lot 
of rescheduling work has to be done. Moreover, coordinating activities requires a great deal 
of dialogue between the control centres. For instance, the regional traffic controller has to 
warn neighbouring traffic controllers about the situation and order them to stop trains 
from moving to the affected area. ProRail’s regional traffic controller also has to consult 
with the regional monitor of NS to decide where trains should be short-turned and what 
should be done with the trains stranded in the disrupted area. Hence, this first phase of the 
disruption management process is characterized by local improvisation and little control 
over the situation by the OCCR. A national traffic controller outlines the situation in the 
broken overhead wire case:
NtC: “We don’t have a contingency plan ready, but they (local control centres) are very 
active in short-turning trains. They are very busy at all locations, but how exactly and 
what they are precisely doing, I don’t know. They are still writing everything down.”
However, during both cases it was noticed that information is often no longer shared 
properly during stressful situations as people tend to focus on their own task. For example, 
regional traffic controllers often told the national traffic control that they experienced 
updating and reading the messages in the communication system as an administrative 
burden, which had lower priority then trying to keep traffic flowing. Moreover, telephone 
lines quickly got overloaded and communication flows crumbled due to the large flow of 
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direct communication between operators. This caused control centres to work at cross-
purposes, as teams acted on the basis of incomplete information and faulty assumptions. 
In the second case, for instance, neighbouring traffic control centres were unaware of the 
difficulties that operators in the disrupted area were experiencing in keeping the traffic 
flowing. Neighbouring traffic controllers therefore kept sending trains to the disrupted 
area. As a result, trains were queuing up before the station, which made it more difficult 
to isolate the disrupted area and halt the spread of the disruption to other areas. Similarly, 
NS’ local control rooms started to make use of each other’s resources, such as train person-
nel, without consultation. There were also instances in which train drivers were relying on 
(incorrect) information from ProRail’s train dispatchers, as they couldn’t get in contact with 
their own organization.
Orchestrating action and managing the flows of communication
The OCCR has the important task of developing an overall understanding of operational 
conditions. To create this overall understanding, the coordinators of the different teams 
co-located in the OCCR regularly come together to share and discuss the information 
received from local operators and decide on a shared course of action. The various parties 
then inform the local operators of the decisions that have been made to orchestrate their 
activities. However, as we have observed, especially in the broken overhead wire case, the 
overall understanding of the situation created by the coordinators in the OCCR can quickly 
become outdated, as one of the national coordinators rail (LCR) explains:
LCR: “What you repeatedly see is that we are running behind the facts here in the 
OCCR. What often happens is that we are discussing things that are already outdated. 
So, while we are creating a shared understanding, the situation outside has already 
changed completely.”
Hence, it is important that local operators provide regular situation updates so that the 
operators in the OCCR can update their overall understanding of the situation. Despite this, 
we noticed that these big picture updates were very scarce. Instead, the operators in the 
OCCR had to actively collect the information themselves. This was made difficult by the 
overloaded telephone lines. In fact, in the broken overhead wire case, a pattern emerged 
in which neighbouring traffic control centres were actually providing the national traffic 
controllers with important new information when they contacted them for guidance.
This information disadvantage negatively influenced the OCCR’s ability to monitor per-
formance and take control when needed. First of all, since decision making by the coordina-
tors in the OCCR was based on already outdated information, their decisions were often no 
longer feasible and new rounds of decision making had to be started. As a result, the role of 
the OCCR became reactive, instead of proactive. Moreover, the development of a collective 
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understanding on the basis of new information takes quite some time. This conflicts with 
local operators’ need for a quick decision in order to intervene quickly in the escalating situ-
ation. For example, in the winter storm case the regional traffic controller single-handedly 
decided to stop the rail traffic in his area of control while the operators in the OCCR were 
still discussing newly-obtained information on the situation outside. If this decision had 
been coordinated better, it might have had less of an impact on the management of the 
train crew and services could have been restored sooner. Finally, instead of being a hub 
for information collection and dissemination, we noticed that local control centres often 
bypassed the OCCR for information and consultation. Instead, they sought direct contact 
with the local operators managing the disruption in order to receive first-hand informa-
tion. This is illustrated by the following fragment of a conversation between a regional 
traffic controller and national traffic controller.
RtC: “I will discuss matters with Utrecht. Not to be rude, but I prefer to listen to Utre-
cht instead of you, because with them I have a shorter line of communication (…) If 
you tell me that they will be able to manage things and the regional traffic controller 
over there says he is not, then I will run into problems with them.”
At NS they try to solve issues with the synchronisation between and with the local control 
rooms by scheduling regular conference calls with their shift leaders to obtain periodic situ-
ation updates. In addition, the coordinator at NS in the OCCR can make use of four ‘cards’ 
(punctuality, control, large traffic flows and rolling stock) that are assigned to each control 
centre matching the operational environment. These cards indicate the priorities for each 
control area and provide guidelines for achieving these goals. For instance, during these 
major disruptions the coordinator assigned the ‘control card’ (preventing the propagation 
of disruptions) to all regional control rooms in order to shift to a clear chain of command in 
which there should be no discussion about decisions made by the operators in the OCCR. 
Nevertheless, applying these cards are not without their difficulties when it is necessary to 
make a trade-off between the goals of carrying passengers and achieving a balance in the 
rolling stock, as one of the coordinators of NS (LBC) explains:
LBC: “A chain of command starts with good agreements and communication and 
there you have it… Good communication is often difficult because you can’t get into 
contact with each other. I’m also convinced that not everyone fully understands what 
these cards actually mean. You should actually do a check. We are currently playing 
the ‘rolling stock’ card, but do you know what that means? It means that I can cancel 
a passenger train to free up a train driver, because rolling stock has first priority. There 
should be no discussion then about the fact that the train is full with passengers and 
that cancelling the train will lead to a crowded platform.”
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4.6.3  Getting stuck in outdated behaviour
The success of the Dutch disruption management model largely depends upon the capac-
ity of local operators to make a correct situation assessment quickly so that a contingency 
plan can be implemented that matches operational conditions. In a time-compressed 
and dynamic environment the availability of information needed to make an accurate 
assessment of the situation is however often challenging, while decisions have to be 
made quickly to prevent the situation from escalating (Salas et al. 2001). Regional traffic 
controllers normally deal with this issue by relying on their experience. In other words, 
they anticipate that a situation will unfold according to earlier experiences and start to 
manage the disruption in line with the anticipated contingency plan, (cf. Schipper, Gerrits, 
& Koppenjan, 2015). This is not an easy task, however, when disruptions are cascading, as 
in the first case, or when operators are confronted with a new and complex situation, as in 
the second case. In those cases understanding of the situation often needs to be adjusted 
on the basis of new insights (Uitdewilligen & Waller 2012). In the broken overhead wire 
case this led to a tension between the desire to implement a contingency plan and the need 
to remain vigilant to changes in the environment.
Plan formulation and remaining vigilant to changes in the environment
The previous section highlighted the risks of managing a disruption without a shared 
plan. To reduce these risks, operators in the OCCR tried to formulate and implement a 
contingency plan as soon as possible. Hence, national traffic controllers urged regional 
traffic controllers to quickly make an assessment of the remaining infrastructure capacity. 
However train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers found it difficult to make an ac-
curate assessment of the complex and evolving situations, either because there was still a 
lot unknown or because any assessment of the situation was soon outdated. For example, 
in the broken overhead wire case it took quite some time to investigate the break in the 
overhead wire and restore power to the overhead lines, while in the winter storm case 
the number of malfunctions reached a total of 26 within an hour. Moreover, in both cases 
we observed that regional traffic controllers struggled to divide their attention between 
making a situation assessment and keeping the traffic flowing to prevent a propagation of 
the disruption. They often preferred to focus on to the latter.
In the second case the implementation of a contingency plan was further delayed be-
cause the unique circumstances meant that predefined plans were not applicable. Hence, 
plans had to be adjusted by hand to the specific circumstances, which is a time-consuming 
task. In the meantime the situation deteriorated rapidly. Local operators of NS were strug-
gling to assign crew members to trains, platform tracks were kept occupied, and trains 
were queuing up in front of the station. Consequently, the issue was no longer just a loss 
of infrastructure capacity due to the broken overhead wire as operators struggled to keep 
control over all resources. Hence, the alternative service plan being implemented no longer 
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matched operational conditions. In fact, the OCCR’s desire to swiftly move on to the plan 
execution phase conflicted with the capacity limits of the local operators, as one of the 
team leaders of the regional traffic control rooms explains:
team Leader: “When they (OCCR) want to implement a contingency plan, which in 
my view happens more often, we are still in the first phase of managing the disrup-
tion. Dealing with the shunting of trains so we can get an overview of the situation 
and to see what is still possible. At that point, there is already a logging in ISVL that we 
will operate according to this contingency plan. When that logging was made we had 
seven trains waiting for a red signal! (…) I believe that there has been a check, but the 
desire of National Traffic Control (to quickly implement the contingency plan) and 
what we could manage in practice, didn’t match.”
Adjusting plans to unexpected changes in environment
The national traffic controller had indeed checked with the regional traffic controllers 
whether they thought the alternative service plan could be implemented. Although the 
regional traffic controllers agreed with the plan, they soon had to revise their judgement 
and make additional cuts to the train service. There was actually quite some doubt among 
the national traffic controllers as to whether the regional traffic controllers had made an 
accurate assessment of the available capacity and if the contingency plan could be imple-
mented. This concern was never fully expressed to the regional traffic controllers, nor did 
they take the time to jointly make a good assessment of the situation in order to detect any 
mistakes. In fact, the operators of ProRail and NS in the OCCR decided not to significantly 
adjust the plans, but to hold on to the chosen contingency plan in order to create stability 
and to re-assess the situation later on to see if additional measures were needed.
Nevertheless, in this case the contingency plan did not lead to a stable train service as 
there was not enough capacity to run all the trains according to the alternative service 
plan. Instead of stability, incremental adjustments had to be made to the contingency plan 
to match it to the changing conditions. This kind of re-planning is not without risks. Not 
only does it lead to unreliable information for passengers, since trains are cancelled at 
last-minute notice, but it also causes confusion among the control centres. Revising a plan 
requires a great deal of renewed coordination between the different control centres and 
increases their communicative burden and workload. This makes the decision to revise a 
plan in progress difficult and highlights the importance of making an accurate assessment 
of the situation. In practice though, operators in the Dutch railway system (at both levels of 
control) often tend to simplify conditions and make a positive estimation of the possibili-
ties to run trains, as a travel information employee (MRI) explains:
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MRI: “What you could witness here was the classical rail spasm, which you see often, 
to say let’s try and see what happens (…) The problem is that you are totally unpredict-
able for the passengers. At best you are predictable in terms of underperformance (…) 
I wonder if we would have had the same problems if we had made bigger cuts to the 
train service. Then afterwards, we could have seen what was still possible and if there 
was room for more. Now we make initial cuts in the train service and start to clean up 
the mess. However, the mess does not become any smaller and we still have to make 
additional cuts.”
4.7  DISCuSSIoN
The analysis of these two large-scale disruptions has shown that leadership is not an easy 
task in a MTS adapting under stress and that adaptive failures form a serious threat to the 
system. In Table 4.4 the barriers to leadership, as found in the previous section, have been 
summarized and contrasted with the markers from Table 4.1. The main findings will be 
discussed in the next section.
table 4.4 Summary of the barriers to leadership observed in the cases
Component observed barriers to leadership
Communication •  Local operators often gave preference to immediate task performance instead of 
providing regular big picture updates to the OCCR or updating the communication 
system.
•  Operators in the OCCR were quickly running behind the facts due to the dynamics of 
the operational environment and communication difficulties.
•  The information provided to the national traffic controllers was often full of details, 
making it difficult for them to grasp the core message.
•  Local control centres bypassed the teams in the OCCR for consultation due to their 
degraded situation awareness.
Performance 
monitoring
•  Leader teams didn’t always take the time to cross-check information with the sender 
to create a shared understanding of the operational environment.
•  Leader teams didn’t always express their doubts regarding the actions of local 
operators.
Back-up 
behaviour
•  Leader teams didn’t always recognize signals as a legitimate need for help
•  National traffic controllers passively waited for a request for help
•  National traffic controllers struggled to proactively provide assistance, due to the lack 
of communication with local operators.
•  Local operators rarely asked for help and sometimes refused the help offered
Decision 
Making
•  Local operators struggled to divide their attention between situation assessment and 
immediate task performance.
•  Leader teams focused on quickly implementing a standard contingency plan despite 
changes within the internal and external environment.
•  Leader teams struggled to decide between holding on to an initial assessment and 
revising plans in progress.
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First of all, we have seen that decompensation is a serious issue in the Dutch railway 
system during large-scale disruptions, as local operators were falling behind the tempo of 
events. To avoid this maladaptive trap, it is important that workload distribution problems 
are noticed quickly and that workload is redistributed or assistance is offered proactively. 
We observed two specific issues in providing back-up behaviour regarding back-up provision 
and requesting and accepting back-up. First of all, operators in the OCCR often struggled 
to adequately monitor the performance of local operators in order to detect whether they 
might need back-up and how this should be provided. Besides performance monitoring, 
it is therefore important that the local operators themselves indicate that they need as-
sistance and that help is accepted when needed.
However, when confronted with increasing demands, local operators are not always able 
to recognize and express their need for assistance. As Smith-Jentsch et al. (2009) notice, 
back-up providers and recipients will weigh up the likely costs and benefits of coordinating 
back-up prior to offering it or requesting it. The interviews revealed that regional traffic 
controllers often refuse help because they prefer to manage things on their own. There is a 
fear among regional traffic controllers of relinquishing control over their process and risk-
ing losing sight of the overall picture in their own region. Moreover, some regional traffic 
controllers actually believe that asking for help is a sign of weakness. Studies have shown 
that factors like trust, team orientation and the experience of working together have a 
positive effect on offering and requesting back-up (Fiore et al., 2003; Smith-Jentsch et al., 
2009). However, given the setting of distributed teams and continuously changing team 
compositions, it can be expected that these factors will be less developed and that requests 
for assistance will be context-specific, as one of the traffic coordinators of ProRail describes:
traffic coordinator: “It strongly depends on who is on the other side of the phone. A 
good regional traffic controller knows when to hand things over, instead of wanting 
to do everything themselves. If I call them and tell them, I will call your colleague, or I 
will take over this part of your work, they shouldn’t mind.”
Secondly, the telephone conversations revealed that signals of back-up needs were not 
always recognized by the operators in the OCCR as a legitimate need for help. This is partly 
due to the fact that the information shared was so detailed that the operators in the OCCR 
were unable to grasp the core message. This shows that just sharing information about 
the situation at hand is not enough, but that it needs to be translated into meaningful 
information for others. However, the telephone conversations also showed that operators 
in the OCCR regularly failed to ask for clarification of the information received in order to 
create a shared understanding of the situation. The interviews revealed that operators in 
the OCCR are often hesitant to cross-check information out of the fear of intervening in the 
work of the local operators.
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Another key issue we identified was the information gap of the teams in the OCCR during 
the management of the disruptions. We expected the OCCR to have an overall understand-
ing of the situation during the disruptions in order to orchestrate the activities of the 
local control centres. On the contrary, we noticed that the OCCR quickly had a degraded 
or outdated situation awareness due to the amount of information that had to be shared 
between teams, inadequate communication lines, and the pace at which the environment 
changed during the disruptions. This shows that effective leadership is not just the result 
of the actions of the leader teams, but that component teams play a critical role in facilitat-
ing the performance of leader teams by maintaining their situation awareness (Salmon 
et al., 2008). As such, component teams should be aware of the kind of information the 
leader teams need and provide regular updates, something which is easily neglected when 
confronted with a high-workload.
Finally, this study has revealed important tensions between coordination by plan and 
the need to remain vigilant to changes. Research has shown that the adaptability of teams 
depends on the speed with which environmental changes are recognized and appropriate 
responses are enacted (Burke et al., 2006). However, local control centres need to contain 
the disruption and make an accurate situation assessment simultaneously. As the cases 
illustrate, it is not always easy to do the latter. The local operators were nevertheless under 
pressure from the OCCR to quickly move to the implementation of a contingency plan. The 
broken overhead wire case showed that situation assessment and plan execution are thus 
not always strictly separated steps, but these activities actually overlapped and even con-
flicted. It resulted in an oversimplification of conditions and in the end the need to revise 
the contingency plan. Hence, disruption management is not always a single, linear process, 
but may involve several rounds of assessment, rectification and adjustment of plans (Go-
lightly et al. 2013). This creates an important challenge for operators in the OCCR, who 
have to decide between holding on to an initial assessment and revising a plan in progress, 
the latter involves a great deal of renewed coordination between the teams involved in the 
disruption management process.
4.8  CoNCLuSIoNS
While most studies have focused on the contribution of leadership to the adaptation 
of single teams, leadership in a multiteam setting poses additional challenges. Both in 
theory (with the development of the concept of polycentric control) and practice (with 
the development of the OCCR) there is a strong belief that complex networks of control 
centres - which pursue their own sub-goals and operate in a dynamic and turbulent en-
vironment - need a higher level of control to coordinate their activities. The main aim of 
this study was to further investigate the role of MTS leadership in a real-world setting. 
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We therefore examined the role of leader teams in the management of two large-scale 
disruptions. This study has shown that operators in the OCCR experienced difficulties in 
recognizing workload problems before local operators lost capacity to control the situation; 
were confronted with an outdated situation awareness when coordinating activities of the 
local control centres, and tended to oversimplify conditions in order to swiftly implement 
standard contingency plans.
The challenges to MTS leadership identified in this study show that it can not be expected 
that polycentric control will instantly occur, simply by placing a leader team above the com-
ponent teams. Leadership in a MTS requires effective teamwork between component and 
leader teams in which the component teams should actually facilitate the leader teams 
in their role. This requires specific interventions, such as joint training sessions, in order to 
gain a better understanding of how other teams function and to improve communication 
and coordination skills (Wilson, Burke, Priest, & Salas, 2005).
Naturally we are aware of the limitations of our study. The two case studies analyzed 
show the behaviour of a specific group of operators dealing with a specific disruption. It 
is therefore difficult to generalize the insights of this study, although we must point out 
that these findings are embedded in broader longitudinal research. As such, a larger body 
of knowledge on the management of disruptions has been collected over a three-year 
period through many hours of observations at the different control centres, interviews with 
operators, and by studying evaluation reports on other disruptions. Hence, the detailed 
descriptions of the findings from these two cases are embedded in a broader understand-
ing of disruption management in the Dutch railway system and the behaviour of operators 
at both levels of control.
With this research we have shown some of the difficulties of providing leadership in a 
MTS. We believe, however, that leadership is important in relation to MTS effectiveness. 
We therefore need further empirical research on leadership in various multiteam systems 
to increase our understanding of the unique challenges of leadership processes in MTS 
and how to deal with them. In addition, in this study we have not focused on leadership 
behaviours prior and subsequent to the management of a disruption, but these transition 
phases can be of importance to the effectiveness of leadership during the management of 
disruptions. Moreover, the coordination between the different leader teams in the OCCR 
fell outside the scope of this study, but poses an interesting challenge in terms of balancing 
the needs of one’s own team or organization and that of the system as a whole. Future 
research on these topics could help our understanding of leadership in a MTS.
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aBStRaCt
Disruptions severely undermine the reliability of railway systems. Consequently, a lot of 
investments are made to improve disruption management. Much has already been written 
about disruption management, often with the purpose of supporting operators in their 
decision making. However, to the best of our knowledge, this literature does not consider 
the structural differences of disruption management in different countries. An overview of 
the various ways in which disruptions are solved and conditions under which that happens 
could help rail infrastructure managers and train operating companies to reconsider the 
ways in which they operate. This paper takes stock of the similarities and differences in how 
disruptions are managed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Of 
importance is not only how these systems work on paper, but above all what happens in 
practice, i.e. the habits and routines that operators have developed for solving disruptions.
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5.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
Train service disruptions pose an important challenge to railways as a reliable mode of 
transport (Golightly & Dadashi, 2017). European railway infrastructure managers (RIM) and 
train operating companies (TOC) have invested considerably in technology to help operators 
solve disruptions. Despite the automation of certain tasks and increasingly sophisticated 
information systems, railway traffic control remains a labour-intensive process performed 
by many thousands of operators working in control centres (Roets & Christiaens, 2015). 
Over the last decades these operators have experienced fundamental changes to the 
environment in which they operate. The introduction of market mechanisms (e.g. Council 
Directive 91/440/EEC), followed by regulations on a single railway market (e.g. Directive 
2012/34/EU) have eroded national railway monopolies. The most important change has 
been the separation between RIMs and TOCs, and emergence of many private and semi-
private or corporatized TOCs. It is therefore justified to speak of a networked instead of an 
integrated system for dealing with disruptions.
In such networked systems, reliable services require more than sound technical equip-
ment and infrastructure. The operators of the RIM and the many TOCs still need to work 
closely together to provide reliable services. Interdependency becomes especially pressing 
during disruption management, when operators at different control centres have to solve 
the complex puzzle of rescheduling timetables, train crews and rolling stock in a coordi-
nated manner. Coordination between control centres can be achieved through pre-defined 
plans and procedures, but ad-hoc measures are often necessary due to the dynamic and 
uncertain conditions under which operators work (Johansson & Hollnagel, 2007). There 
are many studies on railway unbundling and privatization in the academic literature (e.g. 
Link, 2012), but not much attention has been paid to the effects of these policies on the 
daily operations of controllers managing rail traffic and disruptions (See Steenhuisen 
& De Bruijne, 2009 for an exception to the rule). This is an important topic, since these 
restructuring policies and how they have been put into practice, have greatly impacted 
disruption management structures and practices in different countries (De Bruijne & Van 
Eeten, 2007).
Practical experience suggests that there are major differences and similarities in how rail 
systems have structured disruption management processes. A thorough literature search 
showed that there is currently very little research into those differences and similarities. 
We therefore ask: what different types of structures and practices of railway disruption 
management have been developed in European railway systems? We will take stock of both 
disruption management structures and practices in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. Since formalized plans set out in documents do not tell much about 
what happens in reality, our focus will be on actual practices. We will first discuss the main 
elements of the complexity of managing railway disruptions in Section 5.2. The research 
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method is discussed in Section 5.3. Country characteristics are presented in Section 5.4 and 
then categorized in Section 5.5. The conclusions are presented in section 5.6.
5.2  MaNaGING LaRGe CoMPLex INfRaStRuCtuRe SySteMS
Although restructuring policies have had a major impact on the ability of infrastructure 
industries to provide reliable services, not much is known on how these networks of orga-
nizations have been organized to reliably operate these systems (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, 
Müller-Seitz, Raab, & Sydow, 2017; De Bruijne, 2006). We start from the premise that 
disruptions in rail services will occur, and that their impact has to be minimized in order to 
return to normal services as soon as possible. We therefore want to understand how these 
disruptions are managed in different systems and how operators coordinate their actions 
during the process of managing disruptions. We thus see reliability as the ability of an 
organization to anticipate and contain incidents in the course of its operation (Berthod et 
al., 2017). This places an emphasis on how systems manage their adaptive capacity to suc-
cessfully manage disruptions (Branlat & Woods, 2010; Hémond & Robert, 2012; Mattsson 
& Jenelius, 2015). Complex systems have to deal with trade-offs that bound their adaptive 
performance (cf. Hoffman & Woods, 2011). In this paper, we focus on two such trade-offs: 
(a) decentralized versus centralized structure, and (b) anticipation versus resilience.
The occurrence of unexpected disruptions in complex systems places an emphasis on a 
decentralized structure, because detailed knowledge of the local context and direct control 
over resources give local actors the flexibility required to deal with these non-routine situ-
ations (Perrow, 1999). However, Perrow (ibid.) warns against the tight-coupling of complex 
systems and the risk of cascading failures. Disruptions can severely compromise the capac-
ity of local operators to keep an overview of and control over the situation (Schipper, 2017). 
As a result decisions made locally do not always contribute to the overall performance 
of the system. One solution for this problem is to centralize control in order to facilitate 
rapid and decisive coordinated action. Centralized control, however, is not without its dif-
ficulties. Decisions require that a considerable volume of information is shared between 
the different levels of control; something that is not always possible when working under 
stress (Branlat & Woods, 2010; Schipper, 2017). Consequently, decisions may be perpetually 
lagging behind the actual local situation. It is therefore necessary to find the right balance 
between decentralized and centralized decision making.
The second trade-off concerns anticipation versus resilience (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; 
Wildavsky, 1988). The anticipation approach involves the prediction of potential failures or 
disruptions in order to plan ahead (Stephenson, 2010). Part of this planning is the develop-
ment of pre-defined coordination mechanisms, e.g. contingency plans, rules, and proce-
dures, that specify roles and tasks for all operators. Pre-defined coordination mechanisms 
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reduces coordination issues between actors, subsequently increasing responsiveness. 
However, it remains impossible to anticipate every situation. For instance, the type, loca-
tion, and timing of an incident will influence the effectiveness of the response (Golightly & 
Dadashi, 2017). Consequently, there needs to be discretionary room for operators to modify 
plans to the specific situation through mutual adjustment and improvisation (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006). Real time adaptation can be considered a resilience9 approach that substitutes fore-
sight for the reactive capacity of control room operators and focuses on their expertise and 
tacit knowledge (Roe & Schulman, 2008). However, an improvised response still needs to be 
swift and coordinated when dealing with a rapidly changing environment. Hence, anticipa-
tion and resilience are not mutually exclusive but constitute a trade-off when developing 
an effective response (Comfort, Sungu, Johnson, & Dunn, 2001).
There is not one single, optimal way of dealing with these trade-offs in general; and each 
railway systems will balance these trade-offs in specific ways (Woods & Branlat, 2011b). 
Yet, the extent of these trade-offs in various European countries is currently unknown. This, 
then, is the motive of the current research. We will categorize the different national struc-
tures and practices of disruption management, with a focus on the trade-offs discussed 
above. Disruption management happens within the specific context of a country that (dis)
allows for certain solutions. We will first look at the characteristics of the different railway 
systems, i.e. the length of the rail network, the number of train operating companies, the 
average daily number of trains being operated, and the relationship between the RIM and 
TOCs. Next, we will present the different roles and teams involved in disruption manage-
ment and the relationships between them (section 5.4). Please note that our focus is on 
the rescheduling of resources (timetable, train crew, rolling stock), i.e. we only consider 
operators working at the control centres, not those directly involved in the management 
of an incident or emergency, e.g. emergency services or repair crew. We will then turn to 
the actual disruption management process itself and categorize the countries in terms of 
centralization vs. decentralization, and anticipation vs. resilience (sections 5.5 and 5.6). 
For both trade-offs we have selected several items with which to categorize the countries. 
These items are derived from various strands of literature and are summarized in Table 5.1.
9 We acknowledge that this is a simplified application of the concept of resilience, aimed at address-
ing the fact that disruptions fall outside the design principles of systems and systems thus require 
additional adaptive capacity. For a more elaborate discussion on resilience, see e.g. Boin & van 
Eeten, 2013; McManus, 2008; Stephenson, 2010; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007.
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table 5.1 List of items and their descriptions used in order to categorize the various countries. Items 
are scored from 1 (centralized/anticipation) to 5 (decentralized/resilience).
trade-off a: centralization (item score 1) vs. decentralization (item score 5)
Item Description Measurement References
Distribution of 
control centres
This concerns the number of control 
centres and the distribution across the 
country.
Low number and 
limited distribution: 
1; high number and 
distribution: 5
(Golightly et al., 
2013; Stanton, 
Ashleigh, 
Roberts, & Xu, 
2001; JWilson & 
Norris, 2006)
Allocation of decision 
rights during 
disruption
This concerns the issue where decisions 
on alternative service plans are made: 
locally or centralized
Centralized 
decision-making: 
1; decentralized 
decision-making: 5
(Branlat & 
Woods, 2010; 
Stanton et al., 
2012)
Autonomy of local 
control centres
This concerns the extent to which local 
control centres can make autonomous 
decisions on the rescheduling of rail 
traffic
Little autonomy: 
1; considerable 
autonomy: 5
(Perrow, 1999; 
Woods & 
Shattuck, 2000)
Structure and lines of 
communication
This concerns the information flows 
between the control centres and the 
operators that process the information
Centralized 
information flows: 1; 
distributed flows: 5
(Houghton et al., 
2006)
Co-location of RIM 
and TOCs
This concerns the issue whether RIM 
and TOC’s are located in the same 
control room
Co-location: 1; full 
separation: 5
(Goodwin et al., 
2012; Jespersen-
Groth et al., 
2009)
trade-off B: anticipation (item score 1) vs. resilience (item score 5)
Item Description Measurement References
Role of contingency 
plans
This concerns the number of 
contingency plans and how these plans 
are used in practice.
Strict reliance on 
pre-defined plans: 
1; reliance on 
improvisation: 5
(Chu & Oetting, 
2013; Golightly 
& Dadashi, 2017)
Automation of 
control
This concerns the availability and use of 
automated control that can support or 
replace human control and monitoring
Emphasis on 
automation: 1; 
manual control: 5
(Golightly et al., 
2013; Stanton et 
al., 2001)
Institutionalization of 
shared sensemaking
This concerns the extent to which 
shared sensemaking is organized and 
institutionalized
Organized 
sensemaking: 
1; no organized 
sensemaking: 5
(Merkus et al., 
2016; Schipper 
& Gerrits, 
2017; Waller & 
Uitdewilligen, 
2008)
Use of dispatching 
rules
This concerns the availability and use of 
dispatching rules
Strict employment 
of dispatching rules: 
1; no dispatching 
rules: 5
(Corman, 
D’Ariano, 
Hansen, & 
Pacciarelli, 2011; 
Zhang, Lei, 
Wang, & Zeng, 
2013)
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5.3  MethoDS
The focus on disruption management practices required observations and interviews, which 
were conducted during site visits to national control rooms and regional (or decentral) con-
trol centres from September 2015 until October 2016. Site visits commonly lasted 2 to 3 full 
days, most of which would be spent on observation time in the control rooms. In all cases 
we were granted unrestricted access to all operations and all operators. We observed daily 
operations to see how operators interacted, and if and how certain protocols, procedures 
etc. were followed. This included emergency meetings whenever disruptions took place. 
All observations were carried out by two or three researchers, each taking detailed note. 
These reports were compared to prevent misinterpretations and the omission of important 
details.
In addition, we interviewed operators as well as managers on location when daily opera-
tions allowed for it. The duration of these interviews varied greatly, from 15 minutes to 
2 hours. Due to their confidential nature we were unable to make audio recordings. The 
researchers took detailed notes during each interview. The resulting reports were then 
compared for the reasons mentioned above. Forty-nine respondents were interviewed, as 
listed in Table 5.2. The Netherlands appears underrepresented in the sample, but consider-
able data for this country has already been collected and published (cf. Schipper et al., 2015; 
Schipper, 2017). We also obtained detailed presentations and written documentation on 
the standard operating procedures and organizational structure of each railway system. 
These materials supplemented our own observation and interview reports. The research 
findings have been returned to the contact persons in each country for a member-check to 
correct incomplete or incorrect data. All data obtained was used by the authors to charac-
terize and categorize the different countries on the basis of the items in Table 5.1. Each item 
was given a score ranging from 1 to 5. Since there is no theoretical reason to prioritize an 
item, we assigned equal weight to all items.
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table 5.2 Overview of respondents per country and organization, in order of meeting
Country function Country function
Austria Belgium
Regional traffic 
control Innsbruck
Regional leader Central traffic 
control
Deputy operational planning
Executive leader Team leader operational 
planning
Leader traffic and production Manager operational planning
Manager operations Developer communication 
system
Regional coordinator Planner
Emergency coordinator General supervisor
Train dispatcher Kufstein Traffic officer
Regional traffic controller 
Wörgl
Team leader Antwerp
Central traffic 
control
Leader traffic control Regional traffic controller
Traffic and production 
manager
Signal house 
Brussels
Instructor
Denmark Germany
Central traffic 
control
Director Banedanmark Central traffic 
control
Shift leader
Manager traffic control Traffic controller West
Punctuality manager DSB Network coordinator
Director disruptions DSB Network coordinator
Duty officer Local control centre 
Frankfurt
Coordinator Frankfurt
Monitor freight traffic Deputy coordinator
Duty officer DSB Emergency coordinator
Local control centre 
Copenhagen
Manager Copenhagen Train dispatcher
Duty officer
Train dispatcher
Train dispatcher
Rail signaller
Rail signaller
Manager Frankfurt
S-train Copenhagen Duty officer
DB Frankfurt region Monitor rolling stock DB
Traffic information DB
Coordinator DB
Netherlands
Local control centre 
Utrecht
Team leader
Train dispatcher
Regional traffic controller
Regional traffic controller
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5.4  CouNtRy DeSCRIPtIoNS
First, a brief overview of the core characteristics of each country is given, followed by a 
description of the roles and responsibilities of the operators, and the relationships between 
the operators. Roles and communications lines have been visualized in Figures 5.1 to 5.5. 
Disruption management practices are discussed in Section 5.5. Please note that different 
countries use different terms for similar positions or roles and that it was not always pos-
sible to harmonize these terms into English. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the terms 
used in this paper.
table 5.3 Description of the different roles
Role Description
Signaller An operator who is responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity 
through the control of rail switches and signals. This operator implements 
rescheduling decisions made by the regional traffic controller.
Train Dispatcher An operator who is responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity 
through the control of rail switches and signals. This operator is allowed 
to reschedule the traffic plan for its own small area of control.
Regional Traffic Controller Is responsible for the optimization of rail traffic flows in a specific 
geographical area.
Network Traffic Controller Oversees railway traffic at a national level
Network Operations 
Controller
Manages train operations for the main TOC at a national level
Team leader/ Duty Officer/ 
Shift Leader/ Team Supervisor
Oversees the work of a group of operators in a control centre and 
communicates with other control centres
5.4.1  Denmark
National Characteristics
The Danish railway network measures 2,667 kilometres, 2,132 of which is managed by 
RIM Banedanmark. Banedanmark is a government agency under the Ministry of Transport 
and Building. The railway network is moderately centralized with most traffic converging 
around Copenhagen. Only the main line to Sweden and Germany and the S-train network 
of Copenhagen are electrified. Outside of the Copenhagen region, the network is relatively 
simple with mostly non-electrified, single tracks. There are four cross-border connections 
to neighbouring countries, one of which is by train ferry. Passenger trains make 2,700 runs 
per day on average, adding up to a total of 5.84 billion passenger kilometres per year. Most 
of the trains are operated by DSB, which is state-owned and works on a for-profit basis. 
Some smaller lines in the west of the country are operated by Arriva and offer regional train 
services. Freight traffic is relatively small in volume, with most traffic running between 
Sweden and Germany.
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Structure and relationships between roles and teams
The main line and regional network are monitored by train dispatchers of Banedanmark 
working in four regional control centres (Regional FjernstyringsCentral, RFC). Unlike other 
countries in this study, in Denmark only one position (train dispatcher) has been tasked 
with both monitoring the safe allocation of tracks and optimizing traffic flows in specific 
areas. Train dispatchers usually make use of computers to operate signals and switches, 
but in some cases switches are still operated using control panels. Each regional control 
centre has a duty officer who is in charge of operations and oversees the work of the train 
dispatchers. The duty officer also communicates with the national control centre (Drift Cen-
ter Danmark, DCDK) during a disruption. The DCDK was established in 2006. Banedanmark 
and DSB are co-located here.
DCDK’s main task is to monitor long-distance traffic and to assume a supervisory role if 
disruptions occur that could potentially impact the overall performance of the network. 
Banedanmark has 4 traffic controllers who monitor long-distance rail passenger services 
in the west and east of Denmark, the Coast Line, the international services to Sweden and 
Germany, and freight traffic. DCDK’s traffic controllers use the same traffic management 
system as train dispatchers in the RFC. It provides them with highly detailed information 
on the local situation and allows them to swiftly assess the impact of a disruption. Train 
dispatchers have to explain every delay of more than 3 minutes, which they note in the 
traffic management system. Operators in the DCDK can then simply click on a train to see 
why it is delayed and assess whether it is necessary to intervene. In addition to this, there is 
a communication system that allows Banedanmark’s operators to provide each other with 
more details on a disruption using short text messages.
On the other side of the control room, just separated by monitors and facing the Bane-
danmark team, a team of DSB monitor their operations. Two operators monitor the rail 
traffic and time-table deviations. There are also 8 operators who reschedule rolling stock 
and train crew when needed. Both the Banedanmark and DSB teams in the DCDK have 
a duty officer who is in charge of the team and oversees the operators’ work. Most com-
munication is assigned to these duty officers in order to structure the flows of information. 
Communication with the emergency services has also been centralized in the DCDK to 
avoid miscommunications.
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Network Traffic Control
Banedanmark
Duty Officer
Train Dispatchers
Network Operations 
Control
DSB
Drift Center 
Danmark 
(DCDK)
Regional 
Fjernstyrings
Central 
(RFC)
Communication
figure 5.1 Coordination structure in Denmark
5.4.2  austria
National Characteristics
The Austrian railway network measures almost 5,000 kilometres in length, most of which 
electrifi ed, and is managed by ÖBB-Infrastruktur. A considerable chunk of the infrastruc-
ture is concentrated in and around the capital of Vienna. Long-distance (high-speed) lines 
connect the capital to other major cities in Austria, as well as to other European cities. 
Austria’s central location in Europe means that there are many cross-border connections 
to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Germany and Switzerland. Much 
of the freight traffi c between Germany and Italy passes through the Tirol region. ÖBB-
Personenverkehr is the largest train operating company. It operates an average of 4,000 
train runs per day, with a total of 10.28 billion passenger kilometres per year. Some smaller 
TOCs also operate cross-border connections as well as regional, and intercity services. Both 
ÖBB-Infrastruktur and ÖBB-personenverkehr belong to ÖBB-Holding AG, which is owned 
entirely by the Republic of Austria.
Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Railway traffi c on the main rail lines is monitored from fi ve regional traffi c control centres 
(Betriebsfühhrungszentralen, BFZ). Traffi c management is carried out by a regional traffi c 
controller or Zuglenker. Rail traffi c operations are mainly automated using the ARAMIS traffi c 
management system, which makes it possible to track train positions and potential confl icts 
in real-time. In such cases, the system generates operational solutions. Moreover, routes 
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(switches and signals) are automatically set, and passenger information is automatically 
adjusted. However, not all rail lines can be fully controlled from the BFZ and are managed 
from signal boxes located at stations. Hence, while signallers (Fahrdienstleiter-Stellbereich) 
in the BFZ are solely tasked with monitoring the safe allocation of rail capacity, signallers at 
the stations still operate switches and signals by order of the Zuglenker. ÖBB-Infrastruktur 
is also tasked with shunting operations. Consequently, signallers are quite busy with moni-
toring these operations. Each BFZ has an operations coordinator (Betriebskoordinator, Beko), 
who is the central operational actor. He or she communicates with the TOCs, neighbouring 
regional traffi c control centres at home and abroad, and the national traffi c control centre 
in Vienna. During a local disruption, the Beko will decide on a contingency plan and moni-
tor the workload of all employees. An emergency coordinator (Notfallkoordinator or Noko) 
communicates with the emergency services and manages all emergencies in a specifi c 
system (REM), which can be accessed by all parties in the rail system.
The central control room in Vienna (Verkehrsleitzentrale Wien or VLZ) was established in 
2006. ÖBB-Infrastruktur and Personenverkehr are co-located in the VLZ. The VLZ has two 
operators of ÖBB-Infrastruktur who monitor the rail traffi c on Austria’s north-south and 
east-west corridors. There is also an operator responsible for the management of all infor-
mation during a crisis and a network coordinator who communicates with the TOCs, both at 
home and abroad, and informs management. A team of operators from ÖBB-Infrastruktur 
and Personenverkehr jointly manage both rolling stock and train crew for the whole of 
ÖBB-personenverkehr. Operators from ÖBB-Personenverkehr monitor the connections 
between trains and update passenger information on the website.
Network Traffic Control
ÖBB-Infrastruktur
Regional Traffic 
Control 
(Zuglenker)
Rail Signaller
(Stellbereich)
Network Operations 
Control
ÖBB-Personenverkehr
Verkehrsleit-
zentrale
(VLZ)
Betriebsfühhrungs
-zentralen
(BFZ)
Communication
Team Leader
(Betriebskoordinator
)
figure 5.2 Coordination structure in Austria
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5.4.3  Germany
National Characteristics
Deutsche Bahn (DB) Netz AG manages 33,295 kilometres of rail lines, the largest network in 
Europe. Due to Germany’s central position in Europe, 6 out of 9 European freight corridors 
run through this country. Subsequently, rail freight transport volumes are quite high. The 
busiest sections are the corridors between the North Sea ports (Rotterdam/Antwerp) to 
the Alpine countries (Swiss, Austria, and Italy), Frankfurt – Hamburg, and the Ruhr area to 
Berlin and further. DB Netz monitors about 45,000 train runs, consisting of approximately 
39,000 passenger trains and almost 5,500 freight trains, on a daily basis. A total of 76.93 
billion passenger kilometres are travelled annually. DB Netz is one of the subsidiaries of 
Deutsche Bahn AG, others being DB Fernverkehr (long distance traffic), DB Regio (local and 
regional traffic), and DB Cargo. DB Fernverkehr is the almost-exclusive provider of long-
distance passenger services. While there is far more competition on the regional and the 
cargo rail market in particular, DB Regio and Cargo still dominate both markets. Still, there 
are almost 400 TOCs operating on the German rail network, 360 of which are not part of 
the DB holding.
Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Railway traffic is managed from seven regional control centres (Betriebszentrale, BZ). How-
ever, only a relatively small number of the more than 12,000 signallers nationwide work 
in the BZs and use computers for setting switches and signals. There are still over 3,400 
operational signal boxes from which switches and signals are set: some even use manually 
operated mechanical levers. A BZ has ten train dispatchers (Zugdisponent) on average, who 
monitor the traffic flows on specific line sections and nodes. They manage conflicts be-
tween trains with the help of predefined dispatching rules. During a disruption, they take 
the first measures to isolate the disrupted area with the help of their traffic management 
system LeiDis-NK. They also take note of the reasons behind delays and disruptions in the 
traffic management system.
In addition, there are two or three regional traffic controllers (Bereichsdisponent) who 
oversee the work of the Zugdisponenten from a different control room. The Bereichsdis-
ponent manages requests and complaints from TOCs, for example regarding connecting 
services. They also manage disruptions in consultation with the TOCs. The Netzkoordinator 
supervises all activities of the BZ. During large-scale disruptions, the coordinator commu-
nicates with the TOCs and neighbouring control centres. He or she also has the final say if 
there is a conflict of interest, or resources of the TOCs might be needed to solve the disrup-
tion. An emergency manager (Notfallmanager) manages incidents and communicates with 
the emergency services.
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In 1997, a national control room (Netleitzentrale or NLZ) was established in Frankfurt 
am Main. Here, three to four operators (Bereichskoordinator) monitor long-distance and 
international rail traffi c along the main corridors. Each Bereichskoordinator is responsible 
for two or more BZs. Together they monitor around 800 passenger trains and 1,200 freight 
trains per day. In addition, they coordinate with the traffi c control in neighbouring coun-
tries. The NLZ also has a coordinator (Netzkoordinator). The Netzkoordinator mainly has a 
supervisory role during extreme disruptions and severe weather conditions. The coordina-
tor in the NLZ has the fi nal say in the event of a disagreement between actors on a national 
level. During normal operations the Netzkoordinator is mainly occupied with monitoring 
the entire rail network and writing daily reports for senior management.
Network Traffic Control
DB-Netz AG
Regional Traffic 
Control 
(Bereichsdisponent)
Train 
Dispatcher
(Zugdisponent)
Netzleitzentrale
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Communication
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(Netzkoordinator)
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(Fahrdienstleiter)
Over 400 train 
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with different control 
centres
figure 5.3 Coordination structure in Germany
5.4.4  the Netherlands
National Characteristics
The Dutch railway network measures more than 3,000 kilometres in length, often with 
double or quadruple tracks, and is mostly electrifi ed. The network is dense around the four 
largest cities in the west of the country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht), 
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with Utrecht being the most important node in the railway network. The main network is 
exclusively served by Netherlands Railways (Nederlandse Spoorwegen or NS). Some regional 
or secondary lines are operated by various smaller TOCs. The Dutch rail network is one of 
the busiest rail networks in Europe (per kilometre of rail track), with almost 5,500 pas-
senger train runs per day and a total of 15.31 billion passenger kilometres annually. There 
is also considerable freight traffic between Germany, Belgium and the ports of Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam, although overall freight traffic is relatively low. The network is managed 
by the state-owned RIM ProRail.
Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Rail traffic is managed from 13 regional traffic control centres (Verkeersleidingspost). 
Each centre has one or two regional traffic controllers (Decentale verkeersleider, DVL) who 
optimize the traffic flows in their control area and process orders from the TOCs. There 
are also several train dispatchers (Treindienstleiders, TDL), whose main responsibility is the 
safe allocation of rail capacity on specific sections (nodes) assigned to them. All switches 
and signals are operated using computer-based control. In addition, train dispatchers re-
schedule the rail traffic in their own control areas (mostly around large stations). The latter 
task is delegated to the DVL. A team leader monitors the crew’s workload. NS also has five 
regional control centres (Regionale Bijsturingscentra) to manage its train crew and rolling 
stock. These control centres more of less mirror those of ProRail. This means that there are 
two operators to monitor traffic flows (they communicate with the DVL), node coordinators 
to arrange the shunting of trains and manage train crew at the major train stations (they 
communicate with the train dispatcher), and a shift leader (who communicates with the 
team leader). There are also several operators tasked with the management of rolling stock 
and train crew.
The central Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR) was established in 2010. The OCCR 
houses all parties involved in the rail operations under one roof to improve collaboration 
and communication. Consequently, a wide range of specialized teams can be found in the 
OCCR, including ICT, asset management, maintenance contractors, and a freight operator. 
All TOCs have been invited to take up workstations, but NS is the only passenger TOC active 
in the OCCR. Back-office functions have also been centralized. Back-office employees collect 
all information on disruptions and malfunctions in a specific system, alarm emergency 
services and contractors, and provide updates on the management of the disruptions. Each 
team in the OCCR is represented by a director (regisseur). These directors meet at the begin-
ning and end of every shift at meetings chaired by a coordinator (Landelijk Coordinator Rail). 
During a major disruption the directors will often come together to provide each other with 
updates and to make joint decisions.
Operators of ProRail’s traffic management and NS’s operations management in the 
OCCR monitor rail traffic on a national level and coordinate the activities of the regional 
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control centres. Two operators from ProRail monitor the rail traffi c on the main corridors 
and communicate with the regional traffi c controllers (DVL). The director of the national 
traffi c control communicates directly with the team leaders of the regional control centres. 
Their NS counterparts monitor the traffi c and rolling stock on a national level to optimize 
punctuality and the distribution of rolling stock over the regions.
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figure 5.4 Coordination structure in the Netherlands
5.4.5  Belgium
National Characteristics
The Belgian network measures around 3,600 kilometres. Most of the network is electrifi ed 
and around two-thirds feature double or more tracks. The network is particularly dense 
in the Flemish part of the country, marked by the cities of Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent and 
Leuven. Brussels forms an important, but fragile, node in the north-south and east-west 
corridors. The infrastructure is managed by the state-owned autonomous company In-
frabel. In 2014 Infrabel was separated from the sole provider of passenger services, the 
state-owned autonomous company NMBS (or SNBC in French). There is more competition 
in the freight sector, with around 11 freight operating companies. NMBS operates around 
4160 train runs per day, which adds up to a total of 10.4 billion kilometres per year.
Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Belgium has around 91 signal boxes. This number has been reduced signifi cantly over the 
years with the introduction of new traffi c control systems, which should result in central-
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izing of control to initially 31 and later 10 regional control centres. Operators in the signal 
boxes monitor rail traffic at three different control levels. At the lowest level signallers (op-
eratoren) operate the switches and signals and set the route of a train. The next rung in the 
hierarchy is occupied by the traffic controllers (toezichtbedienden) who monitor the work 
of the signallers and are responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity. At the highest 
level, there is one operator (regelaar), who is in charge of the entire team and operations in 
the area monitored by the local control centre. The specific task of the local control centres 
is the safe allocation of rail capacity.
Rail traffic management is conducted by operators in the national control centre (Railway 
Operations Center or ROC). They decide on the rescheduling of trains in the event of delays, 
disturbances or disruptions. The local control centres have to implement these decisions. In 
the ROC Infrabel and NMBS work very closely together. The country has been divided into 
four regions, each of which has been assigned a team, composed of operators from Infrabel 
and NMBS who manage the rail traffic. Belgium has a language divide between the Dutch 
and the French speaking regions. Consequently, the ROC has been divided in French and 
Dutch speaking teams, even though operators are supposed to speak both languages. The 
high-speed lines to France, Germany and the Netherlands are managed by a separate team. 
The regions themselves are also subdivided into two or three sections containing several 
rail lines. Regional traffic controllers of Infrabel (Lijnregelaars) monitor the rail traffic on 
one or more rail lines. To manage the rail traffic, the regional traffic controllers need to be 
in close contact with the local control centres. Interestingly however, the Lijnregelaars can 
also directly communicate with train drivers and even place an emergency call. This makes 
it possible for the Lijnregelaars to immediately intervene in the rail traffic. Besides the 
regional traffic controllers, there are two operators of NMBS, in each team, who monitor 
their own passenger trains.
With NMBS and Infrabel operators being part of one co-located team it is very easy for 
them to discuss matters face-to-face. Although there is a lot of flexibility within the teams 
in terms of roles and providing each other with back-up, interaction between the teams 
appears limited. Each team clearly functions as a separate entity, supervised by a team 
leader from both Infrabel and NMBS. A Traffic Officer and General Supervisor coordinate 
the activities of the four teams and monitor their workload. During normal operations 
they are responsible for collecting information on regular delays and writing management 
reports. Positioned in the middle of the control room are NMBS operators, who manage all 
the rolling stock and train crew and provide technical support to the train drivers. Overall, 
much communication is conducted by phone. An advanced notification system is currently 
being developed to reduce oral communication.
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figure 5.5 Coordination structure in Belgium
5.5  SIMILaRItIeS aND DIffeReNCeS BetweeN DISRuPtIoN MaNaGeMeNt 
PRaCtICeS
Having discussed team roles and responsibilities, we will now turn our attention to actual 
disruption management practices. The two trade-offs identifi ed in the introduction are 
used to characterize and categorize the countries: centralization versus decentralization, 
and anticipation versus resilience. The items from Table 5.1 structure the observations.
5.5.1  Rail traffi c control: centralized or decentralized?
Distribution of control centres
The overview in Section 5.4 revealed some major differences in the centralization of traffi c 
control. Although all rail systems show an increased automatization and centralization of 
traffi c control, the Dutch railway system is the only one to have fully replaced its signal 
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boxes with modern regional control centres equipped with computerized control systems. 
In the other countries signalling is still controlled using a mix of mechanical lever frames, 
control panels and computers. Hence, Austria, Belgium, and Germany feature a decentral-
ized network of signal boxes. The Dutch rail system is also an outlier with regard to the 
decentralized management of train crew and rolling stock by the main TOC. In Denmark, 
Belgium, and Austria the main TOCs have mostly integrated these processes in national 
control centres. In Germany there are numerous control centres from which the many dif-
ferent TOCs manage their operations. For instance, Deutsche Bahn has control rooms for lo-
cal rail traffic (Transportleitung Personenverkehrs) and long-distance traffic (Verkehrsleitung 
Fernverkehr). Not all of these control rooms have been integrated in the Betriebszentrale of 
DB Netz.
Allocation of decision rights during disruption
In the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium decision-making during a disruption is done in 
the national control centres. Hence, no matter what impact a disruption has, the national 
control centre will decide on an alternative service plan. In Belgium and Denmark this 
alternative service plan is mostly the result of joint decision-making by the TOC and IM, 
whereas in Belgium, decisions are made within each of the four teams. In the Netherlands 
consultation between the RIM and TOC is also important, but the TOC will decide on the 
alternative service plan within the boundaries set by the RIM. In Germany, decision mak-
ing is decentralized, with the Betriebszentralen making most decisions on rescheduling 
rail traffic. The Netzleitzentrale’s role is to coordinate the decisions made by the different 
Betriebszentralen with regard to long-distance traffic. As such, their involvement in the 
management of a disruption depends on the situation but is usually restrained. The author-
ity to make decisions during disruptions in Austria is divided between local traffic (BFZ) and 
long-distance traffic (Verkehrsleitzentrale). The BFZ manages the disruptions in their own 
region, in consultation with the TOCs, and only has to consult with the Verkehrsleitzentrale 
over long-distance traffic.
Autonomy of local control centres
There are also differences regarding the distribution of authority and the division of 
responsibilities between the different layers of control. In Belgium signal boxes are specifi-
cally there to guarantee safe allocation of rail capacity. Decisions on rescheduling rail traffic 
are exclusively made by the operators in the ROC. This strict separation of responsibilities 
between both layers of control seems to work quite well and the hierarchical structure 
appeared undisputed. In the Netherlands and Denmark, local traffic controllers are tasked 
with the optimization of rail traffic in their own area of control, while national operators 
monitor rail traffic on the main corridors. However, consultation with the national opera-
tors is mandatory if rescheduling decisions taken by the regional traffic controllers affect 
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multiple regions. In the Netherlands we noticed that it is not always clear to operators at 
what point a local issue becomes a super-regional problem, resulting in ambiguity concern-
ing when and how national operators should intervene in local operations (see chapter 4).
The Austrians also used to experience a diffuse separation of roles and responsibilities 
between local and national control centres, which often led to conflicts between the BFZ 
and the VLZ. Subsequently, the VLZ was made solely responsible for the management 
of long-distance and international services. The BFZ have to consult with the VLZ when 
rescheduling long-distance trains. The BZ in Germany have considerable autonomy within 
their own region. The NLZ monitors the actions of the BZ and only intervenes during major 
disruptions, when long-distance traffic in multiple regions is affected. In practice, we ob-
served that intuition also plays an important role in Germany with regard to the decision to 
intervene in local operations and therefore there are no strict boundaries.
Structure and lines of communication
The communication structure of the different countries can be traced in Figures 5.1 to 
5.5. The distinct structure of the Dutch system stands out because of its density. In the 
Netherlands, both the RIM and the main TOC have several local control centres that inter-
act directly with each other. Moreover, there are also many direct connections between 
operators in these different control centres. This has produced a denser and more complex 
communication network in contrast to the other countries. Although a dense network fa-
cilitates the swift dissemination of information, it also means less control over information 
flows and more coordination costs (Schipper et al., 2015). In the other countries we noticed 
a much more centralized communication structure in which team leaders communicated 
with the national control centres, and vice versa. Of course, the co-location of the RIM 
and main TOC in Belgium, Denmark, and Austria also greatly reduces the communication 
burden. In Germany, communication with the numerous TOCs forms a major challenge. In 
all of the countries except Belgium, ICT facilitates the distribution of information to the 
TOCs and national control centres. For instance, the traffic controllers in the VLZ receive 
most information about disruptions from the traffic management system and the railway 
emergency management system. On the basis of this information they decide whether to 
intervene in the long-distance traffic or to leave the management of the disruption to the 
BFZ. This is less of an issue in Belgium because the ROC performs a somewhat different role 
than national control centres elsewhere.
Co-location of RIM and TOCs
The extent of competition and, subsequently, the unbundling of infrastructure manage-
ment and rail operations varies significantly between the countries. The Netherlands, 
Denmark, and recently Belgium implemented a more or less complete unbundling of 
infrastructure management and train service operations, while this is less the case in Ger-
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many and Austria, where the RIM and the main TOC are part of the same holding. However, 
there is far more competition on the German rail network than in the other countries. The 
fragmentation of train operating services has an important influence on the relationship 
between the RIM and TOCs in the disruption management process. In Germany we found 
that although some TOCs (mostly regional branches of DB) are co-located in the BZs, most 
of them have opted to use their own control centres. In the other countries, where there 
is less competition even though legal unbundling is more predominant, we still see a 
very strong relationship between the RIM and the historically dominant TOC. In all these 
countries the RIM and TOC are co-located in the national control centre. Integration is 
strongest in Belgium where the teams consist of operators from both Infrabel and NMBS. 
Here, co-location facilitates joint decision-making through face-to-face communication. In 
Germany we noticed a stricter separation between the processes of DB Netz and the TOCs. 
Standardized text messages are sent via e-mail or text message (Strecken.info) in order to 
quickly notify all TOCs of a disruption (planned and unplanned) so that they can adjust 
their operations. TOCs can also make use of DB Netz’s traffic management system, which 
gives them a real-time overview of their own trains and potential delays. However, they 
are unable to monitor services operated by other TOCs because DB Netz wants to avoid 
potential discussions about unfair treatment.
5.5.2  Disruption management: anticipation or resilience?
Role of contingency plans
The Dutch railway system relies strongly on predefined contingency plans (Versperrings-
maatregel). Numerous alternative service plans have been developed by ProRail and NS for 
almost all kinds of disruptions, on all lines. A quick implementation of a contingency plan 
should prevent a propagation of the disruption and facilitate coordination between the 
different control centres. Accordingly, trains are not rerouted, with the exception of inter-
national and cargo trains. Instead, passengers are advised to use an alternative route or 
alternative transport (busses). This reliance on contingency plans is not without its difficul-
ties. In practice, defining, checking, and implementing a contingency plan requires consid-
erable communication between the different control centres. In addition, small deviations 
or changes in the operational environment might make these static plans infeasible, which 
in practice necessitates a real-time adjustment of plans. In Austria contingency plans have 
been developed for the most common disruptions. Although these contingency plans are 
detailed and numerous, they mainly serve as a template for the operators managing the 
disruption. Hence, on-the-spot decision making is still dominant and the final solution de-
pends on the specific circumstances. In other words, there appears to be more operational 
flexibility in Austria than in the Netherlands.
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In the other countries we noticed that the use of contingency plans is much less com-
mon or almost non-existent. For example, in Denmark there are around 30 predefined 
contingency plans, but these plans are often revised. During disruptions, operators of 
Banedanmark and DSB gather in an emergency room in the DCDK to decide on an alterna-
tive plan on-the-spot. This makes the disruption management process in Denmark more 
flexible, but also very dependent on the team of operators in charge. We also observed that 
most of these ad-hoc plans are not recorded for later use, so the solution is often lost after 
the disruption is solved. Another issue concerns the fact that both parties have to reach 
consensus in the heat of the moment. Similarly, in Belgium operators stressed the unique 
characteristics of every disruption and therefore the need for improvisation. During our 
observations we were struck by the fluidity of the teams and the amount of implicit coordi-
nation, i.e. their actions seemed coordinated despite relatively limited communication and 
the absence of a predefined plan. In Germany contingency plans have been developed with 
the TOCs for the main lines, but not for the entire network. These plans also mainly serve 
as a template. For instance, it is a common practice to reroute long-distance trains during 
disruptions, which is something the large and dense network allows for (many stations can 
be reached through various routes). These alternative routes are not part of a predefined 
plan, but the operators rely on their extensive knowledge of the rail network and creativity 
to reroute trains in consultation with the TOCs.
Automation of control
The countries in this study show a mix of automation and manual routing. For example, 
while the Netherlands is the only country with full computer based control and automatic 
route setting, regional traffic controllers have to rely on their experience to detect conflicts 
between trains and to find solutions. Nevertheless, while some countries still partly rely 
on mechanic lever frames, we noticed that all the countries are working on automation 
and centralizing their traffic control. For example, Denmark is the first European country 
planning to deploy ERTMS 2 for both train-track communication and the back office. The 
new signalling should make it possible to manage rail traffic from two control centres. 
Similarly, Austria is fully replacing older technologies for computer-based signalling and 
traffic control on its main lines. ÖBB’s Aramis traffic management system features auto-
matic route setting, conflict detection, and decision support during rescheduling. Similarly, 
Infrabel and DB Netz have bought the Swiss Rail Control System to manage its rail traffic. 
This system offers conflict detection and simulates possible solutions. Such systems have 
a huge impact on traffic management as work routinely performed by operators becomes 
automated, making it possible for operators to monitor larger areas and reducing the 
number of operators needed. Moreover, these systems also support operators to act more 
proactive and let them focus on solving disruptions. There are however also risks associated 
with automation. Modern traffic management systems often feature more possibilities 
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than human operators can comprehend. In addition, operators may become fixated by 
computer screens and lose the detailed knowledge and experience of the traffic manage-
ment processes that comes through manual control.
Institutionalization of shared sensemaking
A coordinated response to a disruption requires the exchange of appropriate information 
between the different control centres. However, simply sharing information is not enough 
to create this shared understanding. Operators need to combine their expertise and collec-
tively make sense of the information. In the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Austria 
shared sensemaking is facilitated in the form of special crisis rooms in the national control 
centres where the operators of the RIM and TOC gather to discuss the situation and make 
joint decisions. In Denmark this is done during every disruption, while the crisis rooms in 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria are only used during severe disruptions, like those 
caused by extreme weather conditions. In the Netherlands we also often observed that op-
erators of ProRail and NS would arrange ad-hoc meetings at a cabinet in the control room.
In Belgium face-to-face communication between the RIM and TOC is straightforward 
because operators cooperate in teams. Nevertheless, we observed that operators often did 
not take a time-out to discuss ongoing activities and plans in a quick meeting. Most, if not 
all, discussions took place on the work floor. In Germany, face-to-face meetings between 
RIM and TOCs is extremely difficult because of the size and complexity of the network and 
the many TOCs working from different locations. Information exchanges have therefore 
become more and more standardized and shared sensemaking has to be done by phone. In 
all countries, shared sensemaking between national and regional control centres remains 
difficult due to the physical distances, as well as time lag and only incomplete information 
being available at various locations.
Use of dispatching rules
In Germany, rail traffic management is guided by predefined goals and rules. In the event of 
a disruption DB Netz’s dispatching guidelines prescribe a maximum usage of the remain-
ing capacity, the need to improve joint punctuality of all trains, and the task of quickly 
rescheduling in order to operate according to an alternative plan. This rescheduling is 
done on the basis of dispatching rules that give priority to emergency vehicles, trains with 
express routes, and fast-speed over slow-speed trains. TOCs can purchase an express (prior-
ity) status for their passenger and cargo trains to assure a swift and direct journey during 
disruptions. The dispatching rules should secure non-discriminatory access to the German 
rail network and provide a framework for the dispatchers. However, one of the issues with 
the use of dispatching rules is that delayed express or fast-speed trains will overtake slower 
but punctual trains. This can severely disrupt local rail traffic. A similar dispatching rule is in 
use in Austria. It prioritizes long-distance trains over all other trains (apart from emergency 
Chapter 5
130
vehicles) to assure conflict-free management of rail traffic by the BFZ. It is, however, pos-
sible for the BFZ to deviate from these rules if this benefits local traffic flows, but only in 
consultation with the traffic controllers in the VLZ. For instance, the third dispatching rule 
dictates that punctual trains (-5 to +10 minutes) should remain punctual. In practice, we 
observed that in both instances there is quite some pressure to prioritize long-distance and 
express trains, even if that means delaying local traffic.
In the Netherlands, train dispatchers have a document with dispatching rules (Trein Af-
handelings Document or TAD) for the most common situations, which have been developed 
jointly with NS. TADs tell the train dispatcher how long a train can wait for a connecting 
train and where to short-turn a train. They also provide resolution rules if there is a conflict 
between trains. However, not every conflict situation is covered in the TAD. Consequently, 
train dispatching still relies heavily on the skill and experience of the train dispatchers to 
decide on the right order. ProRail does not make a distinction between trains, but trains 
running on time are given priority over delayed trains. The same goes for Denmark, where 
Banedanmark decides on the priority of trains and experience plays an important role in the 
decision on the order of priority. Finally, in Belgium a total of fifteen dispatching rules give 
fast-speed trains priority over slow trains, international or intercity services priority over 
local traffic, and most passenger services priority over freight traffic. However, operators 
are allowed to deviate from these rules if doing so would help to swiftly restore services. 
During our observations, a bomb threat at Brussels North had blocked all traffic in the Brus-
sels region. We observed how international trains were the first to be dispatched, followed 
by regional and local trains. The order of dispatching local trains, however, seemed to be 
based on pragmatism.
5.6  SyNtheSIS
The previous section described the practices of disruption management in the countries 
studied with regard to the two main trade-offs. As a final step, we will show how the coun-
tries dealt with the trade-offs. To this end, we assigned scores to each item on a scale from 
1 (strongly centralized; reliance on anticipation) to 5 (strongly decentralized; reliance on 
resilience) on the basis of the data. The resulting scores are shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 demonstrates that while countries can differ significantly on individual items, 
they can also show quite some similarities in how they deal with both trade-offs. This is an 
expression of the trade-offs: there is no one best solution. Institutions, existing routines on 
the basis of ‘how things are done here’, the relationship between RIM and TOCs, and the 
ongoing introduction of new technologies mean that the trade-offs are made in a certain 
direction, while not necessarily providing the ‘best’ way of doing things. This, of course, is 
the nature of a trade-off.
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table 5.4 Scores per country (all individual items were given equal weight; the aggregated scores are 
averages).
Item
Countries
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Centralized or decentralized
Distribution of control centres 3 5 1 4 2
Allocation of decision rights during disruption 3 2 1 4 1
Autonomy of local control centres 3 1 4 5 4
Structure and lines of communication 2 3 1 4 5
Co-location of RIM and TOCs 2 1 2 5 2
average score 2.6 2.4 1.8 4.4 2.8
anticipation or resilience
Role of contingency plans 2 5 4 3 1
Automation of control 1 4 2 3 2
Institutionalization of shared sensemaking 2 3 1 3 1
Use of dispatching rules 2 2 5 1 3
average score 1.75 3.75 3 2.50 1.75
Figure 5.6 visualizes how the five countries relate to each other with regard to the trade-
offs. Note that this figure is purely illustrative and does not imply precise measurement. 
Two clusters can be discerned. First of all, Austria and the Netherlands are both moderately 
centralized and of the five countries, they rely the most on a formalized approach to dealing 
with disruptions. As has been mentioned before, while formalization reduces the coordina-
tion burden and produces more predictable outcomes, it may also reduce a system’s ability 
to adapt to unanticipated events. Belgium and Denmark form the second cluster as they 
are relatively similar. Belgium and especially Denmark combine a centralized structure 
with an emphasis on resilience. Indeed, operators seemed to enjoy more flexibility in the 
management of disruptions as compared to the Netherlands. Germany appears a bit of an 
outlier. It is much more decentralized than the other countries. This is very likely to be an 
expression of the size and complexity of the network along with the large number of TOCs 
as this reduces the possibilities for centralized control.
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figure 5.6 Visualization of how countries perform on both trade-offs
5.7  CoNCLuSIoNS
We described and categorized disruption management structures and practices in Belgium, 
Germany, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. On the basis of interviews and observa-
tions, we showed the various ways in which these countries deal with the main trade-offs 
between centralization & decentralization, and between anticipation & resilience. We then 
related the countries on the basis of these two trade-offs. We found clusters of countries, 
which suggests that differences on individual items can still lead to an overall similarity. 
Austria and the Netherlands can be characterized as moderately centralized and relying 
on an anticipatory approach, while Belgium and Denmark are more centralized and put 
more emphasis on resilience, i.e. the freedom to rely on the operator’s ingenuity to solve 
disruptions. Germany proved to be far more decentralized than the other countries, which 
seems to be in line with the size and complexity of its system.
This research, with its focus on everyday practices in international perspective, is a first. 
Naturally, more research would be welcome. The sample could be extended and there is a 
clear need for a more empirical grounding of the items used. Nevertheless, we think that 
the current results could help rail infrastructure managers and train operating companies 
to reflect on their own practices and to learn from others. A goal, still far away, would be 
to relate the trade-offs to performance and resilience of the systems. This goal requires 
considerable caution. Both the complexities of the systems and their mutual differences 
are so immense that making a straightforward link to performance would require a leap of 
faith. A focus on practices is in itself complex because it takes a good command of several 
languages and a great deal of time before one starts to understand what operators do and 
how this differs from country to country. Nonetheless, this should be an important strand 
of research.
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6.1  INtRoDuCtIoN
The aim of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the coordination and com-
munication challenges between the different control centres during the management 
of large-scale, complex disruptions. In the last couple of years there have been several 
‘out-of-control’ situations when nobody really knew what was going on and what should 
be done, resulting in the uncoordinated management of large-scale, complex disruptions. 
While there has been a lot of academic research into supporting rescheduling activities 
during a disruption, far less attention has been paid to the difficulties encountered when 
coordinating these activities. This led to the following main research question of this dis-
sertation: “What explains the coordination breakdowns between the control centres in the 
Dutch railway system during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions?” This 
thesis examined disruption management practices and associated coordination challenges 
in the Dutch railway system and compared it to four other European rail systems. In this 
final chapter, the research’s main conclusions are presented and reflected upon. Section 6.2 
will first provide a summary of the main findings of the four studies. Section 6.3 presents 
the overall conclusions on coordination practices in the Dutch railway system. Section 6.4 
then focuses on the practical implications of the findings. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 offer a meth-
odological and theoretical reflection. This chapter ends with some concluding remarks in 
Section 6.7.
6.2  SuMMaRy of the MaIN fINDINGS
This section summarizes the main findings of the four studies in this dissertation.
6.2.1  using DNa to investigate disruption management
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation we sought to answer the following research question: 
“How can DNA help to investigate coordination between the geographically distributed 
teams involved in the management of a railway disruption?” Control centres must share 
up-to-date information in order to be able to quickly respond to disruptions and to align 
their activities. However, efficient and timely communication is not without its difficulties 
when operating in a dynamic and complex environment. A good understanding of the 
structure of the network of actors involved in the disruption management process and 
the flow of information between these actors can help to optimize the response to disrup-
tions. Although Social Network Analysis is a proven technique for visualizing and analyzing 
networks, it only provides a static snapshot of a network. We therefore suggested Dynamic 
Network Analysis (DNA) as a valuable tool for taking the dynamics of the disruption man-
agement process into account and tested its use on a simulated case of a catenary failure.
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First of all, the DNA has shown that the development of a collective understanding of the 
situation, as well as the formulation and implementation of a contingency plan leads to a 
considerable information flow between the different operators. Secondly, the DNA revealed 
that during the first phase of the disruption management process train dispatchers and 
regional traffic controllers play a central role in the lines of communication. The fact that 
they have to process and distribute a great deal of information, however, also makes them 
potentially weak points in the network due to the high task demands and the risk of infor-
mation overload. This is especially problematic for the operators in the OCCR, as the DNA 
showed that they heavily rely on the information provided by these local operators.
Thirdly, the DNA also displayed that the network’s structure is relatively sparse. This 
means that there are often no direct ties between actors and information therefore has to 
pass along many actors before reaching the intended recipient. While this reduces the co-
ordination issues associated with unbridled direct mutual adjustment, it also slows down 
the dispersion of information in the network. This is challenging in a dynamic environment 
where conditions change fast. Actors thus often have to deal with inaccurate or outdated 
information. Finally, the inclusion of time in the network analysis revealed that operators 
actually start to manage disruptions without having the full details of the situation. This 
ties in with the perceived urgency of acting quickly in order to prevent the disruption from 
propagating. Overall, the first study has shown that DNA is a valuable tool for visualizing 
and analyzing the disruption management process and that the inclusion of time is im-
portant in order to capture the dynamics of the process. However, as the second study has 
shown, it is also important to look at the content of the information being shared. Simply 
sharing information does not mean that others will interpret it correctly and that actions 
will be coordinated.
6.2.2  a mixed-methods approach to understanding a coordination breakdown 
The third chapter presents an in-depth case study of how a coordination breakdown be-
tween the different teams in the Dutch rail system led to the decision to stop the train 
service at two major stations during rush hour. In this study we wanted to understand: 
what was the cause for this coordination breakdown and what explains the difference in 
response between the traffic control centres of both areas of control? To answer this research 
question we combined Dynamic Network Analysis with theories of sensemaking. The 
mixed-methods approach addresses the need to study both the flows of information and 
the way this information is interpreted in order to understand the emergent behaviour 
that follows on from the complex interactions within the network of teams. The quantita-
tive network analysis acted as a first stage in the research to identify key moments and 
actors in the process, and these served as important starting points for a more in-depth 
qualitative analysis of how actors made sense of this information.
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The analysis showed how the term ‘red flag’ triggered the operators in the OCCR to frame 
the situation as a routine procedure, while the track team’s aim was to find an improvised 
way of managing the process. This divergent framing of the situation accumulated over 
time, leading to inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions and a lack of effective com-
munication. The DNA showed how incorrect and incomplete information spread rapidly 
and uncoordinatedly through the network. As a result, actors and teams held different 
pieces of information and created fragmented accounts of the situation. The lack of a clear 
understanding of the situation and the following inconsistent actions of teams promoted 
uncertainty and negative emotions. This eventually resulted in a conflict between the track 
team and the train dispatchers in area A, when roles became under threat and were even 
debated. We observed two different responses to coping with the uncertainty: one whereby 
procedures were strictly followed and which eventually resulted in the decision to stop the 
train service (area A), and one in which safety concerns triggered improvisation (area B). 
This study highlighted the risk of blind spots that are the result of a commitment to taken-
for-granted frames, such as procedures, labels and routines, which hinder adaptation. In 
the study we showed the difficulties of re-framing, as frames become reinforced over time 
and hence contradictory cues are overlooked or ignored. This seems to be of particular 
concern to distributed teams, as challenges of communication and interpretation are more 
salient there.
6.2.3  the role of MtS leadership during disruption management
Chapter 4 starts from the premise that there is a need for polycentric control to secure a 
system’s adaptive capacity. Local control centres are needed to quickly respond to disrup-
tions, while leader teams are necessary to synchronize the activities of the local control 
centres and to obtain system level goals. In this study we wanted to answer the following 
research question: “How do leader teams in the OCCR provide leadership during the manage-
ment of disruptions and which challenges affect their leadership?” We looked at the role of 
the teams in the OCCR in preventing the system from falling into the three basic patterns 
of adaptive failure in complex systems: decompensation, working at cross-purposes, and 
outdated behaviours, or correcting these failures. The leadership behaviours of the teams 
in the OCCR were analyzed using the literature on functional leadership in Multiteam 
Systems. While studies have shown that effective leadership has a positive influence on 
inter-team coordination and system performance, the study in chapter 4 revealed some 
important challenges for leadership in a MTS.
First of all, we found that the operators in the OCCR often struggled to adequately moni-
tor the performance of local operators in order to detect if they might need back-up and 
how this should be provided. But even when there were clear signals from local operators, 
these signals were not always recognized by the operators in the OCCR as a legitimate need 
for help. Secondly, local operators often did not ask for help or refused the help being of-
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fered by the operators in the OCCR. Thirdly, while the OCCR was intended as an information 
hub with an overall understanding of the situation, we found that the teams in the OCCR 
were quickly confronted with a degraded situation awareness due to inadequate lines of 
communication between the local control centres and the OCCR. Maintaining a shared 
situation awareness was further complicated by the pace at which conditions changed. 
This greatly reduced the possibilities of the teams in the OCCR to orchestrate the activities 
of the local control centres as the decisions made by these teams were often founded on 
already outdated information. Finally, we noticed a tension between the rescheduling ac-
tivities of the local control centres and the wish of the teams in the OCCR to quickly imple-
ment a contingency plan based on an accurate situation assessment. It was shown that 
this could lead to an oversimplification of the situation by the teams in the OCCR, whereby 
contingency plans were implemented that did not match the operational conditions.
6.2.4  Differences and similarities in european railway disruption management 
In Chapter 5 we presented an international comparison of the disruption management 
structures and practices of five European countries (Germany, Denmark, Austria, Belgium 
and the Netherlands). A thorough literature search showed that there was no comparative 
research into the disruption management structures and practices of European railway 
systems. That’s why we asked ourselves the following question: “What different types of 
structures and practices of railway disruption management have been developed in European 
railway systems?” The comparison focused on the trade-offs identified in the first chapter 
of this dissertation, that of centralized vs. decentralized structures and anticipation vs. 
resilience.
To compare the countries we derived several items from various strands of literature for 
both trade-offs. We began our comparison by describing the roles, structures and lines of 
communication in each country. This was followed by a description of each item, which 
revealed important differences between the countries. In order to show how each coun-
try performs on both trade-offs we assigned scores to each of the items and then took 
the average scores of all items to show how the countries compare in terms of how they 
perform on both trade-offs. We found two clusters of countries. First of all, Austria and the 
Netherlands are both moderately centralized and of the five countries, they rely the most 
on a formalized approach to deal with disruptions. Belgium and Denmark form the second 
cluster as they combine a centralized structure with an emphasis on resilience. Germany 
proved to be a bit of an outlier in our comparison due to its decentralized structure, which 
seems to relate to the size and complexity of the system.
Although rail systems are essentially quite similar in what they do (transporting passen-
gers and goods) and how they do it, we nonetheless found important differences between 
the countries studied and therefore the study shows that there is not one best way in which 
to organize rail disruption management. Only by comparing practices does the range of 
141
Conclusions and reflections
Ch
ap
te
r 
6
possibilities become apparent. As such, comparative studies help rail infrastructure man-
agers and train operating companies to reflect on their own practices, which have been 
shaped over a long period of time and become part of their daily routine. Moreover, the 
comparison also provides important insights into how each rail system has dealt with 
major developments in the rail sector, such as the growing competition on the rail market, 
which can have a huge impact on disruption management. At the same time these dif-
ferences between the countries also make it difficult to make a direct comparison. First 
of all, a system’s specific characteristics and the context in which it operates are not only 
important to understanding how disruption management has been organized, but also 
determine the possibilities for improvement and what can be learned from other countries. 
Secondly, the complexity of rail disruption management makes it impossible to look for a 
direct causal link between how disruption management is organized and the performance 
of a rail system. Hence, one should be cautious when comparing rail systems and doing so 
without taking the contextual details into account has proven to be of limited value.
6.3  GeNeRaL fINDINGS
We can now move beyond the findings of the individual studies and answer the main 
research question. The main research question of this dissertation is: “What explains the 
coordination breakdowns between the control centres in the Dutch railway system during the 
management of large-scale, complex disruptions?” From the findings in the four studies we 
can draw four main conclusions.
Conclusion 1: Situation awareness is often not shared during the management of large-
scale, complex disruptions
One issue that appeared in all of the studies was the need to quickly share information 
between the different control centres in order to create and maintain a compatible under-
standing of the dynamic environment. This shared situation awareness is crucial to the 
control centres’ ability to take rapid and decisive action in the event of a disruption and to 
effectively coordinate and adjust their actions during the management of a disruption (Uit-
dewilligen & Waller, 2012). Consequently, the way in which information is shared between 
the different control centres influences the system’s adaptive performance. In this thesis it 
has been shown that sharing information between teams working in a dynamic and time 
pressed environment entails significant challenges.
The dynamic network analysis revealed that information processing and distribution is 
unevenly distributed among the actors during the first phase of the disruption manage-
ment process. We identified train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers as potential 
weak points in the network, given the large amount of information they have to process 
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and distribute, as well as the high number of tasks assigned to them. The third study con-
firmed the findings from the first study, as it found that these operators indeed struggled 
to keep others informed, especially during large-scale, complex disruptions as operators 
have to invest a lot of their cognitive capacity in rescheduling rail traffic in order to contain 
the disruption and avoid it propagating to other areas. During these moments of extreme 
high workload it is not only difficult to maintain a shared understanding of the operational 
environment among operators within a single team, but even more so between teams. We 
noticed that lateral communication between the regional control centres diminished, caus-
ing control centres to work at cross-purposes. But most of all, there was a steep decrease in 
regular information updates to the OCCR. This made it very difficult for the operators in the 
OCCR to maintain an overall understanding of the situation and to coordinate the activities 
of the regional control centres.
Maintaining a shared situation awareness is not only difficult because of the challenges 
of sharing information under pressure, but also because of the dynamics of the operational 
environment. Take, for example, the winter storm in the fourth chapter during which the 
number of malfunctions exponentially increased and the situation changed by the minute. 
In such a dynamic environment it is extremely difficult to keep each other up-to-date on 
the situation. As the DNA showed, information needs to be passed along many actors, 
which makes dispersion of information by phone rather slow. Consequently, informa-
tion might already be outdated by the time it reaches its recipient. Of course there are 
other means of sharing information, such as the ISVL information system. The advantage 
of this system is that it makes it possible to quickly provide updates to all teams involved 
in the disruption management process via short text messages. However, when the work 
pressure rises this system suffers from the same limitations, as operators tend to neglect 
reading and updating the system. In fact, some operators see the communication system 
as an administrative burden, rather than a necessary tool to keep each other up-to-date. 
In sum, during large-scale, complex disruptions information is often scattered throughout 
the system and teams receive information at different moments in time.
Disruption management demands rapid and decisive action as trains can easily queue 
up. This makes it impossible to wait for information to become available and we have 
seen two ways in which the actors cope with this issue. First of all, operators will actively 
seek information. In the third chapter we used the term sensedemanding for this act of 
updating one’s own situation awareness. The DNA in the third chapter has shown how 
these acts of sensedemanding actually caused a chain reaction of sensedemanding, which 
greatly increased the interactions in the network. Telephone lines quickly become clogged 
as everyone starts to phone everyone else. Moreover, operators get overloaded with in-
formation demands and are unable to attend to other tasks, such as making an accurate 
situation assessment. Secondly, operators often do not wait for the full details on a situ-
ation to become available. In the first study the DNA showed how operators pick up cues 
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from overhearing their colleagues’ phone calls and start managing the disruption before 
they have all the information. Operators anticipate that a situation will unfold according 
to earlier experiences and start managing the disruption ‘in the spirit of’ the anticipated 
contingency plan. Hence, experience and assumptions play an important role when dealing 
with time pressure and uncertainty. Assumptions, however, may be very misleading if they 
do not correspond to the actual situation (cf. Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Salas, & Hancock, 
2017), as the second study has shown.
Situation awareness in a system that operates a complex and dynamic environment thus 
seems to be distributed between teams rather than shared. According to the distributed 
situation awareness (DSA) perspective (Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 2017; Stanton 
et al., 2006) systems have a dynamic network of information upon which operators have 
their own unique view given their own specific goals, experience and tasks. Awareness will 
thus not be shared between actors, but should be compatible in order to hold the system 
together. Compatible situation awareness is acquired and maintained through transac-
tions in awareness that arise from actors sharing information on the state of the environ-
ment. Poor information sharing can lead to inaccurate and conflicting assumptions and 
teams working at cross purposes. Once more, the winter storm case in the fourth chapter 
provides a good example. In this case the operators in the OCCR assumed that everything 
was relatively calm while local operators were increasingly struggling to keep the situation 
under control.
Conclusion 2: Collective sensemaking between teams is weakly developed
The second study of this dissertation demonstrated how the adaptive behaviour of one 
team can have a very negative effect on the system as a whole if it is not well coordinated 
with the other teams. As the track team deviated from formal procedures by giving an early 
warning to the OCCR, they caused confusion among the other teams in the rail system 
which eventually led to a complete coordination breakdown. This situation highlights the 
risks of deciding to work around standard procedures in a multiteam system. The case also 
revealed that coordinating this decision was made more difficult due to the fact that the 
teams in the Dutch railway system did not have compatible views on roles and responsibili-
ties, procedures and the information needs of others. A good example of this is the track 
team’s decision not to directly coordinate with the train dispatchers, but to first alarm the 
OCCR. It shows that the track team did not fully anticipate the impact of their decision on 
the train dispatchers’ task of assuring the safe allocation of rail tracks and their differences 
in norms concerning safety. Similarly, contrary to the track team’s expectations the OCCR 
felt no responsibility to inform the train dispatchers.
In response to this particular case, ProRail decided to improve both its procedures and the 
training given on following them. This is a logical response given the outcome of this par-
ticular decision to deviate from procedure. At the same time this research has shown that 
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strictly following procedures actually hindered an effective response to the track team’s 
workaround. The analysis of how actors made sense of the information revealed that the 
term ‘red flag’ triggered a routine response among the operators in the OCCR. This frame 
of a routine procedure was reinforced over time in the communication with the regional 
operators, in spite of the many contradictory signals that were ignored or simply missed. 
In fact, operators in the OCCR actively tried to restore standard procedures. Using the DNA 
we visualized how information uncoordinatedly spread through the network, leading to 
fragmented accounts of the situation and actions. The outcome of this particular case 
underscores the importance of quickly detecting a misunderstanding and repairing it. The 
detection of the misunderstanding was, however, hindered both by the operators’ reliance 
on standard behaviour, rigid communication patterns and their incorrect expectations of 
other people’s actions.
In the second study we emphasized the ability of operators and teams to update or 
switch frames when dealing with ambiguous situations as a perquisite for adaptive team 
performance. That is, they should be able to detect when a reliance on routine processing 
negatively impacts performance (Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009). Instead of accepting 
taken-for-granted interpretations of events, ambiguous situations require extensive collec-
tive sensemaking (Uitdewilligen, Waller, & Zijlstra, 2010). Collective sensemaking means 
that actors jointly develop an understanding of the situation, challenge each other’s as-
sumptions and detect any potential loss of shared understanding on time. In the different 
studies we found that collective sensemaking between operators in the Dutch rail system 
is weakly developed. Operators often do not take the time to pose additional questions 
or do not feel free to cross-check information they receive. Moreover, when a situation 
becomes more ambiguous operators tend to reduce communication and hide behind their 
own interpretation of role boundaries and procedures. Finally, we have seen that the stress 
and growing frustration following the ambiguity and uncertainty of events negatively 
impacted operators’ ability to make sense collectively. It even resulted in a conflict between 
teams and the decision to no longer cooperate.
So, shared procedural knowledge is important, as it enables teams to effectively coordi-
nate their activities, but our research has shown that shared procedural knowledge alone 
is insufficient and may even lead to rigidity when dealing with non-routine events. The 
second study highlighted that teams will interpret situations differently, which triggers 
them to follow different and often incompatible procedures. Moreover, the study has also 
shown that the triggering of a specific procedural response can create blind spots to the 
need to reframe situations. Coordination thus should not only rely on being able to apply 
procedures, but also on the ability of actors to collectively make sense of events and to 
explicate different interpretations of situations (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). As Cooke et al. (2013) 
observed, it is important to have shared knowledge of tasks and teams, but if team mem-
bers do not interact or fail to coordinate effectively, coordination will break down.
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Conclusion 3: Contingency planning can lead to rigidity when responding to non-
routine disruptions
Contingency planning is an important way of preparing the system for anticipated disrup-
tions to rail services. These pre-established plans reduce workload during the management 
of a disruption as the solution to a disruption has already been developed in advance. 
Contingency planning also reduces coordination costs since the plans have been discussed 
and agreed upon in advance by the different parties involved, so that no consensus has 
to be reached during the management of the disruption. This makes it possible to quickly 
respond to a disruption. Moreover, the plans coordinate the rescheduling activities of the 
different control centres, as they indicate which trains or lines should be cancelled and 
where trains have to be short-turned. During our international comparison we observed 
significant differences between the countries we visited regarding the use and implemen-
tation of contingency plans. Some countries have only a small number of contingency plans 
or no plans at all, while in the Netherlands there are more than a thousand contingency 
plans for all kinds of disruptions. Moreover, while most countries use contingency plans 
as a reference framework, the Dutch rail system places emphasis on quickly choosing and 
implementing the predefined solutions of the contingency plans.
The Dutch railway system’s reliance on contingency plans is understandable given its 
dense rail network and the intensive use. There is little time to develop an on-the-spot 
solution and there needs to be a quick response to prevent trains from queuing up and 
the disruption from cascading through the network. Moreover, contingency plans make 
the system less reliant on the expertise of the specific operators involved in managing 
the disruption and how they work together. The implementation of a contingency plan, 
however, is not without its difficulties. Choosing a plan (whether pre-defined or on-the-
spot) requires an accurate assessment of the disruption and its impact on the available 
resources. In the third study we saw that it is very difficult for train dispatchers and traf-
fic controllers to make a good situation assessment when faced with very dynamic and 
complex disruptions. Not only do they have to invest a lot of their cognitive capacity in 
controlling the traffic flows by quickly rescheduling trains, but these rescheduling activities 
also change the operational environment. Furthermore, information often only becomes 
available gradually.
This makes it very complicated to implement a contingency plan, as a great deal of 
communication is needed for enough knowledge on the situation to be shared between 
the regional and national control centres so that they can decide on a plan and make 
sure that it can be implemented. While situation assessment and the implementation of 
a contingency plan require a relatively stable situation, we have seen in the studies that 
the operational environment can be so dynamic that the understanding of the situation 
has to be updated continuously. Hence, disruption management cannot always follow a 
linear process: new rounds of situation assessment, communication and decision making 
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are necessary to revise the plan. In the third study, however, we witnessed the opposite. Al-
though the disruptions in the third study were far from routine, we still noticed a standard 
response to these disruptions with a step-by-step implementation of a contingency plan. 
This was illustrated by the fact that operators in the OCCR pushed for a quick implementa-
tion of a contingency plan on the basis of an already outdated and simplified assessment 
of the operational conditions to assert control over the situations and synchronize the 
activities of the regional control centres. Simplification helps decision makers to deal with 
the dynamics and complexity of the environment, as modifying a plan in progress poses 
many challenges in terms of communication and coordination between control centres (cf. 
Kontogiannis, 2010). However, if there is a failure to adapt to changing circumstances, the 
situation can quickly degrade and control over it may eventually be lost (Woods & Branlat, 
2011a).
The findings of this study tie in with planning problems as identified by Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2007). According to these authors detailed plans discourage actors from recognizing and 
responding to the specific risks of events, as they focus people’s attention on signals that 
are in line with the plan. Our research has shown that operators are not always aware that 
they are dealing with a much larger disruption than expected and that the conditions to 
implement the plan are thus no longer met or have significantly changed. Secondly, plans 
encourage a standardized response that discourages operators from improvising or think-
ing for themselves. Although the Dutch rail system has numerous contingency plans, there 
are even more conditions or combinations thereof that make every disruption unique and 
in need of a specific solution (cf. Golightly & Dadashi, 2017). We found in our international 
comparison that this is one of the main reasons why the other countries restrict the use 
of contingency plans or use them mainly as a reference framework. Conceptual plans offer 
more flexibility and encourage the development of a shared understanding of the specifics 
of each disruption and its potential risks.
Conclusion 4: Polycentric control requires effective teamwork between regional control 
centres and the teams in the national control centre
Another important coordination mechanism studied in this thesis is that of leadership. 
Regional control centres have their own goals, priorities and scope of responsibility. Con-
sequently, local operators might make decisions that benefit the rail traffic in a specific 
region, while negatively impacting the traffic flows in other regions and the system as a 
whole. As was argued in chapter 4, leader teams are important to integrate the activities 
of the different control centres and manage resources in order to achieve the system’s 
overall goals. In our international comparison we found that each country has its own way 
of integrating these multiple layers of control. Despite their differences, what all of these 
countries have in common is that authority is shared between national and regional con-
trol centres, with regional control centres often enjoying quite a lot of autonomy. Hence, 
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although the national control centres are positioned hierarchically above the local control 
centres, their actual level of influence on the regional control centres is restricted. In the 
literature on these polycentric systems it is argued that it is necessary to find a dynamic 
balance between both layers of control that also corresponds to the operational conditions.
High Reliability Organizations are known for their ability to be both centralized and 
decentralized, as they can transfer from a centralized hierarchical structure during normal 
operating periods to a decentralized structure in the event of a crisis (Grabowski & Roberts, 
1997). In the railway system the shift in authority is basically the other way around. During 
normal operations the system is decentralized, as rail traffic is controlled by regional con-
trol centres. During a large-scale disruption, a switch should be made to a more hierarchical 
structure in order to foster coordination and rapid decision making (Berthod et al., 2017). 
This thesis has shown that leader teams face important challenges in striking the right 
balance between centralized control to align the activities of the regional control centres 
and allow regional control centres enough flexibility to adapt to local conditions.
The transfer of authority between both layers of control has proven to be prone to am-
biguity and disagreement (cf. Moynihan, 2009). Operators in the national control centres 
face the dilemma of having to decide on the right moment to intervene in local operations. 
Making this decision is often severely complicated by a lack of up-to-date information from 
the regional control centres and relies heavily on the expertise of operators in the national 
control centre to monitor their performance and correctly make sense of the incoming 
information to identify potential problems. At the same time, operators in the national 
control centre depend on the ability and willingness of local operators to notice in time 
when there is a workload issue, to call for help and to accept the help that is offered. We 
found that there is a great deal of variation in the perception among and between opera-
tors at both levels of control regarding how and when leadership should be exercised. This 
ambiguity concerning roles and responsibilities results in actors not meeting each other’s 
expectations, impedes information sharing and may even lead to conflicts when roles are 
deemed to have been violated.
In the international comparison we found that Germany and Austria have tried to reduce 
this ambiguity by making the national control centres solely responsible for long-distance 
traffic. This separation of responsibilities is supported by detailed dispatching rules that 
guide the rescheduling of the local operators. Based on the findings of the third study, sim-
ply defining roles and responsibilities does not seem enough to support polycentric control. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, it cannot be expected that polycentric control will instantly 
occur by placing a leader team above the component teams. Leadership in a MTS requires 
effective teamwork between the component teams and the leader teams that follows from 
the acknowledgement of their mutual dependency.
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Answering the overall research question
On the basis of the four conclusions, we can now give an answer to the main research 
question: What explains the coordination breakdowns between the control centres in the 
Dutch railway system during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions?
In order to align their activities, it is important that the different control centres involved 
in managing a disruption have an accurate and shared understanding of the operational 
environment. During large-scale, complex disruptions, however, it is a difficult and often 
time- consuming task to create an accurate understanding of the situation and given the 
dynamics of the operational environment this understanding can quickly become obso-
lete. In these ambiguous and dynamic situations it thus becomes especially important to 
continuously share and collectively make sense of information to maintain a congruent 
understanding of the operational environment. Paradoxically, the heavy workload that 
confronts operators during these large-scale, complex disruptions, as well as the limited 
communication channels, make it particularly difficult to keep each other up-to-date and 
to take the time to collectively make sense of this information. Consequently, operators 
and teams will have different or incomplete information and develop different and often 
incompatible accounts of the developing situation. Coordination mechanisms, such as 
procedures and plans that should hold the system together, not only prove to be brittle 
in these dynamic and complex environments, but they can actually obscure the need to 
adapt to changing conditions. In addition, centralized control is often severely hampered 
by the degraded situation awareness of operators in the OCCR and the slow decision mak-
ing resulting from this. Consequently, regional operators make decisions without knowing 
whether they will impact the system as a whole.
6.4  IMPLICatIoNS of ReSeaRCh fINDINGS aND PRaCtICaL 
ReCoMMeNDatIoNS
At the start of our research project we were told that ProRail and NS were working on a 
new model for the management of disruptions after being confronted with several out-of-
control situations. These out-of-control situations were a warning for ProRail, NS, and the 
government that despite the establishment of the OCCR, the rail system was still not fully 
capable of managing large-scale disruptions. Over the years we have seen how the initial 
ideas for this new traffic control model resulted in the development of a Centraal Moni-
tor- en Beslisorgaan (Central monitoring and decision making body, CMBO). The CMBO has 
been operational since early 201710 and forms a specific unit of ProRail’s rail traffic control 
10 Data collection for our research on the Dutch railway system was finalized before the CMBO was 
established.
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within the OCCR. The CMBO is now the only party in the OCCR that monitors and decides 
on the adjustments made to the timetable in the event of a disruption. In the previous 
situation, as described in detail in this thesis, rail traffic was monitored by teams in the 
OCCR of both ProRail and NS and during a disruption they jointly decided on a contingency 
plan. In the new situation NS is solely responsible for the management of its own train crew 
and rolling stock and the rescheduling of these resources according to the alternative time 
table decided upon by the CMBO. It is expected that the removal of the overlap in tasks 
and responsibilities between ProRail and NS will lead to more rapid and decisive decision 
making.
Decision making is done by a team of national rail traffic controllers supervised by one 
duty officer. To support the traffic controllers of the CMBO in their decision making the 
various parties in the rail system have to provide regular updates on the status of their 
resources (rolling stock, train crew, infrastructure and traffic flows) and potential risks 
(weather-related issues or understaffing of local control centres) via new communication 
systems. To further secure the interest of the train operating companies, contingency plans 
will be improved and specified to increase the ease with which they can be implemented. 
Moreover, the decision making processes and outcomes will be jointly evaluated afterwards 
and contingency plans will be improved when necessary. What hasn’t changed, at least not 
at the time of writing, is that rail traffic is still being monitored by the operators of ProRail 
in the regional control centres11. However, the manner in which operators in the CMBO 
monitor and can intervene in regional operations will be made more explicit. Moreover, 
there are plans to greatly reduce the number of regional control centres (ProRail) and even 
to fully centralize the rescheduling of train crew and rolling stock (NS).
Overall, the development of the CMBO should lead to 1) a command and control struc-
ture with clear role structures, supported by 2) improved contingency plans and 3) new 
information systems. The development of a more centralized form of decision making, 
clear division of roles, and improved planning is understandable given the coordination 
challenges encountered during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions. 
The decision to make one team or even person (duty officer) responsible for the decision 
making on the train service is in line with what we have seen in other countries and the 
reduced complexity of the structure could indeed speed-up decision making. However, in 
the first chapter of this thesis we highlighted the duality encountered when dealing with 
coordination issues in complex, dynamic and uncertain environments. A trade-off has to be 
made between an emphasis on centralization vs. decentralization and on anticipation vs. 
resilience. The current development will push the system towards greater centralization 
and anticipation, which could be beneficial when managing anticipated disruptions. At the 
11 As of May 1st, 2018 the role of monitor in the regional operations centres of NS (Monitor RBC) does 
no longer exist
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same time it could also make the system less able to handle unanticipated disruptions if 
these developments come at the expense of the adaptive capacity needed to quickly notice 
and effectively manage complex and non-routine disruptions. On the basis of the findings 
of this research, we will reflect on each of the three building blocks of the CMBO mentioned 
earlier and provide practical recommendations for each item.
6.4.1  Making more information available by means of improved information 
technology does not automatically lead to a shared understanding.
Improvements in information technology are regularly seen as a way in which to support 
coordination and decision making, as it allows for a fast dispersion of information that 
facilitates a shared understanding of the operational environment. However, there is a 
growing body of literature that points to the fact that making more information available 
does not automatically lead to improved situation awareness and decision making (Da-
dashi, Golightly, & Sharples, 2016; Marusich et al., 2016; Salmon et al., 2011). In fact, the 
volume of information available can overwhelm operators and lead to slower responses. 
As has been found in chapter 4, operators struggled to read and process all the informa-
tion in the information systems and did not feed the system with new information as a 
consequence of high task demands. Moreover, an increase in the quantity and speed of 
information dispersion does not necessarily mean an increase in the quality of information. 
As each actor interprets the information in their own way, there is no guarantee that the 
information made available will be interpreted correctly by members of a different team, as 
we have seen in chapter 3. Information technology thus neglects the collective sensemak-
ing process that is crucial for the enactment of coordination when dealing with uncertain 
or ambiguous situations (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013).
Recommendation 1: Underline the importance of collective sensemaking between 
teams and support this through training and the use of rich communication channels.
Does this render improvements to information technology obsolete? As Wolbers (2016) 
notices, information technology is not the final solution, but might still act as an important 
supporting platform that provides input for acts of collective sensemaking. Cooke and col-
leagues (2013) also stress the importance of applications that focus on facilitating interac-
tions and the timely and adaptive sharing of information to support situation awareness 
as opposed to making more information available. So while information systems may 
facilitate a rapid dispersion of information, richer communication channels (e.g. telephone 
and conference calls) are still needed for the integration of information and negotiation on 
its relevance for the different teams (Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2012; Wolbers & Boersma, 
2013). Besides improvements to information technology, it is thus also crucial to improve 
the way in which operators interact and share information in order to advance their collec-
tive sensemaking.
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First of all, it is important that respectful interaction between operators is the norm. Hav-
ing a diversity of perspectives can actually help to avoid blind spots and provide alternative 
solutions, as long as norms are in place to support the negotiation of different perspectives 
(Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, & Spencer, 2008; Wolbers & Boersma, 2013). In the studies 
we observed that this is not always the case and that emotions and conflicts negatively 
influenced collective sensemaking. Respectful interaction is crucial for people to be willing 
to share their interpretations with others, become aware of each other’s point of view, 
and therefore to creating a compatible understanding of unforeseen situations (Sutcliffe, 
2011). Secondly, in a multiteam system it is not just the quantity of communication that 
is important: even more important is the quality of the information being shared. More 
is not always better and people can easily be overloaded with details, as we have seen in 
the fourth chapter. Instead, information sharing should not only be on time by correctly 
anticipating the information needs of other teams; it must also be clear and concise so the 
intended recipient can more easily understand the message (Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006). 
Both communication norms and skills can be improved through training and regular as-
sessment.
We do realize that the emphasis on collective sensemaking stands in sharp contrast to 
the need for speed felt by the operators and the high workload they experience during 
the management of disruptions. It is, however, important to regularly discuss the situation 
with the different control centres to see if everyone is still on the same page, especially dur-
ing dynamic and non-routine situations when there is a high risk of false expectations. At 
NS we have seen that this is done by scheduling conference calls. Strangely enough, ProRail 
does not use these conference calls. Conference calls could facilitate the integration and in-
terpretation of information between teams, as one-on-one communication by phone, have 
proven to be rather slow. Moreover, these conference calls are not only important during 
the management of a disruption, but can be especially useful in-between disruptions when 
workload is still low and potential risks can easily be shared between control centres. In ad-
dition, national traffic controllers can share system level goals and provide a framework for 
the regional control centres to adapt to situations. In the fourth chapter we have already 
seen how this can be done by distinguishing different modes of operation, each with their 
own specific goals and guidelines on how to achieve them. Shattuck & Woods (2000) call 
this the commander’s or supervisor’s intent. If these guidelines are provided prior to the 
management of a disruption, regional control centres will be more likely to pay attention 
to overall system goals and less communication will be required in the heat of the moment.
Recommendation 2: Reduce the risk of a communication overload among train 
dispatchers and regional traffic controllers.
In this study the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers were marked as potential 
weak points in the communication network on the basis of the DNA. In the fourth chapter 
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we found that during periods of high workload these operators struggled to share informa-
tion. It is thus important to reduce the communication burden of the train dispatchers 
and regional traffic controllers. In the last years there have already been experiments with 
placing two train dispatchers behind one work station, one responsible for safety and one 
for logistics, to reduce the workload during disruptions. This experiment, however, showed 
an increased need for coordination between the two train dispatchers working at the same 
desk. Moreover, it does not solve the high workload of the regional traffic controllers. One 
way of reducing the communication burden of the regional traffic controllers is to give the 
team leaders a more central role in the lines of communication. Compared to the other 
countries studied, the team leaders at ProRail’s regional control centres have a limited role 
with regard to communication. In the other countries visited, team leaders would manage 
the information in the control centre and share this information with the other regional 
control centres and the national control centre. In contrast, we noticed that there is often 
little communication between the team leaders of the regional control centres and the 
director (regisseur) in the OCCR; team leaders often lack a good understanding of the op-
erational conditions and as we saw in the third chapter, team leaders are also not always 
on site.
6.4.2  Limits to command and control
The command and control paradigm is a powerful instrument for accomplishing tasks 
characterized by repetition and uniformity (Moynihan, 2009). Although the desire for com-
mand and control is understandable given the need for decisive decision making, it does 
not reflect the actual situation in which the CMBO only has partial control over the regional 
control centres. The latter would seem to be especially the case during large, non-routine 
disruptions when the regional operators are confronted with a high workload and tend 
to focus on their own tasks and goals. Successful disruption management thus relies on 
effective cooperation between the two levels of control, which needs to be fostered.
Recommendation 3: Train operators in the CMBO for multiteam leadership.
In the fourth chapter we have shown that there are important challenges to MTS leader-
ship. Leadership of a multiteam system requires specific qualities that are different from 
those required in single teams. For example, leaders must integrate information from 
the different component teams and ask the right questions in order to create an overall 
understanding of the operational environment, be able to adequately detect and respond 
to workload issues, know how to distribute workload and provide assistance when needed, 
and adjust plans to unanticipated changes. These leader teams have to do this while being 
geographically separated from the other teams and often having to rely on already out-
dated information. Many of the operators in the OCCR have been hired on the basis of their 
long-term experience working in the rail sector and their expertise in terms of rail traffic, 
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rolling stock and train crew management. Although this is very important knowledge, it 
does not mean that one also automatically has the requirements for a leadership role in 
a MTS. Such a leadership role and the associated behaviours require specific qualities in 
terms of communication and coordination that need to be actively trained. Moreover, MTS 
leadership qualities should also be an important criterion when hiring new operators to 
work in the CMBO.
Recommendation 4: Regularly train and evaluate the management of disruptions with 
multiple teams to foster the development of shared knowledge.
Training should not only be given to a single group of people or a team, as the training 
conducted with multiple teams is especially important. In the four years of doing research 
at ProRail we observed that this kind of training is very sparse. Most of the training is 
given within teams instead of between teams. Operators therefore do not receive train-
ing as a MTS, but as a single component team (Lacerenza, Rico, Salas, & Shuffler, 2014). 
This is strange, given the fact that good performance on the part of a single team does 
not necessarily entail good multiteam performance. Moreover, the training often focuses 
more on task skills or procedures and less on team work competencies. The evaluations of 
the disruption management processes, which are often conducted by the different control 
centres individually, also illustrated this. In the cases where different teams did meet each 
other to evaluate a disruption, I noticed that people were often meeting face-to-face for 
the first time, whereby they actively started to ask each other questions about their role, 
responsibilities, task requirements, and how they shared different viewpoints.
This knowledge of each other’s roles and responsibilities is very important to ensure 
smooth coordination between teams (Marks et al., 2005). For example, Power (2017) 
argues that a poor understanding of roles can reduce cooperation as teams lack trust in 
other’s abilities and impede coordination as they fail to share information and anticipate 
each other’s actions. We have noticed that there is a particular lack of clarity between 
the regional and national control centres regarding their roles and responsibilities. Cross-
training can help to make teams more able to anticipate each other’s needs and actions 
(Wilson et al., 2007). The goal of cross-training is the development of shared knowledge on 
how the system functions and how tasks and responsibilities are interrelated by receiving 
information on other roles, observing other roles, or gaining first-hand experience of dif-
ferent roles (Gorman, Cooke, & Amazeen, 2010). As such, cross-training could help to make 
regional operators better aware of how their actions contribute to the overall goals of the 
system and how they could support the operators in the OCCR in their role of safeguarding 
these system level goals. At the same time it could help operators in the OCCR to better 
anticipate the needs of the regional operators.
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6.4.3  the risks of relying on anticipation by planning
The Dutch rail system is very focused on the use of standard operating procedures. In 
response to the situation described in chapter 3, ProRail decided that new and better 
procedures, along with training people to apply them, should prevent situations like this 
from happening in the future. Unfortunately, this has not been the case as similar cases of 
coordination breakdown between teams, caused by misunderstandings, have occurred in 
the last couple of years. Similarly, the development of new and improved contingency plans 
can be seen as an attempt to be better able to anticipate events and guide the response 
to these events to reduce unwanted variation. However, contingency plans have their 
limitations and therefore it will not be enough just to prepare plans for all kinds of events. 
Reliable organizations acknowledge that surprising events occur and that it is necessary to 
deploy alternative solutions to problems (Branlat & Woods, 2010).
Recommendation 5: Train teams how to balance adhering to and deviating from 
procedures and plans.
Procedural training is aimed at following a standard response each time a specific event 
is encountered. This adherence to specific procedures should reduce the errors, unwanted 
variation, and waste resulting from human interaction and creative human involvement, 
and improve performance when working under stress and a high workload (Gorman et al., 
2010; Gray, Butler, & Sharma, 2015). Training operators to follow an automatic response, 
however, prevents them from acquiring the skills needed to successfully deviate from 
procedures and adapt to the specific circumstances (Stachowski et al., 2009). Besides being 
good at applying procedures and plans it is thus also important that people are able to 
know when to abandon standard operating procedures and how to improvise in a coor-
dinated manner. This requires operators to adopt a different mind-set, in which they are 
encouraged to confront ambiguity and uncertainty, look for weak signals, and be able to 
restructure their framing of a situation (Weick et al., 2008).
Hence, training should be aimed at increasing the range and richness of frames and 
improving operators’ skills in noticing and diagnosing weak signals under stress (Klein, 
Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007; Siegel, 2017). This could be done by including challenging and 
non-routine scenarios in training sessions to improve re-framing and coordination skills 
during surprise events. For instance, Gorman et al. (2010), have shown how perturbation 
training can be used to train teams in finding new solutions to coordination problems. 
Perturbation training introduces perturbations to standard coordination procedures (e.g. 
cutting of communication link) during skill acquisition to increase the flexibility and adapt-
ability of teams. Perturbation training is thus focused on broadening a team’s interaction 
repertoire instead of prescribing standard forms of coordination (ibid.).
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6.5  MethoDoLoGICaL RefLeCtIoN aND LIMItatIoNS
In this section I will reflect on the methodological choices made during the course of the 
PhD research, their implications, and the limits of this study.
6.5.1  Methodological reflection
The study of coordination in multiteam and/or interorganizational systems tasked with 
the time-critical response to disruptive events poses major challenges. Broadly speaking 
there are three main challenges: the unpredictable nature of the disruptive events, the 
geographical distribution of the teams under study and data collection during the actual 
management of the events. As a result, many studies focus on coordination in a single 
team, observe the response operation during a simulated exercise, or make use of retro-
spective interviews, surveys and event reports to reconstruct the response to an event. 
Although these decisions are understandable given the fact that research needs to be kept 
manageable and viable, they also limit our understanding of the complexity of multiteam 
coordination. In this study we have shown how recordings of telephone conversations in 
combination with the tools of Dynamic Network Analysis can act as a complexity-informed 
approach to understand coordination in complex systems (cf. Gerrits, 2012; Schipper & 
Spekkink, 2015; Teisman & Gerrits, 2014).
As far as we know, the tools of social network analysis have never before been used 
within the context of rail disruption management. In the first study, Dynamic Network 
Analysis turned out to be a very useful tool to efficiently describe and quantitatively assess 
the whole network of operators involved in the management of a disruption and the flows 
of information between them during the first phase of the process. It made it possible to 
assess not only the size and structure of the network, but also the position and tasks of the 
different actors within it. This was a first important step towards unravelling some of the 
complexity of the disruption management process. A true complexity informed method, 
however, includes the element of time to take into account the dynamic and emergent 
nature of disruption management. In this dissertation we have shown how the element of 
time can be included in social network analysis by chopping the process into time slices. 
This dynamic representation of the network provides a better understanding of how infor-
mation flows and roles in the network change over time and thereby reduces the risk of 
misinterpreting data when looking only at aggregated networks.
One of the other drawbacks of social network analysis is that data collection has proven 
to be labour intensive and time-consuming when you want to model real-time commu-
nication between different teams during a disruption. The telephone recordings used in 
the second study yielded a huge amount of data that had to be hand-coded. This is why 
researchers have been developing ways of automating the collection of data and analysis 
of communication (e.g. Foltz & Martin, 2009; Gorman, Cooke, Amazeen, & Fouse, 2012; 
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Grimm et al., 2017; Kiekel, Gorman, & Cooke, 2004). Since communication between teams 
is mediated by information technology it is possible to collect data in real-time. For ex-
ample, automatic speaker identification techniques are becoming better at detecting who 
is speaking to whom (Barth, Schraagen, & Schmettow, 2015). At the same time there are 
also attempts to automate the analysis of the data to quickly provide feedback on team 
performance. Algorithms and software have been developed to extract patterns in the spe-
cific timing and sequences of interactions that characterize a specific team performance 
or their situation awareness (Weil et al., 2008). Currently, the data used in the real-time 
monitoring of communication patterns is quite basic. As Weil et al. (2008) observe, a trade-
off has to be made between ease of collecting and analyzing data, and the richness of the 
data. The problem is that these quantitative methods and tools abstract a great deal from 
the actual complexity of social systems (Schipper & Spekkink, 2015).
In this dissertation we have shown that rich qualitative data greatly contributes to a 
more complete understanding of real-time coordination. In the third study we made clear 
that it is not only important to look at the flows of information in a network or the timing 
of interactions, but that the interpretation of this information also plays a very important 
role in effective coordination. So instead of looking at the network structure to explain 
observed behaviour, we have combined a quantitative analysis of the communication pat-
terns with a qualitative analysis of the communication content to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the behaviour observed in this specific context. For example, this mixed-
methods approach explained why the actors in the OCCR did not use their central positions 
in the network to provide others with crucial information, as they did not believe that it 
was their role. Mixing SNA with a qualitative analysis of the data makes it possible to reap 
the benefits of being able to visualize and investigate the structure of the network in which 
actors operate, while also gaining an in-depth understanding of the ties between actors 
that shape this network and the specific contextual details that would otherwise be lost.
A mixed-methods approach is not only valuable for researchers who mainly apply 
traditional quantitative SNA, but also for researchers who mainly use qualitative research 
methods and who write thick case descriptions, such as ethnographers. Howard (2002) 
and Berthod et al. (2017) have called for network ethnography to study the practices of 
distributed teams and interorganizational networks. Network ethnography uses SNA to 
select specific cases and sites for ethnographic field research. We have shown how DNA 
can be used as an important starting point for a more in-depth qualitative analysis by first 
abstracting and visualizing system-level patterns. Moreover, the network visualizations can 
also be used to collect additional qualitative data by discussing them with respondents 
(Schipper & Spekkink, 2015). For example, actors in the Dutch Railway system declared 
that they were unaware of their relatively central position in the network and thus their 
potential to steer the process.
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A mixed-methods approach can thus help the researcher to structure data collection and 
analysis, but also to reflect on the result of both methods. Nonetheless, combining insights 
derived from both methods is not only complex, but as we have seen, the results of this 
combination might even be more clear to the researcher than their audience. Moreover, 
mixing methods is labour intensive and time consuming. So, despite the growing recogni-
tion that qualitative and quantitative approaches need to be integrated, researchers often 
opt for only one method. In this research we have shown that a mixed-methods approach 
does not only offer important benefits when studying distributed teams, but that it is also 
crucial to understanding multiteam performance as it emerges out of the interactions 
between the different teams.
6.5.2  Limitations of the study
This study also has some limitations that need to be discussed. First of all, there are limita-
tions on the data used in the first study. The data for the DNA was collected by means of 
value stream mapping and not from a real disruption. Experts took several days to recon-
struct the first phase of the disruption management process and very precisely describe 
the tasks and communication of every actor. This yielded a very detailed description of 
the disruption management process, which we could use for our DNA. Nonetheless, the 
data was not collected real-time and therefore the value stream might not represent the 
exact response during real-time operations. In addition, the aim of the value mapping was 
to reconstruct the disruption management process during a catenary failure, but did not 
involve the actual management of a disruption. Therefore we could not relate the network 
structure to a specific outcome.
Secondly, we should also point to a limitation concerning the scope of the research. In 
this study the focus has been on the first and, to a more limited extent, the second phase 
of the disruption management process. This is from the moment a disruption has been 
noticed until an alternative service plan has been implemented. Hence, no particular at-
tention has been paid to the third phase of the disruption management process, during 
which the system has to return to normal operations. The decision to focus on the first 
and second phase was made from both a practical (limits on the data available in the first 
study) and theoretical point of view. The first phase of the disruption management process, 
or chaos phase as it is often called in the rail sector, is known for its dynamics, complexity, 
and high levels of uncertainty. This makes it a particularly interesting phase of the process 
in which to study the system’s response. In contrast, during the recovery phase the system 
is relatively stable and more information and time is available for making decisions. The 
findings of this research, however, seem to indicate that the recovery phase forms a major 
bottleneck in the disruption management process, and deserves specific attention in future 
research.
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Thirdly, there are also limitations regarding the use of telephone conversations to study 
real-time coordination. In the previous section I highlighted the benefits of coding and 
analyzing the content of recorded communication. Not only could we precisely follow 
the flows of information between operators, but we could also gain a good and detailed 
understanding of their collective sensemaking and team work behaviours, such as asking 
for help, providing back-up, and mutual performance monitoring. Naturally, information 
sharing is not confined to telephone calls. What the recordings do not reveal is how much 
information was actually available to the operators other than that shared through verbal 
communication. As Stanton (2017) rightfully observes, technological systems, such as ISVL 
and traffic management systems, have an important role in maintaining the operators’ 
situation awareness. To deal with this issue, we carefully examined the loggings made in 
the ISVL communication system. Moreover, although it is not possible to get a complete 
picture of an operator’s situation awareness, I do believe that this study has shown that it 
is possible to gain a good understanding of what the different operators and teams know 
and do not know by examining the content of the verbal communication.
Finally, the use of telephone recordings as the main source of data has placed an em-
phasis on the interactions between teams and the observable teamwork behaviours. At 
the same time there are also more implicit and difficult to capture affective, motivational 
and cognitive properties of teams that affect communication and coordination (Kozlowski 
& Ilgen, 2006). In the team literature these affective (trust, cohesion), motivational (collec-
tive efficacy) and cognitive properties (shared mental models and transactive memory) are 
seen as emergent states that characterize properties of teams and are typically dynamic in 
nature and vary as a function of team context, inputs, processes, and outcomes (Marks et 
al., 2001). As chapter 3 has shown, this cohesion between teams can quickly crumble and 
even lead to a competitive orientation between groups when negative emotions spread 
within teams and conflicts arise. Team attitudes are thus very important to understanding 
the observable teamwork. Yet, in comparison to team communication and explicit coordi-
nation they are far more difficult to measure by means of communication analysis and thus 
for some part remain unknown (Wilson et al., 2007). We have, however, used interviews 
to allow operators to reflect on their own actions and behaviours in order to gain a better 
understanding of the attitudes and motivations underlying observed behaviours.
6.6  theoRetICaL RefLeCtIoN aND IMPLICatIoNS
In this section I will reflect on the theories and insights used from the different academic 
fields and the specific contributions made by this study to the literature.
One of the major contributions of this research is that we have studied a largely neglected 
issue in the disruption management literature, which is the coordination of the different 
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rescheduling activities. Rail disruption management literature has mainly focused on the 
development of models and algorithms to provide decision support tools for the reschedul-
ing of time-tables, rolling stock and train crew. The focus in rail disruption literature on 
algorithms and models has pushed the role of operators to the background. In this study 
we have shown the importance of gaining a better understanding of the complexity of 
disruption management and the inter-team communication and coordination challenges. 
Since there are almost no studies on this specific topic, we used and combined theories and 
insights from many different fields, including resilience engineering, organizational stud-
ies, human factors, applied psychology and emergency management. Most of the literature 
found in the different academic fields, however, focuses on teams as isolated entities or 
uses the aggregated system as its level of analysis.
This is why we turned to the literature on Multiteam Systems to better understand not 
only what happens within teams, but also within this network of heterogeneous teams. 
MTS is a relatively new field, but there is a growing interest in it and during our research a 
great number of new articles on MTS were published. Most of these articles are, however, 
conceptual and focus on theory building. Similar to the literature on single teams, theory 
testing is mostly done via simulation-based, modelling or laboratory settings under tightly 
controlled conditions. Moreover, students often play a crucial role in these experiments 
and simulations. Hence, the essential contextual details, task dynamics, and the expertise 
of operators is lost in these studies, which raise doubt as to whether the findings of these 
studies can be generalized to natural settings (Byrne & Callaghan, 2013; Gerrits, 2012; Klein 
& Wright, 2016). The number of actual field studies is still very limited and it is therefore 
time that the current theory on MTS is tested in field studies. This thesis already makes a 
contribution to the literature on MTS with the study of real life cases of coordination during 
the management of rail disruptions. In the third study we have, for instance, found that 
theoretical ideas on MTS leadership might not always be so easy to accomplish in real life, 
given the complexities in which MTSs operate.
In addition, as Shuffler et al. (2017) observe, most research on MTS has followed tradi-
tional variable-centric approaches to understanding MTS performance, i.e. identifying and 
isolating important constructs relevant for MTS performance and then studying how these 
variables influence performance. This variable-centric approach relies on simplifying the 
complexity inherent to MTS, such as assuming that intra-team properties are homogenous 
across teams and team members, and that they are static. By isolating general mechanisms 
we do not truly account for the behaviour that we encounter in complex social systems 
(Morçöl, 2012). For instance, it does not take into account how different properties manifest 
simultaneously, how these properties influence each other, and how they vary between 
teams. So although variable centred approaches can help to advance the theory on MTS, 
they do not in themselves explain MTS performance. Instead, it is necessary to study the 
dynamic interactions between the different actors and teams in order to understand the 
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resultant emergent and non-linear outcome at the system level (Gerrits, 2012). As we have 
shown in chapter 3, it takes the entirety of interactions and activities of actors and teams 
to explain a coordination breakdown. In addition, the case has shown that the specific 
context in which the operator works is explanatory for which mechanisms are triggered 
and which are not (Teisman & Gerrits, 2014).
This is why researchers advocate taking a process approach in order to understand team 
performance in real-life settings (Cooke, 2015; Klein & Wright, 2016). For example, Interac-
tive Team Cognition (ITC) theory (Cooke et al., 2013; Cooke, 2015) sees team cognition as 
a process of team members interacting to complete a cognitive task, rather than static 
knowledge held by the team. Instead of seeing situation awareness as the static shared 
knowledge on a situation, ITC considers situation awareness as the timely and adaptive 
responding of a team through interactions among team members. In this dissertation 
we have shown how DNA can be combined with a qualitative analysis of the content of 
communication in order to gain insights into the process of collective sensemaking not 
only within teams, but also between teams. DNA does not only capture the dynamics of 
the interactions between actors, but also shows how the behaviours of individuals are 
constrained by the network they are embedded in. As such, it is an example of a process ap-
proach that takes the specific dynamics and contextual constraints into account for a more 
fine-grained perspective on the complexities of multiteam performance. This can help to 
better specify MTS theory and create more advanced interventions and tools (Shuffler et 
al., 2017).
The findings of this dissertation also contribute to the literature on critical infrastruc-
tures providing public services. Most of the train operating companies and infrastructure 
managers in Europe are still state owned and basically fulfil a public service. In the intro-
duction I have pointed to the fact that much has been written on restructuring policies in 
the rail industry, but that these studies have mostly paid attention to the actual policies, 
their implementation, and their outcome in terms of performance. Far less attention has 
been paid to the effects of these policies on the daily operations of the operators managing 
the railway system. This is quite strange, as these restructuring policies have had a major 
impact on the rail system’s ability to provide reliable services, changing it from a primarily 
intra-organizational task to an inter-organizational task (De Bruijne, 2006).
As Berthod and colleagues (2017) also point out, research on whether and how public 
networks organize to provide reliable service delivery is absent from the literature, despite 
the challenges inherent to such networks as an organizational form. Much remains unclear 
on how these networks are structured, managed and controlled. In this dissertation we 
have made an international comparison of how the different rail systems have organized 
their disruption management process. This comparison has also provided insights into 
how the different extents of open market access and unbundling of rail operations and 
infrastructure management influence how disruption management has been organized.
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6.7  ReCoMMeNDatIoNS foR futuRe ReSeaRCh
Based on the findings and limitations of this study, I will also propose some avenues for 
future research
Recommendation 1: Further explore how dynamic network analysis can be used in a 
mixed-methods approach.
In this study we have advocated taking a more qualitative approach to social network 
analysis and have demonstrated how this can be done by combining a quantitative analysis 
of the communication flows with a qualitative analysis of how actors made sense of the in-
formation shared. In our research we made use of qualitative data for both the quantitative 
and qualitative methods of analysis and used the outcomes of the DNA as a starting point 
for the qualitative analysis. As mentioned earlier, combining methods is labour intensive 
and complex. Hence, many researchers will opt for either a quantitative or qualitative ap-
proach. Given the results of this research, however, I would not only urge more network 
researchers to adopt a mixed-method research design, but also to explore new and maybe 
even better ways of balancing the qualitative and quantitative approaches. As Edwards 
(2010) rightfully observes there is no one best way to integrate quantitative and qualita-
tive methods in SNA and so there is definitely room for methodological development. It 
would be interesting to explore the different ways in which quantitative and qualitative 
approaches can be balanced, both in terms of data collection and analyses, and to also 
examine the advantages and limitations of these different approaches.
Recommendation 2: More research on coordination challenges in rail disruption 
management is needed.
This study has addressed a largely neglected issue in the disruption management litera-
ture, that of coordinating actions and information between the different teams manag-
ing the disruption. As we are one of the first to explore this topic in this specific context, 
additional research is needed. Future research should not only study the management of 
more and different kinds of disruptions to expand our knowledge on this topic, but should 
also provide insights into how the specific characteristics of the disruption (e.g. cause 
and timing) influence the communication and coordination challenges encountered (cf. 
Golightly & Dadashi, 2017). Secondly, the international comparison of rail disruption man-
agement could be expanded and improved by including more countries in the comparison 
and by providing a more empirical grounding of the items used. Moreover, an important 
step would also be to relate the trade-offs found in the international comparison to the 
effectiveness of the disruption management process. We have taken a first step towards 
expanding and enriching the international comparison during a one-year postdoctoral re-
search project. Thirdly, future research should not only pay attention to the initial response 
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to a disruption in order to bring the system into a relatively stable state, but also to its 
ability to fully recover from a disrupting event and the associated coordination challenges. 
Finally, the wider network of actors involved in the management of rail disruptions, such as 
contractors and emergency services, should be included in future research to also take into 
account the role of those managing the specific incident and how their activities impact 
the disruption management process.
Recommendation 3: Further explore the role and challenges to MTS leadership.
In the fourth chapter we have shown that there are some major challenges to MTS. Leader-
ship is very important to integrate the activities of the different component teams in a MTS. 
This is why it is important to further explore the role of MTS leadership in different settings. 
Future research should not only look at the behaviours and qualities of leaders, but also at 
how these leader teams are embedded in the wider system. For example, Davison and col-
leagues (2012) argue that lateral coordination between component teams combined with 
hierarchical integration through leader teams constrains MTS performance. In the fourth 
chapter we have indeed seen how lateral coordination between the regional traffic control 
centres can negatively impact vertical coordination. At the same time this research has 
shown that both lateral and hierarchical integration is possible and even necessary in rail-
way systems as component teams need to quickly respond to disruptions in a coordinated 
manner. Our international comparison has shown that there are different ways in which 
hierarchical and lateral integration have been combined. Future research should focus on 
the conditions that support both lateral and hierarchical coordination between teams.
Recommendation 4: Compare the disruption management practices of different critical 
infrastructure systems.
Railway systems are not the only critical infrastructure systems in which control centres are 
tasked with the reliable provision of services and that are very vulnerable to disruptions. 
Other such systems include road, electricity and telecommunication networks. Some of 
these infrastructures have also experienced the unbundling of the monopolies that used 
to manage them (cf. De Bruijne, 2006). In this study we have already seen that there are 
similarities, but also major differences in how the different rail systems have organized 
their disruption management process. It would therefore be interesting to explore how 
disruption management has been organized in other critical infrastructures and how these 
systems deal with the trade-offs identified in the first chapter.
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6.8  CLoSING ReMaRkS
In this thesis we have looked at the management of large-scale, complex disruptions. We 
have seen that disruption management is a very complex matter that requires the coor-
dinated action of many different operators and teams involved in the process. Commu-
nication and coordination problems become especially pressing during major and unique 
disruptions, when there is a real risk that control over the system will be lost. Perhaps the 
results of this thesis will not immediately contribute to giving the railway system a more 
positive image and might even strengthen people’s conviction that travelling by car is by far 
the best option. We must, however, also look at the other side of the coin. NS and ProRail re-
cently released an international benchmark in which they compare their performance with 
peers in six other European countries (ProRail & NS, 2017). Although we know on the basis 
of the fourth study that it is very difficult to directly compare countries, the results of the 
international benchmark revealed that the performance of NS and ProRail is actually quite 
good. Especially given the fact that the Dutch rail network is the busiest in Europe. Overall, 
the punctuality of passenger trains is one of the best in Europe and there are relatively few 
‘black days’ (days when the total punctuality falls below 85 percent). This does not however, 
mean that there is no room for improvement in both the overall performance of the rail 
system and more specifically the management of disruptions. These improvements are of 
major importance in order to increase the overall reliability of the system and to accom-
modate the desired growth in rail traffic on the already congested rail network.
Process improvements could make an important contribution to the Dutch railway 
system’s ability to quickly respond to disruptions and return to normal operations. At the 
same time we must also point out that there are limitations to what can be achieved by 
improving coordination and communication between teams. Improved coordination and 
communication between teams may expand the system’s adaptive capacity, but there are 
many factors that influence the overall success of managing rail disruptions. For example, 
in this thesis we have seen that the rescheduling of train crews forms a serious issue during 
the management of disruptions and may even trigger an out-of-control situation. Despite 
new innovations there are limits to the number of trains that can be rescheduled and 
during large-scale disruptions this capacity is often insufficient. The rescheduling capac-
ity is closely linked to how crew schedules have been planned. In this planning process a 
trade-off must be made between conflicting goals such as punctuality, costs, rescheduling 
capacity and variation in crew schedules. The system’s adaptive capacity is thus bounded 
and highly depends upon the strategic choices made in the planning phase.
As this thesis has shown there is not one optimal model for organizing rail disruption 
management. Railway systems are complex systems in which important trade-offs have 
to be made that bound their performance (Woods & Branlat, 2011). Problems during the 
management of disruptions can’t simply be blamed on the unbundling of the rail system 
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nor will a merger between ProRail and NS solve all the issues. It is important to gain a better 
understanding of the complexity of rail systems in general, and rail disruption manage-
ment in particular. Although many people have an opinion on how the rail system should 
work, only a few have any idea of how it actually functions. I hope that this thesis will make 
a contribution to the general knowledge on rail disruption management and that it will 
also make people feel more at ease when stranded at a train station, knowing how many 
people are working extremely hard to solve the disruption as soon as possible.
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List of abbreviations used for actors in network
abbreviation full name or function
NTC Network Traffic Control
NOC Network Operations Control
RTC Regional Traffic Control
ROC Regional Operations Control
AL Incident Manager
SMC Department of ProRail which monitors the power of the catenaries
Stoco Disruption coordinator
PLP Platform supervisor
PCL Process Leader
RET Mcn Shunter
LRI Network travel informant
RI Regional travel informant
NSRI Informant for train crew

Summary in English
Summary in Dutch
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Introduction to the research
Railway disruptions can cause substantial deviations from planned operations. Railway 
controllers of ProRail and NS, who work in different control centres spread across the 
Netherlands, are tasked with rescheduling plans to contain and minimize the impact of dis-
ruptions. While in most cases these operators are able to adequately manage disruptions, 
there have been instances in which there was relatively little or no rail traffic in large parts 
of the country. To contain these major disruptions the control centres have to work closely 
together and share a great deal of information. In practice, however, situations during a 
disruption often changed faster than the parties could communicate and the decentralized 
network of control made it difficult to manage disruptions with a national impact. 
ProRail and NS therefore decided to develop a joint control centre: the Operational Control 
Centre Rail (OCCR). In the OCCR, ProRail and NS monitor railway traffic at a national level 
and can intervene in regional operations when necessary. Despite the establishment of 
the OCCR there have been several large-scale disruptions in the last couple of years during 
which the different control centres were unaware of what was going on and what should 
be done. As a result, control centres were often working at cross-purposes. The introduction 
of the OCCR as a boundary-spanning platform for the rail sector thus did not solve the 
coordination issues in the Dutch rail system. In fact, one could say that it might have even 
made things more complicated by introducing another layer on top of the already complex 
network of control centres. The overall aim of this thesis is therefore to gain a better under-
standing of the coordination and communication challenges between the different control 
centres during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions. The main research 
question is as follows:
What explains the coordination breakdowns between the control centres in the Dutch
railway system during the management of large-scale, complex disruptions?”
Theoretical relevance
In recent decades there has been a growing interest among organizational scholars in the 
conditions that influence organizations’ ability to reliably manage large-scale, complex 
socio-technical systems under a variety of dynamic conditions (cf. Hollnagel et al., 2011; La 
Porte, 1996; Perrow, 1984; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Many studies address the limitations 
of traditional hierarchical systems in effectively coping within complex, ambiguous and 
unstable task environments. The core assets of these systems standardization, formaliza-
tion and hierarchy severely limit the flexibility needed to operate in these environments. 
Within the literature two important trade-offs can be identified in the reliable manage-
ment of these systems: a) decentralization versus centralization and b) anticipation versus 
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resilience. Highly centralized authority structures are needed to facilitate coordinated deci-
sion making, but at the same time decentralized decision-making is necessary to quickly 
respond to surprising events. Similarly, anticipating disruptions and developing plans and 
procedures help to reduce the coordination costs during the management of disruptions. 
At the same time, there is a competing need for mutual adjustment and improvisation to 
respond to non-anticipated situations.
Organizations operating in a dynamic and complex environment thus paradoxically em-
phasize both formal and improvised forms of coordination (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). Operators 
working in control centres are confronted by these trade-offs on a daily basis. They have 
to decide between following design principles and relying on improvisation, and between 
hierarchical and on-the-spot decision making. Most research has focused on these coordi-
nation and adaptation challenges in complex, dynamic and time-pressured environments 
from the point of view of co-located teams. In this thesis, however, we focus on a multiteam 
system (MTS): a network of control centres, separated by geographical and organizational 
boundaries. We therefore looked at the role of both trade-offs from a multiteam perspec-
tive. 
Research design and methods
In this research the focus is on how the teams in the Dutch railway system work together 
and adapt to changes during the management of actual large-scale, complex disruptions. 
Studying disruption management in practice poses certain methodological challenges, 
especially when it comes to collecting data. Not only is it difficult to predict when a disrup-
tion will occur, but as a researcher it is also impossible to be present at more than one 
place at a time. In our research, recordings of telephone conversations between operators 
during the management of disruptions were a very valuable data source. These recordings 
were supplemented by observations, interviews, and document analysis. The available data 
was analysed quantitatively using Dynamic Network Analysis (study 1), used in a mixed-
methods approach (study 2), and for a qualitative analysis (study 3). For the fourth study 
we collected data during five site visits to control centres in five different countries. Each 
site visit lasted two to three full days each. During those site visits we observed operators 
in the control rooms and conducted forty-nine interviews. 
Study results
In chapter 2, we introduced Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) as a valuable tool to study 
disruption management. Control centres must share up-to-date information in order to be 
able to quickly respond to disruptions and to align their activities. A good understanding 
of the structure of the network of actors involved in the disruption management process 
and the flows of information between these actors can help to optimize the response to 
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disruptions. Although Social Network Analysis is a proven technique for visualizing and 
analyzing networks, it only provides a static snapshot of a network. We therefore explored 
the use of DNA on a simulated case of a catenary failure to capture the dynamics of the 
disruption management process. First of all, the DNA showed that the development of a 
collective understanding of the situation, as well as the formulation and implementation 
of a contingency plan leads to a considerable information flow between the different 
operators. Secondly, DNA revealed the central role of the train dispatchers and regional 
traffic controllers during the first phase of the disruption management process. Thirdly, the 
DNA also showed that the network’s structure is relatively sparse. This means that there 
are often no direct ties between actors and information therefore has to pass along many 
actors before reaching the intended recipient. Finally, the inclusion of time in the network 
analysis revealed that operators actually start to manage disruptions without having the 
full details of the situation. Overall, the first study has shown that DNA is a valuable tool 
for visualizing and analyzing the disruption management process and that the inclusion of 
time is important in order to capture the dynamics of the process.
In the third chapter we presented an in-depth case study of how a coordination break-
down between the teams in the Dutch rail system led to the decision to stop the train 
service at two major stations during rush hour. In this study we wanted to understand this 
coordination breakdown and the decision to stop the train service from the perspective 
of the system as a whole by looking at the complex interactions between teams. That’s 
why we used a mixed-methods approach to study both the flows of information between 
teams, and the way this information is (collectively) interpreted. In this mixed-methods 
approach we combined Dynamic Network Analysis with theories of sensemaking. The 
results showed that the involved teams were unable to create a shared understanding of 
the situation. These different understandings of the situation accumulated over time, lead-
ing to inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions, a lack of effective communication, and 
increasing uncertainty. This study also highlighted the risk of blind spots that are the result 
of a commitment to taken-for-granted frames. In the study we showed how these blind 
spots caused actors to miss important signals that they weren’t dealing with a routine 
situation. As a result, they were unable to repair the coordination breakdown between the 
teams in time, leading to the decision to stop the train service as a safety measure.  
In chapter four we  examined the role of the teams in the OCCR in preventing the rail 
system from falling into the three basic patterns of adaptive failure:  1) decompensation, 2) 
working at cross-purposes, and 3) outdated behaviours. These patterns of adaptive failure 
can eventually lead to a system break-down and thus need to be avoided or recognized and 
escaped from. Effective leadership is assumed to have an important positive influence on 
inter-team coordination and the overall adaptiveness of systems. The leadership behaviours 
of the teams in the OCCR were therefore analyzed using the literature on MTS-leadership. 
While multiteam system literature stresses the importance of leader teams, the study in 
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chapter 4 revealed some important challenges for leadership in a MTS. First of all, we found 
that the operators in the OCCR often struggled to adequately monitor the performance of 
regional operators in order to detect a need for back-up, and how it should be provided. 
Secondly, regional operators often didn’t ask for help, or even refused the help offered by 
the operators in the OCCR. Thirdly, while the OCCR was intended as an information hub 
with an overall understanding of the situation, we found that the teams in the OCCR were 
quickly confronted with a degraded situation awareness. This made it difficult to orches-
trate the activities of the regional control centres. Finally, we noticed a tension between the 
dynamics and complexity of the disruption and the wish to quickly implement a predefined 
contingency plan. 
In the final empirical study, discussed in Chapter 5, an international comparison of 
disruption management is made. A thorough literature search showed that there was no 
comparative research into disruption management. In this study we therefore explored 
the structures and practices of railway disruption management in five European railway 
systems. The comparison focused on the trade-offs described earlier, that of a) centraliza-
tion versus decentralization, and b) anticipation versus resilience. To compare the countries 
we derived several items from the literature for each trade-off. We assigned scores to each 
of the items on the basis of our observations and interviews. We then took the average 
scores of all items to show how the countries compared on both trade-offs. This resulted in 
two clusters of countries. The first cluster consists of Austria and the Netherlands. They are 
both moderately centralized and of the five countries, they rely the most on a formalized 
approach to deal with disruptions. Belgium and Denmark form the second cluster, as they 
combine a centralized structure with an emphasis on resilience. Germany was a bit of an 
outlier in our comparison due to its decentralized structure, which seems to relate to the 
size and complexity of the system, and was therefore not part of either cluster. The results 
show there is not one best way to organize rail disruption management. 
Conclusions
In the final chapter we built on the findings of the four empirical studies and answered 
the main research question of this thesis. We conclude that creating and maintaining  a 
compatible understanding of the operational environment during large-scale, complex 
disruptions is very difficult. This shared situation awareness is crucial to the control cen-
tres’ ability to take rapid and decisive action in the event of a disruption, and to effectively 
coordinate and adjust their actions during the management of a disruption.  Creating and 
maintaining a shared situation awareness is not only difficult because of the challenges 
of sharing information under pressure, but also because of the complexity and dynamics 
of the operational environment. Especially during complex disruptions information only 
slowly becomes available, and at the same time this information can be outdated once it 
is received. As a result, information is often scattered throughout the system, and teams 
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receive information at different moments in time. Under time pressure operators have to 
decide between collecting more information or making decisions on the basis of incomplete 
information. The first option has proven to be difficult, because of the limitations set by the 
available communication channels. The second option is not without risks. Especially when 
dealing with nonroutine disruptions there is a chance that decision are made on the basis 
of inaccurate and conflicting assumptions, resulting in teams working at cross-purposes.  
In this dissertation, we have pointed to the importance of collectively making sense 
of information in order to coordinate activities around a common framing of the situa-
tion. Our studies however showed that collective sensemaking between teams is weakly 
developed. Operators often do not take the time to pose additional questions, or do not 
feel free to cross-check the information they receive. Moreover, when a situation becomes 
more ambiguous, operators tend to reduce communication and hide behind their own 
interpretation of events and the procedures to follow. The latter however does not always 
have to be on purpose, as the second study has shown. The activation and commitment to a 
framing of the situation as a routine procedures, caused the teams to miss important cues 
that were lacking common ground. So, plans and procedures do not only prove to be brittle 
when dealing with nonroutine situations, but can actually obscure the need to improvise.
The latter also became apparent when looking at the implementation of contingency 
plans. Our international comparison showed that the Dutch railway system relies the 
strongest on predefined contingency plans. Although these plans can greatly contribute to 
reducing coordination costs during the management of disruptions, they prove to be brittle 
when dealing with nonroutine disruptions. While situation assessment and the implemen-
tation of a contingency plan require a relatively stable situation, there are situations where 
the operational environment can be so complex and dynamic that the understanding of 
the situation has to be updated continuously. As a result, new rounds of situation assess-
ment, communication and decision making are necessary to revise the plans. In practice, 
we have seen that predefined contingency plans are implemented on the basis of a simpli-
fied assessment of the operational conditions. Without a sufficient plan the risk of local 
optimization increases and conditions can quickly degrade, as was noticed in the cases. 
Finally, we can conclude that the coordinating role of the leader teams in the OCCR often 
remains inadequate. This is not only due to their often degraded situation awareness, but is 
also caused by a lack of effective teamwork with the regional control centres. There is a lot 
of ambiguity concerning the division of roles, tasks, and responsibilities between both lay-
ers of control. This results  in actors often not meeting each other’s expectations, impedes 
information sharing, and may even cause conflicts when roles are deemed to have been 
violated.
The findings in this dissertation have some important practical implications. During 
the course of our research ProRail and NS were working on restructuring the disruption 
management process. This new model should lead to more and better centralized decision 
making, faster information sharing by means of improved information technology, and 
the development of better contingency plans. Although the findings in this dissertation 
underline the importance of these developments when it comes to routine disruptions, 
at the same time this shift to more anticipation and centralization could also make the 
system less adaptive to nonroutine disruptions. Our findings show that improved informa-
tion technology does not substitute the need for improve collective sensemaking between 
teams, centralized decision making only possible is in close cooperation with the regional 
control centres and that plans and procedures could actually obscure the need for impro-
visation. 
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Introductie van het onderzoek
Verstoringen op het spoor kunnen de treindienst flink ontregelen. Verspreid over Nederland 
zorgen medewerkers van ProRail en NS vanuit verkeersleidingsposten en bijsturingscentra 
dan ook dat de treindienst snel wordt bijgestuurd in het geval van een verstoring. Snel 
bijsturen is belangrijk om de impact van een verstoring klein te houden en te voorkomen 
dat problemen zich verspreiden naar de rest van het spoornetwerk (de zogenoemde 
olievlekwerking). De meeste verstoringen op het spoor worden adequaat afgehandeld 
en blijven zodoende beperkt tot een klein gebied. Er zijn echter ook verscheidene grote 
verstoringen geweest, waarbij in grote delen van het land weinig tot geen treinverkeer 
mogelijk was. Tijdens deze grote verstoringen moeten de verkeersleidingsposten en bijstu-
ringscentra intensief samenwerken en veel informatie met elkaar delen, zodat processen 
op elkaar afgestemd worden. In de praktijk bleek echter dat tijdens deze grote verstoringen 
de onderlinge communicatie trager was dan de dynamiek van de verstoring. Bovendien 
zorgde het decentrale netwerk van verkeersleidingsposten en bijsturingscentra er voor dat 
het moeilijk was om grip te krijgen op verstoringen met een landelijke impact. 
ProRail en NS hebben daarom een gezamenlijke controlecentrum ontwikkeld,, genaamd 
het Operationeel Controle Centrum Rail (OCCR). In het OCCR monitoren medewerkers van 
ProRail en NS onder één dak de treindienst vanuit een landelijk perspectief en kunnen zij, 
indien nodig, ingrijpen bij de regionale controlecentra. Ondanks de oprichting van het 
OCCR zijn er in de afgelopen jaren verschillende grote verstoringen geweest waarbij de 
situatie zo uit de hand liep dat niemand meer een goed overzicht had van de situatie en 
wist wat er moest gebeuren. Dit zorgde er voor dat de controlecentra elkaar onbewust 
begonnen tegen te werken en daarmee de situatie zelfs verergerden. De introductie van 
het OCCR heeft de problemen rond de afstemming tussen de verschillende partijen die 
betrokken zijn bij de bijsturing van de treindienst tijdens grote verstoringen dus niet vol-
ledig op kunnen lossen. Het doel van dit onderzoek is dan ook om beter inzicht te krijgen 
in belangrijkste uitdagingen op het gebied van coördinatie en communicatie tussen de 
verschillende controlecentra tijdens de afhandeling van grote en complexe verstoringen. 
De volgende onderzoeksvraag staat daarbij centraal:
Wat verklaart de coördinatieproblemen tussen de controlecentra in het Nederlands spoorsys-
teem tijdens de afhandeling van grootschalige, complexe verstoringen?
Theoretische relevantie
In de afgelopen decennia is er een toenemende interesse te zien vanuit de organisatie-
wetenschappen in de wijze waarop grootschalige, complexe socio-technische systemen, 
zoals het spoor, betrouwbaar kunnen worden gemanaged onder uiteenlopende condities 
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(cf. Hollnagel et al. 2011; La Porte, 1996; Perrow, 1984; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Daarbij 
gaat het er om dat deze organisaties niet alleen in staat zijn om een betrouwbare dienst-
verlening te leveren onder stabiele omstandigheden, maar ook geplande en ongeplande 
incidenten kunnen opvangen zonder dat de controle verloren gaat. In de literatuur wordt 
er op gewezen dat traditionele hiërarchische organisatiestructuren onvoldoende flexibel 
zijn om in deze complexe, dynamische en ambigue omgeving betrouwbaar te opereren. 
In dezelfde literatuur wordt gewezen op het feit dat organisaties belangrijke afwegingen 
moeten maken die van invloed zijn op de coördinatie en het adaptief vermogen van com-
plexe socio-technische systemen. In dit proefschrift hebben wij ons gericht op de trade-off 
tussen a) centralisatie en decentralisatie en b) anticipatie en veerkracht. Centralisatie is 
noodzakelijk voor snelle en gecoördineerde besluitvorming bij verstoringen, terwijl decen-
tralisatie van belang is om snel in te kunnen grijpen bij onverwachte situaties. De tweede 
trade-off is die tussen het van te voren ontwikkelen van plannen en procedures bij de 
afhandeling van verstoringen (anticipatie) en de noodzaak tot improvisatie bij afwijkende 
situaties (veerkracht).
Organisaties die in dynamische en complexe omgevingen opereren leggen dus para-
doxaal zowel de nadruk op formele als informele vormen van coördinatie (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006). Werknemers in de controlecentra moeten dagelijks belangrijke afwegingen maken. 
Zij worden regelmatig met onverwachte omstandigheden geconfronteerd, waarbij vooraf 
gedefinieerde procedures en plannen niet altijd voldoen en de betrouwbaarheid van het 
systeem afhankelijk is van de gezamenlijke betekenisverlening en afstemming. Veel 
onderzoek naar deze uitdagingen op het gebied van coördinatie en adaptatie richt zich 
op individuele teams. In dit proefschrift hebben we echter te maken met een multiteam 
systeem: een netwerk van geografisch en organisatorisch gescheiden controlecentra die 
gezamenlijk een verstoring moeten afhandelen. Binnen deze context van een multiteam 
systeem wordt er in dit proefschrift gekeken hoe er met beide trade-offs wordt omgegaan. 
Onderzoeksopzet en methoden
In dit onderzoek ligt de focus op hoe meerdere teams hun processen afstemmen tijdens 
de afhandeling van enkele concrete grootschalige en complexe verstoringen. Het bestu-
deren van geografisch gescheiden teams ten tijde van een daadwerkelijke verstoring zorgt 
echter wel voor de nodige methodologische uitdagingen, met name op het gebied van 
dataverzameling. Verstoringen zijn immers grotendeels niet te voorspellen en je kan als 
onderzoeker ook maar op één plek tegelijk zijn. In dit onderzoek vormden de opnames van 
telefoongesprekken tussen teams dan ook een belangrijke databron. De opnames zijn aan-
gevuld met observaties, interviews en document analyses. De verzamelde data is daarna 
zowel kwantitatief geanalyseerd middels een dynamische netwerk analyse (studie 1), 
gebruikt in een mixed-methods benadering (studie 2) en kwalitatief geanalyseerd (studie 
3). Voor de vierde studie hebben wij data verzameld tijdens bezoeken aan controlecentra 
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in vijf verschillende landen die gemiddeld zo’n twee a drie volle dagen duurden. Tijdens 
deze bezoeken hebben wij medewerkers geobserveerd in de controlecentra en daarnaast 
49 interviews afgenomen. 
Onderzoeksresultaten
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben wij Dynamische Netwerk Analyse (DNA) aangedragen als een 
veelbelovende instrument om verstoringsmanagement te bestuderen. De verschillende 
controlecentra moeten up-to-date informatie met elkaar blijven delen om snel te kunnen 
reageren op een verstoring en hun activiteiten op elkaar af te stemmen. Het analyseren 
van het netwerk van actoren betrokken bij de afhandeling van de verstoring en de 
informatiestromen tussen hen kan bijdragen aan een verdere optimalisatie van het ver-
storingsmanagementproces. Sociale Netwerk Analyse is een beproefde methode voor het 
visualiseren en analyseren van netwerken. Het heeft het echter als nadeel dat het alleen 
een statische weergave van het netwerk geeft. We hebben daarom een DNA toegepast op 
een gesimuleerde casus van een bovenleidingbreuk om zo de dynamiek van het versto-
ringsmanagementproces te visualiseren en analyseren. De DNA heeft ten eerste laten zien 
dat het creëren van een gedeeld beeld van de situatie en het kiezen en implementeren van 
een versperringsmaatregel tot een aanzienlijke stroom van informatie tussen de betrokken 
actoren leidt. Ten tweede kwam naar voren dat tijdens deze eerste fase van de verstoring 
de treindienstleiders en decentrale verkeersleiders een centrale rol hebben in het netwerk. 
Ten derde heeft de DNA ook laten zien dat er binnen het netwerk vaak geen directe com-
municatielijnen zijn tussen actoren en informatie dus via-via doorgegeven moet worden. 
Deze lange communicatielijnen kunnen echter leiden tot misverstanden en vertragingen 
in de besluitvorming. Tot slot heeft de inclusie van tijd in de netwerkanalyse zichtbaar 
gemaakt dat werknemers reeds aan de slag gaan met de afhandeling van een verstoring 
zonder dat zij volledig op de hoogte zijn van de situatie. De eerste studie heeft dan ook 
laten zien dat DNA een waardevolle methode is voor het visualiseren en analyseren van het 
verstoringsmanagementproces en dat om recht te doen aan de dynamiek van het proces 
de inclusie van tijd essentieel is.     
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we een casusstudie verricht naar het plotseling staken van het 
treinverkeer rond twee belangrijke stations in Nederland door een gebrek aan coördinatie 
tussen verschillende teams in het spoorsysteem. In deze studie onderzochten we wat de 
reden was voor deze gebrekkige coördinatie en waarom men besloot het treinverkeer 
plotseling te staken. Uitgangspunt daarbij was dat de keuze om het treinverkeer stil te 
leggen niet verklaard kan worden door individuele keuzes, maar dat deze gezocht moet 
worden in de complexe interacties tussen de verschillende teams. Daarom hebben we 
een mixed-methods benadering gekozen, waarbij we zowel gekeken hebben naar de in-
formatiestromen tussen teams, alsmede de manier waarop deze informatie gezamenlijk 
geïnterpreteerd werd. Hiervoor hebben wij gebruik gemaakt van DNA en de theorieën over 
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betekenisverlening van ambigue situaties. In de studie werd duidelijk dat de betrokken 
teams niet in staat waren om tot een gezamenlijk beeld van de situatie te komen, met 
als gevolg verkeerde aannames, het niet delen van informatie, afwijkend handelen en een 
toenemende onzekerheid. In het omgaan met deze onzekerheid speelt betekenisverlening 
door middel van framing een belangrijke rol als een basis voor gecoördineerd handelen. De 
studie laat echter ook zien dat de activatie van een bepaald frame kan zorgen voor blinde 
vlekken. Hierdoor werden de belangrijke signalen gemist dat men niet met een routinema-
tige situatie te maken had en bleek men niet in staat deze coördinatieproblemen tijdig te 
herkennen en te repareren. 
De teams in het OCCR staan centraal in hoofdstuk 4. In deze studie hebben wij gekeken 
naar het leiderschap van deze teams tijdens grote verstoringen in relatie tot het vermijden 
van systeemfalen. Als een systeem onvoldoende in staat is om nieuwe uitdagingen te her-
kennen en succesvol op te vangen, dan kan de controle over het systeem verloren gaan. Er 
zijn drie patronen of valkuilen die tot een dergelijk falen van het systeem kunnen leiden: 1) 
decompensatie door uitputting, 2) elkaar tegen werken en 3) vasthouden aan achterhaald 
gedrag. Met behulp van de Multiteam Systeem literatuur over leiderschap hebben wij 
gekeken hoe de teams in het OCCR in de praktijk proberen te voorkomen dat het systeem 
in één van de drie valkuilen beland. Volgens deze theorie vervullen deze teams immers een 
belangrijke rol in de coördinatie tussen teams en het adaptief vermogen van het systeem 
in zijn geheel. De studie in hoofdstuk 4 heeft echter laten zien dat er grote uitdagingen 
kleven aan leiderschap in een multiteam systeem. Ten eerste hebben wij gevonden dat 
medewerkers in het OCCR moeite hebben om te bepalen wanneer medewerkers in de regi-
onale controlecentra ondersteuning nodig hebben en op welke manier deze ondersteuning 
verleend moet worden. Ten tweede bleek dat regionale medewerkers vaak zelf niet om hulp 
vragen en als er hulp wordt aangeboden dan wordt deze tevens vaak afgeslagen. Ten derde 
werd duidelijk dat men in het OCCR vaak kampt met een flinke informatieachterstand en 
daardoor niet in staat is om het overzicht van de situatie te bewaken en de regionale con-
trolecentra aan te sturen. Tot slot zagen wij een duidelijke spanning tussen de dynamiek en 
complexiteit van de verstoring en de wens van het OCCR om zo snel mogelijk volgens een 
standaard versperringsmaatregel te willen rijden. 
In de laatste empirische studie, besproken in hoofdstuk 5, wordt een internationale 
vergelijking gemaakt van verstoringsmanagement. Een uitgebreid literatuuronderzoek liet 
zien dat een dergelijke vergelijking nog niet eerder was gedaan. In deze studie onderzoch-
ten wij daarom welke verschillende structuren en praktijken voor verstoringsmanagement 
er in  vijf Europese spoorsystemen zijn ontwikkeld. De vergelijking richtte zich op de twee 
eerder besproken trade-offs: 1) centralisatie versus decentralisatie en 2) anticipatie versus 
veerkracht. De beide trade-off hebben wij geoperationaliseerd aan de hand van enkele 
items uit de literatuur. Op basis van onze observaties en interviews hebben wij vervolgens 
voor elk land scores toegekend aan de items. Dit maakte het mogelijk om de landen te 
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vergelijken aan de hand van de gemiddelde scores van alle items. Dit resulteerde in twee 
clusters van landen. Het eerste cluster bestaat uit Oostenrijk en Nederland. Deze twee lan-
den zijn redelijk gecentraliseerd en zijn in hun benadering van verstoringsmanagement het 
sterkst gericht op anticipatie. België en Denemarken vormen het tweede cluster. Zij kennen 
een gecentraliseerde structuur met daarbij een nadruk op veerkracht. Door de decentrale 
structuur bij verstoringsmanagement is Duitsland een outlier in onze vergelijking. Dit kan 
echter te maken hebben met de grootte en de complexiteit van het Duitse spoorsysteem. 
Over het geheel genomen laat de internationale vergelijking zien dat er niet één optimale 
manier is om verstoringsmanagement vorm te geven. 
Conclusies
In het laatste hoofdstuk worden op basis van de vier studies de belangrijkste conclusies ge-
trokken en een antwoord gegeven op de hoofdvraag. Er kan geconcludeerd worden dat het 
creëren en behouden van een gezamenlijk beeld van de situatie tijdens grote en complexe 
verstoringen zeer moeilijk is. Niet alleen is het moeilijk om onder zware werkdruk een goed 
beeld te creëren van de situatie en informatie te blijven delen met andere teams, maar 
informatie komt ook slechts langzaam beschikbaar en de situatie verandert vaak zo snel 
dat het gevormde beeld al snel achterhaald is. Hierdoor is beschikbare informatie vaak on-
gelijk verdeeld over de controlecentra. Onder tijdsdruk moeten medewerkers een afweging 
maken tussen het verzamelen van meer concrete informatie of het nemen van een snelle 
beslissing op basis van incomplete informatie. De eerste optie is lastig aangezien het col-
lectief verzamelen van informatie al snel leidt tot een overbelasting van de communicatie-
lijnen. De tweede optie is ook niet zonder risico, want met niet-routinematige verstoringen 
is de kans groot dat beslissingen worden genomen op basis van conflicterende aannames. 
In dit onderzoek hebben wij gewezen op het belang van gezamenlijke betekenisverlening 
aan informatie, zodat een gedeeld beeld van de situatie wordt gecreëerd en activiteiten 
op elkaar afgestemd zijn. De studies hebben echter laten zien dat deze gezamenlijke 
betekenisverlening tussen teams in het Nederlandse spoorsysteem zwak ontwikkeld is. 
Vaak wordt niet de tijd genomen om door te vragen als men informatie ontvangt of twijfel 
heeft over de inhoud. Als de onzekerheid rond een situatie toeneemt verschuilt men zich 
bovendien al snel achter de eigen interpretatie van de situatie en de te volgen procedures. 
Dit laatste hoeft niet altijd bewust plaats te vinden, zoals we gezien hebben in de tweede 
studie. Het activeren van een bepaald frame rond een procedure kan er immers voor zorgen 
dat belangrijke signalen ten aanzien van het ontbreken van een gezamenlijk beeld tussen 
teams worden gemist. Plannen en procedures zijn zodoende niet alleen beperkt toepasbaar 
tijdens niet-routinematige verstoringen, maar kunnen ook de noodzaak tot improvisatie 
verhullen. 
Dit hebben we vooral gezien rond het gebruik van versperringsmaatregelen in het Ne-
derlandse spoorsysteem. Uit de internationale vergelijking kwam naar voren dat in Neder-
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land het gebruik van deze maatregelen het verst is doorgevoerd. Hoewel deze plannen een 
belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan het coördineren van de activiteiten van de controlecentra, 
blijken ze moeilijk te implementeren als er sprake is van een zeer dynamische situatie. In de 
praktijk worden plannen dan vaak voortdurend aangepast of simpelweg doorgevoerd zon-
der dat ze aansluiten bij de specifieke situatie. Het ontbreken van een gedeeld plan zorgt er 
voor dat lokaal beslissingen worden genomen die niet altijd bijdragen aan het herstel van 
het systeem in zijn geheel en de situatie zelfs kunnen verslechteren. Daar komt bij dat de 
coördinerende rol van het OCCR vaak onvoldoende is. Dit heeft niet alleen te maken met de 
informatieachterstand waar de teams in het OCCR vaak mee te maken hebben, maar ook 
door een gebrekkige samenwerking tussen de regionale partijen en het OCCR. Zo is er veel 
ambiguïteit rond de onderlinge verdeling van taken en verantwoordelijkheden. Hierdoor 
blijft de regie vanuit het OCCR vaak uit en wordt er door de regionale partijen te laat om 
hulp gevraagd.  
De bevindingen uit dit onderzoek hebben ook belangrijke implicaties voor de praktijk. 
Tijdens de uitvoering van dit onderzoek waren ProRail en NS bezig met de ontwikkeling van 
een nieuwe structuur voor de management van verstoringen. Dit nieuwe model is gericht 
op meer centrale besluitvorming, het verbeteren informatiedeling doormiddel van nieuwe 
communicatiesystemen en de ontwikkeling van beter toepasbare versperringsmaatregelen 
en procedures. De resultaten van dit onderzoek onderbouwen de gekozen richting als het 
gaat om routinematige verstoringen, maar wijzen ook op de risico’s ten aanzien van niet-
routinematige verstoringen. Zo is het belangrijk dat de focus op communicatiesystemen 
niet ten koste gaat van de noodzakelijke gezamenlijke betekenisverlening aan informatie, 
zal centrale sturing alleen mogelijk zijn als er sprake is van een goede samenwerking met 
de regionale partijen en mag de ontwikkeling van nieuwe procedures en plannen niet ten 
koste gaan van het improvisatievermogen van teams. 
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Na jaren werken is mijn proefschrift klaar. Hoewel promoveren soms kan aanvoelen als een 
eenzaam beroep, is er een groot aantal mensen die ik wil bedanken voor hun bijdrage aan 
het succesvol afronden van dit proefschrift.
Allereerst wil ik natuurlijk mijn beide promotoren, Joop Koppenjan en Lasse Gerrits, 
enorm bedanken voor de begeleiding tijdens het promotietraject. Joop, jij gaf mij veel 
vrijheid om mijn onderzoek zelf vorm te geven, maar je was ook altijd zeer betrokken. 
Ondanks je drukke bestaan als hoogleraar stond jouw deur altijd voor mij open en nam 
jij alle tijd om mijn onderzoek te bespreken of advies te geven. Daarnaast was je ook een 
uitstekende projectleider die een belangrijke bijdrage leverde aan het vormgeven van het 
onderzoeksproject en de valorisatie van onze onderzoeksresultaten. Lasse, zonder jou was 
ik waarschijnlijk nooit begonnen aan het schrijven van dit proefschrift. Ik kan mij nog goed 
herinneren hoe jij mij tijdens een goed gesprek in Lebkov overtuigde samen op zoek te 
gaan naar een promotieplaats. Je hebt een cruciale rol gespeeld in het mogelijk maken van 
deze ambitie middels je ideeën en zeer belangrijke bijdrage aan het gehonoreerde onder-
zoeksvoorstel. Jouw verhuizing naar Bamberg, aan het begin van mijn promotietraject, 
zorgde er voor dat de dagelijkse begeleiding en onze gesprekken over de spoorwereld en 
het bouwgeweld in Rotterdam voortaan via skype plaats moesten vinden. Gelukkig zagen 
we elkaar ook geregeld in levende lijve tijdens onze mooie reizen voor de internationale 
vergelijking van verstoringsmanagement. Nu onze internationale vergelijking is afgerond, 
ben ik blij dat je terugverhuisd bent naar Rotterdam, zodat we onze gesprekken over deze 
‘wereldstad’ voort kunnen blijven zetten.  
Uiteraard had dit onderzoek nooit plaats kunnen vinden zonder de financiering en 
medewerking van ProRail en NWO. Ik wil ten eerste ProRail en NS bedanken voor de 
toegang die zij verschaft hebben tot de werkvloeren van het OCCR, de verkeersleidings-
posten en de regionale bijsturingscentra. Wij hebben urenlang mensen op de werkvloer 
mogen observeren, hen uitgebreid vragen mogen stellen over hun werkzaamheden en 
konden bovendien regelmatig aansluiten bij opleidingen, oefeningen en overleggen. Ik wil 
daarnaast de respondenten en managers bedanken voor deze gastvrijheid en hun enorme 
behulpzaamheid bij de dataverzameling. Ook de door ProRail en NWO georganiseerde bi-
jeenkomsten waren zeer waardevol om regelmatig feedback te ontvangen op onze onder-
zoeksopzet en resultaten. Tot slot wil ik vanuit ProRail één iemand hier specifiek noemen: 
onze research coach Theo Stoop. Theo heeft ons vanaf het begin af aan wegwijs gemaakt in 
het OCCR, gaf uitgebreid uitleg over het spoorsysteem en het bijbehorende unieke jargon, 
hield ons op de hoogte van verstoringen en introduceerde ons bij de verschillende partijen. 
Theo heeft er zodoende voor gezorgd dat wij voortvarend met ons onderzoek aan de slag 
konden gaan.
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Ik heb het de gehele tijd over ‘wij’ en dat is natuurlijk omdat ik dit onderzoek heb verricht 
binnen een consortium van onderzoekers. Alfons, Marcel, Hans en Sander bedankt voor de 
waardevolle bijeenkomsten in de Framboos in Leiden. Het was fijn om vanuit al jullie ver-
schillende expertises feedback te krijgen op mijn onderzoek en samen te hebben gewerkt 
aan een wetenschappelijk artikel. Een speciale dank gaat uit naar Thijs. Wij hebben samen 
vele uren doorgebracht op het OCCR en de verkeersleidingsposten tijdens onze observaties. 
Ik ben nog altijd onder de indruk hoe jij als etnograaf zoveel gedetailleerde inzichten kwijt 
kon in zo’n verschrikkelijk klein notitieboekje. 
Daarnaast wil ik mijn dank uitspreken richting mijn collega’s bij Bestuurskunde aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit. Te beginnen bij de onderzoeksgroep Governance of Complex Systems 
(GoCS) waar ik deel van uit heb mogen maken. De onderzoeksgroep was niet alleen een fijne 
plek om mijn eigen werk te presenteren en te bediscussiëren, maar ook om meer te leren 
over andermans onderzoek en van gedachten te wisselen over theorieën rond complexiteit. 
In het bijzonder wil ik Erik Hans bedanken voor zijn bevlogenheid bij het in goede banen 
leiden van de werkgroepen Network Governance, Harry en Peter voor de goede gesprekken 
tijdens de koffiepauze en Jacko voor het organiseren van de broodnodige fysieke inspan-
ning tijdens de jaarlijkse voetbal- en sportwedstrijden. 
Wat is een promovendus zonder zijn collega promovendi? De ondersteuning en gezel-
ligheid van deze collega’s is cruciaal bij het schrijven van een proefschrift. Nu is het zo dat 
als je een aantal jaar werkzaam bent geweest op dezelfde afdeling, je een zeer groot aantal 
aio’s, tutoren en jonge onderzoekers leert kennen. Te veel om allemaal op te noemen en 
dat zal ik hier dan ook niet doen. Ik kan echter wel zeggen dat ik aan het begin van mijn 
promotietraject zeer gelukkig was met het warme welkom en de uitgebreide hulp van de 
meer ervaren promovendi. Daarnaast was het mooi om met een groot aantal ambitieuze 
en bovenal gezellige collega promovendi (ongeveer) tegelijktijdig aan het promotietraject 
te beginnen en gezamenlijk cursussen te volgen. Nu besteed je als promovendus vanzelf-
sprekend een groot deel van je tijd achter je bureau. Gelukkig stond mijn bureau in een 
‘blokje’, die hoewel wisselend van samenstelling, door de jaren heen altijd de gezelligste 
van de afdeling was. Wat ik zeker ook niet zal vergeten is de gezelligheid buiten werktijd. 
De gezamenlijke dinertjes, borrels, verjaardagen, housewarmings, oud en nieuw vieringen, 
aio-uitjes en niet te vergeten de bruiloften laten zien dat we een hechte groep van collega’s 
vormden. 
Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar mijn familie en vrienden voor al hun steun. Voor een promov-
endus is het moeilijk om zijn werk los te laten en vaak ben je dan ook thuis nog bezig met 
het oplossen van een complexe puzzel of het herschrijven van een paper. Het is dan ook niet 
meer dan logisch dat dit proefschrift veel energie en tijd van mij heeft geëist. Ik wil mijn 
vrienden bedanken voor het regelmatig doorprikken van mijn academische en proefschrift 
bubbel. Vooral de weekendjes weg met mijn vrienden van de middelbare school zorgden 
(wonderbaarlijk genoeg) altijd weer voor hernieuwde energie. Richard, bedankt voor al je 
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interesse in mijn onderzoek. Helaas konden we, ondanks al jouw inspanningen, Spanje niet 
toevoegen aan de internationale vergelijking. Ik had het leuk gevonden om je de wondere 
wereld van het spoor te laten zien. Bedankt dat je mijn paranimf wilt zijn. 
Speciale dank gaat ook uit naar mijn ouders. Zij staan altijd voor mij klaar. Niet alleen met 
een luisterend oor, maar ook toen wij twee keer in korte tijd verhuisden en daarbij een huis 
met een tuin kochten die wel een opknapbeurt konden gebruiken. De onvoorwaardelijke 
steun van mijn ouders heeft er ontegenzeggelijk voor gezorgd dat ik dit proefschrift suc-
cesvol heb kunnen afronden. Daarnaast laten zij en mijn zus, Denise, zien dat het belangrijk 
is om niet alleen hard te werken, maar ook tijd te maken voor ontspanning en gezelligheid. 
Denise, ik ben enorm trots op wat je allemaal bereikt hebt en heel blij dat je mijn paranimf 
wilt zijn. Nu je eindelijk in een normale stad woont, kan ik gelukkig vaker zomaar even 
langskomen voor een drankje en een goed gesprek.   
Lieve Jolien. Stiekem noemde ik je wel eens mijn derde begeleider. Hoewel we inhoudelijk 
niet eens zo heel vaak aan het sparren waren over mijn proefschrift, snap jij als geen ander 
wat het betekent om een proefschrift te schrijven. Je hebt in jouw voorwoord plechtig be-
loofd mij door de laatste loodjes van het proefschrift te loodsen. Ik kan niet anders zeggen 
dan dat je je op een geweldige manier aan je belofte hebt gehouden. Je stond altijd voor mij 
klaar en wist mij te motiveren als ik het even niet meer zag zitten. Jij bent onmiskenbaar 
het belangrijkste wat dit promotietraject mij heeft gebracht. Ik kijk enorm uit naar alle 
mooie momenten die nog gaan komen samen met jou en ons zoontje Jonas. 
Rotterdam, juli 2018
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